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Abstract 
Background: Our environment provides more stimulation than we can 
process at any one time. Attentional mechanisms exist to help us select information 
that is important or salient. Selective attention, however, becomes non-adaptive when 
these attentional mechanisms continuously over-select negative information in the 
environment. This over-selection of negative information is known as a negative 
attention bias. In extreme manifestations, negative attention bias has been associated 
with a wide range of psychopathology, anxiety in particular. The dot-probe task, 
designed to assess selective attention, is used to quantify the existence and magnitude 
of a negative attention bias. In this task, participants react to a neutral probe that 
either replaces a negative or a neutral stimulus, both being presented on a screen 
simultaneously. It is assumed that for those who have a negative attention bias, 
attention is captured by negative stimuli. These individuals respond quicker to probes 
presented in the same location as the negative stimuli, compared to probes presented 
in the same location as the neutral stimuli. Recently, evidence has been accumulated 
showing that attention bias has a causal relation with psychopathology. Some studies 
have shown that emotional vulnerability related to psychopathology decreased when 
attention bias is manipulated away from negative information. The manipulation of 
selective attention is achieved by providing a predictable stimulus-probe 
contingency, whereby the probe is always presented in the same location as the 
previously presented neutral stimulus. However, most studies have been unsuccessful 
in achieving this attention bias change. Understanding the mechanisms responsible 
for a successful attention bias change through the use of the dot-probe task in the 
scientific community still seems to be lacking. There is, therefore, a need to improve 
the efficacy of attention bias modification (ABM). 
Study 1a – Attention Bias Modification with Non-emotional Stimuli: 
Three experiments were conducted to increase general understanding of the stimulus-
probe associative learning mechanism in the dot-probe task. Non-emotional stimuli 
(shapes) were used to control for the interference of individual differences that come 
with responding to emotional stimuli. The design consisted of two training phases 
with predictive stimulus-probe contingencies (95% congruency), in which the 
stimulus-probe association changed to a reversed contingency in the second training 
session. Assessment phases with non-predictive stimulus-probe contingencies (50% 
congruency) were employed after each training phase and contingency awareness 
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was measured with a self-report measure after each experiment. The existence and 
magnitude of an attention bias was assessed in each phase by calculating a bias index 
score where the reaction times (RTs) obtained in the congruent trials were subtracted 
from the RTs obtained in the incongruent trials. Firstly, it became evident that, 
compared to a ‘no training’ control condition, attention bias was only induced in the 
reversed training, never in the initial training. This finding was consistent with 
varying difficulty levels of the dot-probe task, both with and without a baseline 
assessment. The latter finding ruled out the pre-exposure effect, which hypothesised 
that the lack of attention bias acquisition in the first training phase may have been 
instigated by pre-exposing participants to a non-predictive contingency wherein 
participants learned that the stimuli were uninformative. Secondly, the attention bias 
acquired in the second training phase was never evident in the assessment post-
training. Lastly, only those aware of a stimulus-probe contingency showed evidence 
of attention bias acquisition in the second training phase.  
Study 1b – Attention Bias Modification with Emotional Stimuli:  
Two experiments with emotional stimuli (angry and neutral faces) were conducted to 
test whether the results found in the first three experiments could be replicated when 
emotion was included. In the first experiment, two training phases were employed. 
One training phase was employed in the second experiment in order to reduce 
cognitive load. Social anxiety was assessed in both experiments. State and trait 
anxiety as well as attention control of selectivity and inhibition were assessed in the 
second experiment, which were hypothesised to be predictors of attention bias 
acquisition and change. Anxiety was assessed pre-experiment through self-report, 
whereas attention control was assessed with an anti-saccade task that used non-
emotional stimuli post-experiment. The results indicated that attention bias was not 
induced in either experiment and anxiety did not explain any variance of attention 
bias acquisition or change. Attention control of inhibition was associated with 
attention bias acquired within training. In particular, participants in the ‘attend-
neutral’ training condition who possessed a higher control of attentional inhibition 
showed attention bias acquisition away from negative information during training. 
Participants in the same condition with a lower control of attentional inhibition did 
not acquire an attention bias away from negative information during training.  
Study 2 – Attentional Engagement and Disengagement Bias Change: The 
engagement and disengagement processes are mechanisms that locate and relocate 
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selective attention, respectively. A bias in either of these mechanisms can be 
measured with the attention process assessment (APA) task. This experiment tested 
whether participants’ attentional engagement and disengagement process changed 
pre- to post-training after completing either the dot-probe training task or a novel 
gamified ABM task (the emotion-in-motion task). Similar to the previous 
experiments, neutral and angry faces were used as stimuli. The results showed that 
only the dot-probe task induced a change in the attentional bias pre- to post-ABM. It 
was noted that participants had a difficulty disengaging from angry faces after 
completing the dot-probe training, irrespective of the training condition (‘attend-
neutral’ vs ‘attend-angry’).  
Discussion: Study 1 provided insights into the stimulus-probe associative 
learning mechanism of the dot-probe task with non-emotional and emotional stimuli. 
According to the findings, the assumption that the participants attend to a certain 
stimulus before the probe appears to be incorrect. This was supported by the findings 
of the first three experiments, suggesting that the contingency was only learned by 
those who reported that they were aware of a stimulus-probe association. Moreover, 
it would be incorrect to assume that an assessment task post-training captures the 
attention bias acquired within training. Other ways of assessing attention bias change 
needed to be considered. Furthermore, higher levels of attention control of inhibition 
were associated with successful attention bias acquisition assessed within training. 
Further research into the direction of this effect is recommended. It is possible that 
the attentional control of inhibition is an individual trait which predicts successful 
attention bias acquisition. However, it is also possible that the ABM training 
strengthened the attention control of inhibition, which resulted in successful attention 
bias acquisition. The main limitation of Study 1 involved the assessment of 
contingency awareness. An immediate or online assessment of contingency 
awareness would have increased the validity of the measure and provided more 
insights into its role in ABM. It was found in Study 2 that the attentional 
disengagement process was changed pre- to post-ABM with the dot-probe task, not 
with the emotion-in-motion gamified task. This change in attention bias occurred 
irrespective of training direction, such that participants trained to attend to angry as 
well as participants trained to attend to neutral faces showed greater difficulty 
disengaging from angry faces post-, compared to pre-dot-probe training. A limitation 
of Study 2 arose from the failure of randomisation. Biased attentional processes were 
xxi 
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only found at baseline in participants allocated to complete the ‘attend-neutral’ 
training with the dot-probe task. To conclude, future recommendations derived from 
findings of both studies are discussed. Particularly, studies are recommended to test 
the efficacy of ABM procedures that combine bottom-up and top-down approaches, 
as solely providing bottom-up stimulus-probe associations may not be sufficient to 
modify attention bias. Implications drawn from this research further suggested that 
an attention bias change theory needs to be developed that addresses the necessary 
conditions and processes responsible for a reliably attention bias change.  
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Introduction 
Bias in Selective Attention 
The preference to selectively attend to negative over neutral stimuli in the 
environment has been established as critical in the maintenance and aetiology of 
multiple disorders (Aspen, Darcy, & Lock, 2013; Duque & Vázquez, 2015; Schoth, 
Nunes, & Liossi, 2012; Wabnitz, Martens, & Neuner, 2016). This preference is 
known as a negative attention bias. Selective attention is the central concept of 
attention bias theories, where in essence, the attention system selects certain items 
from large amounts of inputs that are present in the environment. However, there is 
still debate as to how the attentional system selects items to attend to.  
Selection Theories of Attention 
The earliest and best known theory of selective attention is the filter theory 
proposed by (Broadbent, 1958). He introduced the idea of early selection, where the 
selection of stimuli occurs early in the stream of processing. He theorised that the 
attention system filters out input stimuli based on simple physical attributes before 
they come into awareness. Opposing Broadbent’s early selection theory were 
theorists who advocated late selection theories, notably Deutsch and Deutsch (1963), 
Norman (1968), and Mackay (1973). They theorised that the attention system had no 
capacity limitations and all recognised stimuli are processed. Furthermore, they 
stated that one cannot decide what to recognise and inputs are processed beyond 
cognitive control. The selection of stimuli that are attended to and come into 
awareness occurs later in the process, after analysis has occurred. This selection is 
limited in its capacity.  
Between the two extreme views of early and late selection, other intermediate 
views have also emerged. One of them is the attenuated model of processing 
proposed by Treisman (1960). She stated that the selection filter (a) can be allocated 
to different input channels; (b) has limited capacity; and (c) is to a degree controlled 
by the individual. Another intermediate view is the perceptual load theory (Navon & 
Gopher, 1979). They proposed that selection will operate early when the load on 
perception is high and operate late when the load on perception is low. Yet another 
theory is the automatic/controlled parallel theory of selective attention proposed by 
Schneider and Shiffrin (1977). This theory assumes that there are two parallel 
processes of attention. One is a fast and automatic process that requires little effort, 
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while the other is a slow and controlled process that requires effortful training to 
develop. These theories are the foundations of multiple attention theories that have 
been developed over the years to explain the relation between attention and emotion.  
Theories on Attention and Emotion 
At first, cognitive processes (i.e., attention) and emotional processes seem to 
be fundamentally different, and traditionally, it was common for researchers to treat 
them as distinct. Nevertheless, at present, it is known that these two phenomena are 
strongly interlinked (for review see: Shackman & Lapate, 2017). Theories of 
selective attention that account for the link between attention and emotion add a 
simple assumption to selection theories. This assumption is that emotional stimuli are 
more salient and that high-intensity emotional information is prioritised to be 
processed by the attentional system (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). 
These theories generally do not express how emotional stimuli become more salient 
as they often lean on biological theories (Öhman, 1993; Öhman & Soares, 1994). 
These biological theories state that humans have learned through evolution to pay 
attention to stimuli that carry high emotions like a dangerous animal that elicits fear.  
In contrast, the classic feature integration theory of attention (Treisman & 
Gelade, 1980) explains how certain perceptual dimensions (i.e., colour and 
orientation), consisting of features (i.e., blue and horizontal) are processed 
automatically and prior to the selection of attention. This theory hypothesises that 
emotional stimuli belong to another perceptual dimension with features that capture 
attention from the visual environment. Another approach, and currently more 
preferred by researchers than the feature integration theory, is the biased competition 
approach (e.g., Buehlmann & Deco, 2008; Duncan, 2006). The biased competition 
approach is based on the assumption that our capacity is limited and stimuli compete 
to enter our visual attention processes. This competition is biased, either top-down 
(preferred stimuli match the task requirements, the environmental context, past 
experiences or prior knowledge) or bottom-up (preferred stimuli are more salient or 
higher in emotion intensity).  
Theories on Bias in Selective Attention and Psychopathology 
Extrapolating from the attention and emotion accounts, theorists tried to 
explain the negative attention bias found associated with psychopathology. Two 
theories provided the foundations of recent ideas regarding the link between attention 
and psychopathology. The first was the negative dysfunctional schemata theory 
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proposed by Beck (1979). He proposed that sets of related beliefs and attitudes about 
the self, the world and the future (i.e., schemas) bias information processing. 
According to this view, negative dysfunctional schemas, found in disordered 
individuals, are the core of biased attention processing of negative and threatening 
information over neutral information. Later, Beck and Clark (1997) proposed a three-
stage schema-based model of information processing in anxiety, which theorises that 
anxious individuals have automatic threat registration that leads to a primal threat 
mode. This mode consists of automatic, and strategic schema-driven process, these 
are primary appraisal, and vigilance for threat. These processes interact with a 
secondary elaboration stage that either enhances or reduces anxiety.  
The second theory was the associative-network theory of Bower (1981; 
1887), which postulated the existence of distinct emotional nodes, placed among 
nodes that correspond to persons’ ideas, concepts, themes and memory of events. 
Together these nodes form an associative network. The theory hypothesised a two-
way association between the emotional nodes and the other nodes, for instance a 
memory of an event activates the associated emotion and a certain emotion can 
activate a memory of the associated event. According to this view, disordered 
individuals have stronger links between negative emotional nodes and other 
representational nodes, compared to healthy individuals.  
Building on these foundations, research has described in more detail how the 
link between attention and psychopathology can be best understood. Most 
experimental cognitive research that investigated the presence of attention bias in 
psychopathology has focused on anxiety disorders, as anxiety disorders are one of 
the most common forms of psychopathology. Therefore, the four most influential 
views with empirical support that theorise a link between attention and anxiety are 
described here. These are the two-stage theory (Williams et al., 1988), the cognitive 
motivational analysis (Mogg & Bradley, 1998), the attention control theory 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), and the competition activation 
network (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). 
Two-Stage Theory  
Williams et al. (1988) proposed a two-stage model, which consists of a pre-
attentive stage that takes place both before the attentive and elaboration phases where 
the representation of the stimulus will be produced. In this pre-attentive stage, the 
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affective decision mechanism judges the affective salience of an item (e.g., threat 
value) and all meanings of an item are activated. Then, a dominant meaning is 
selected and alternative interpretations are rejected by the resource allocation 
mechanism. On the basis of this decision, priorities for subsequent processing are 
determined, resources are either oriented towards that stimulus, or away from the 
source of the stimulus. Williams et al. (1988) concluded that people with high state 
anxiety have a biased affective decision mechanism in the pre-attentive stage, as they 
automatically select stimuli that are more threatening (hyper vigilant mode). 
Individuals high in trait anxiety have a bias in the resource allocation mechanism in 
the subsequent elaboration stage: they orient towards threatening stimuli compared to 
people with low trait anxiety who shift attention away from threat.  
Cognitive Motivational Analysis 
Mogg and Bradley (1998) proposed that a motivational system mediates the 
cognitive and behavioural responses to emotionally salient stimuli. This motivational 
system contains two conceptually distinct systems, namely the emotional valence 
evaluation and goal engagement systems. The valence evaluation system is 
responsible for assessing the threat value of stimuli, output from this system feeds 
into the goal engagement system, which in turn determines the allocation of 
resources for cognitive processing resources towards the threat. Then, the goal 
engagement system either disregards it, and further inhibits processing, or continues 
to focus processing on current goals when labelled as threatening. Within this 
framework, each primary emotional stage is associated with its own cognitive mode 
and response tendencies. The valence evaluation of a stimulus can either be positive, 
negative or neutral, and the goal engagement can either result in disengaging from or 
engaging with the stimulus. This view states that anxious individuals continuously 
scan the environment for threats and possible danger because threatening stimuli are 
modulated by a negative valence and the external goal is to engage, as they anticipate 
possible danger.  
Attention Control Theory 
The attention control theory proposed by Eysenck et al. (2007) states that 
attentional control is impaired in presence of a threat. As a result, a reduction in 
performance on cognitive tasks is expected, especially in high anxious individuals, 
who experience more threat responding than low anxious individuals do. The theory 
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assumes that threat to a current goal causes attention to be allocated to detecting its 
source and to establish a proper respond to that threat. Threat responding is further 
operationalised through three functions; these are inhibition (the use of attentional 
control to resist disruption or interference from task-irrelevant stimuli or responses), 
shifting (the use of attentional control to adapt and switch attentional focus) and 
updating (the use of attentional control to update and monitor working memory). 
According to the attention control theory, high anxious individuals have greater 
issues controlling threat responding as they have impaired control over the 
attentional inhibiting, shifting and updating functions compared to low anxious 
individuals. In addition, the theory acknowledges two attentional control pathways to 
which the threat can be perceived, one is stimulus-driven and uses bottom-up control 
of attention (i.e., detecting external threat or salient stimuli from the environment), 
the other is goal-directed and uses a top-down control of attention (i.e., detecting an 
event that threatens expectation, knowledge or current goals).  
Competition Activation Network 
The theory of focus in this research project is the competition activation 
network developed by Mathews and Mackintosh (1998). They argued against a 
voluntary monitoring system that detects threatening stimuli in anxious individuals. 
They stated that anxious individuals find threatening stimuli distressing, and, 
therefore, try to ignore them. However, despite their efforts, their attention does 
capture threatening stimuli faster than other stimuli in the environment. The model 
proposed by Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) is based on the biased competition 
account where attention refers to various mechanisms that give priority to some 
representations over others when presented together. The authors assume that aspects 
of both stimuli (i.e., their attributes and meanings) are processed in parallel, prior to 
full awareness of their identity. Furthermore, the activation of the representations 
associated with potential danger are increased by input from a threat evaluation 
system that is strengthened by state anxiety. When two stimuli are competing for 
access to the response systems, each stimulus gains in activation, and simultaneously 
inhibits other representations drawing on common processing resources. This model 
supposes that this process of inhibition is more difficult in anxious compared to non-
anxious individuals. The dot-probe task is the most common task used to assess 
whether a negative attention bias is present. The dot-probe task was designed by 
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MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986) to measure whether stimuli compete for 
selective attention as proposed by the competition activation network. 
The Development of the Dot-Probe Task as Assessment Tool of Attention bias 
The dot-probe task is a visual search paradigm where two stimuli are 
simultaneously presented on two areas of the screen. The stimuli used by MacLeod et 
al. (1986) consisted of 48 emotionally threatening words (24 socially threatening and 
24 physically threatening) that were paired with 48 neutral words. The threatening 
and neutral words were matched on word length and frequency, so that there would 
be no differences in RTs due to these two aspects. The word pairs were presented 
vertically, such that one word was at the top, while the other was presented at the 
bottom of the screen. The 48 threat-neutral word pairs were mixed with 48 neutral-
neutral word pairs, and presented for 500ms. Next, a probe that consisted of a dot 
either replace the words at the top or bottom of the screen. The probe remained on 
the screen until a response was made. Participants were instructed to read the top 
word, out loud, and respond with a button click that corresponded to the location of 
the probe as soon as they saw the probe. Additionally, there were 192 neutral-neutral 
word pairs included as filler and these remained on the screen for 1 second (without 
any response needed). RTs to probes in these trials were discarded. Based on the 48 
threat-neutral word pair trials, an attention bias is evident if participants showed a 
quicker response to probes in the same location as a threat word compared to probes 
in the same location as a neutral word.  
MacLeod et al. (1986) showed that the task could differentiate responding to 
probes in threat and neutral locations between individuals clinically diagnosed with 
general anxiety disorder and non-anxious control participants. Individuals diagnosed 
with general anxiety disorder reported higher levels of state (feelings of anxiety at 
this moment) and trait anxiety (feelings of anxiety in general) as opposed to the 
control participants. Individuals diagnosed with general anxiety disorder responded 
quicker to probes if they were proximal to threatening words, irrespective of their 
location (i.e., attention bias towards threatening words). However, control 
participants showed quicker responding to probes that followed neutral words 
irrespective of their location (i.e., attention bias to avoiding threatening words). 
Subsequent studies used the same task on students 12 weeks before examination (low 
in state anxiety) and one week before examination (high in state anxiety; MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1988), and in current vs recovered patients with anxiety disorder (Mogg, 
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Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992). Both studies replicated the attention bias towards threat 
in anxious vs non-anxious individuals. Additionally, it was found that state anxiety 
did not determine the attention response to threat (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988), nor 
was there a difference between patients, who have recovered from anxiety or were 
currently patients (Mogg et al., 1992). The dot-probe task seemed to be a promising 
tool to assess attention bias towards threat in high-trait anxious individuals compared 
to low-trait anxious individuals. 
One of the main advantages of the dot-probe task, as pointed out by MacLeod 
et al. (1986), was that participants responded in a neutral way (button pressing) to a 
neutral probe (a dot). Hence, the emotional content of the words was task irrelevant 
and this eliminated the possibility of response bias. Another advantage was that 
amongst participants, the task could distinguish between selective attention that was 
directed towards the location of threatening stimuli or directed away from 
threatening stimuli. Lastly, the task seemed to distinguish attention bias patterns 
between high and low-trait anxious individuals as predicted by theories on bias in 
selective attention bias and psychopathology. However, a limitation of the original 
dot-probe task was that a high number of trials were filler trials and half of the 
responses were discarded. Hence, the dot-probe task was time consuming without 
much data output. This was considered a disadvantage, particularly in clinical 
research where individuals with emotional disorders generally have difficulty 
sustaining attention over a long monotonous task (Mogg & Bradley, 1999b). A 
second limitation was that the nature of the task was a probe detection task. Selective 
attention did not need to shift to the probe in order to detect it in the peripheral field. 
These disadvantages indicate that the dot-probe task designed by MacLeod et al. 
(1986) may not measure spatial attention bias effectively. 
The dot-probe task has been modified extensively since its development 
(Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007). Mogg, Bradley, and Williams (1995) were 
the first to modify the dot-probe task and assessed attention bias in anxious, 
depressed and healthy controls. In their new version of the dot-probe task, 
participants were forced to respond on every trial. Participants indicated with button 
pressing whether the probe appeared in the top or bottom location of the screen. This 
modification changed the nature of the dot-probe task from a probe detection to a 
probe location discrimination task. Moreover, compared to the original dot-probe 
task, the possible interfering voice responses were excluded and no foil trials were 
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included. Furthermore, the exposure duration of the word pairs was either 500ms or 
1000ms. Additionally, the word pairs were not only threatening, but also disorder 
relevant. That is, participants, either high in anxiety or depression, received anxiety- 
and depression-relevant negative-neutral word pairs. Finally, they also included 
positive-neutral word pairs, however, it was found that anxious and depressed 
individuals did not have an attention bias towards emotional words in general, rather 
towards negative words only. Furthermore, it was found that anxious and depressed 
individuals, compared to healthy controls showed a general attention bias towards 
negative words, and not only for the disorder relevant words as expected. This is in 
contrast with a more recent meta-analysis by Pergamin-Hight, Naim, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, van Ijzendoorn, and Bar-Haim (2015). They found that the use of 
disorder relevant vs irrelevant stimuli yielded greater effect sizes when assessing the 
existence of a negative attention bias. The results of Mogg et al. (1995) may be 
explained by the large comorbidity between anxiety and depression in their sample. 
The advantage of the first modification of the original dot-probe task by Mogg et al. 
(1995) is that it decreased the load on participants by excluding numerous foil trials, 
and including a forced choice response, based on location of the probe.  
A couple of years later, Mogg and Bradley (1999a) modified the dot-probe 
task once more, and tested whether it reliably distinguished differential selective 
attention processes in a clinical sample of generalised anxious individuals. This time, 
instead of using word stimuli, pictorial stimuli of neutral, happy and angry faces 
were used. They argued that word stimuli were confounded with familiarity of the 
words, such that anxious individuals were possibly more familiar with threat than 
neutral words compared to non-anxious individuals. They further reasoned that facial 
stimuli were more naturalistic, ecologically valid, and salient than word stimuli. 
Other modifications of the dot-probe task were as follows: (a) a trial started with a 
fixation cross in the middle of the screen; (b) the stimuli were presented in the left 
and right location of the screen instead at the top and bottom; (c) the stimulus onset 
varied between 500ms and 1250ms between subjects; and (d) participants needed to 
respond to the type of the probe, either two dots orientated horizontally (like ‘..’) or 
vertically (like ‘:’). The last modification changed the nature of the dot-probe task 
from a location discrimination to a probe discrimination task where selective 
attention needed to shift to the location of the probe to discriminate between the two 
probes. Using this modified dot-probe task, Mogg and Bradley (1999a) found that 
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individuals with general anxiety disorder, compared to healthy controls, showed an 
attentional bias to angry relative to neutral faces. Additionally, over the course of the 
task, those with general anxiety disorder also developed an attention bias towards 
happy relative to neutral faces. Compared to their previous study (Mogg et al., 1992), 
these results indicated that emotion in general seems to be more salient for 
individuals with general anxiety disorder compared to control participants. More 
importantly, the initiative to change the dot-probe task from a probe detection (i.e., is 
there a probe? MacLeod et al., 1986) to a probe discrimination task (i.e., what or 
where is the probe?; Mogg & Bradley, 1999a; Mogg et al., 1992) seemed to have had 
made a significant impact on the field. Since then, an increasing number of studies 
have begun using two types of probe discrimination tasks wherein participants either 
differentiate between two types of probes (type discrimination: “:” vs “..” or “E” vs 
“F” or “↑” vs “↓”) or where participants have to locate the probe (location 
discrimination: “left” vs “right” or “top” vs “bottom”; Salemink et al., 2007).  
Currently, the dot-probe task is considered as the gold standard to measure 
the existence of attention bias in a range of psychopathology (Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van IJzendoorn, 2007). Bar-Haim et al. (2007) 
conducted a compelling meta-analysis of 172 studies and found that a threat-related 
attention bias was a robust phenomenon in participants with anxiety that was not 
evident in participants without anxiety (medium to large effect size of d = 0.41). 
However, no consensus has been reached regarding what version of the dot-probe 
task assesses the existence of attention bias most reliably (Chapman, Devue, & 
Grimshaw, 2017). To summarise, the main differences in the versions of the dot-
probe task employed are: (1) the type of task (probe detection vs probe 
discrimination [type vs location]); (2) stimulus types (words vs pictures); and (3) the 
SOAs (stimulus onset asynchrony between onset of the stimuli and onset of the 
probe): these vary between short (<100ms), medium (500ms) and long (>1000ms).  
These differences in the dot-probe task versions and their impact on 
measuring attention bias have been tested in several experiments. The results show 
no significant difference between assessing attention bias with a probe location or 
probe type discrimination task (Mogg & Bradley, 1999b; Salemink et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, the meta-analysis conducted by Bar-Haim et al. (2007) concluded that 
attention bias towards threat was not moderated by the types of stimuli used. This 
finding was in line with other studies which found no difference between word and 
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pictorial stimuli (e.g., Freijy, Mullan, & Sharpe, 2014; Schmukle, 2005). On the 
other hand, other studies like Pishyar, Harris, and Menzies (2004) did find a 
difference in favour of pictorial stimuli. It is possible that the stimuli contents are 
more important than the types of stimuli used as shown by the recent meta-analysis 
conducted by (Pergamin-Hight et al., 2015). Lastly, Bar-Haim et al. (2007) found that 
different exposure times of the stimuli used in the dot-probe task (long vs short), did 
not result in different effect sizes in detecting an attention bias. However, a 
systematic review done by Bantin, Stevens, Gerlach, and Hermann (2016) found that 
a dot-probe task with SOAs of 500 to 600ms was preferred to dot-probe tasks with 
shorter (<175ms) or longer (>1000ms) SOAs. 
There seems to be no consensus regarding what version of the dot-probe task 
is more successful in assessing the existence of a negative attention bias. However, 
Bar-Haim et al. (2007) found that the dot-probe task was effective in assessing 
attention bias in individuals with high levels of anxiety, both clinically diagnosed or 
self-reported. This finding holds true irrespective of anxiety type (i.e., state or trait 
anxiety) or anxiety disorder (i.e., general anxiety vs obsessive compulsion vs panic 
vs post-trauma vs social phobia vs simple phobia). Furthermore, the dot-probe task 
was successful in assessing a negative attention bias in children as well as adults. 
Together, these findings show that the dot-probe task seems to be an effective task 
for assessing attention bias related to psychopathology.  
Reliability Concerns of the Dot-Probe Task 
Other researchers have disputed the validity and reliability of the dot-probe 
task (e.g., Chapman et al., 2017; Kappenman, Farrens, Luck, & Proudfit, 2014; 
Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 2009; Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 
2014). The dot-probe task has been compared to other attention bias measures and 
found low external validity. For example, the results from the dot-probe task were 
compared to the results of the electroencephalogram (EEG), which measures 
electrical activity in the brain. Participants performed the dot-probe task while 
wearing an EEG. Attention bias to threat was evident in the N2pc component of the 
event-related potential (ERP) waveform, which is linked to selective attention, 
however, not in the RTs of the dot-probe task (Kappenman et al., 2014; Kappenman, 
MacNamara, & Proudfit, 2015). This indicates low predictive validity of the dot-
probe assessment task. Furthermore, Waechter et al. (2014) compared the reliability 
of attention bias measured with a dot-probe task and an eye-tracker device. The RTs 
11 
AN INVESTIGATION INTO ATTENTION BIAS MODIFICATION  
of the dot-probe task were compared to first fixation, viewing time over the first 
1500ms, and viewing time over the total 5000ms. Waechter et al. (2014) found that 
attention bias to threat was reliably measured with an eye-tracker when using the 
total 5000ms viewing time.  
In addition to poor external validity, there are issues of poor internal 
reliability (e.g., Schmukle, 2005). Low internal reliability scores arise from 
inconsistencies in RTs that do not follow the particular pattern inherent to negative 
attention bias (i.e., quicker responding to probes that follow the negative relative to 
neutral stimuli). This may suggest that the dot-probe task does not measure a 
negative attention bias. However, since different versions of the dot-probe task have 
been shown to be sensitive in assessing a negative attention bias in a sample of 
vulnerable individuals compared to healthy controls, it is possible that the construct 
itself is inconsistent over time. In other words, the assumption that attention bias is a 
stable construct may need to be reconsidered (Rodebaugh et al., 2016; Zvielli, 
Bernstein, & Koster, 2015). In addition, RTs vary within each participant and within 
each trial type. This variability increases substantially when these RTs are combined 
into a difference score. There are, however, ways of measuring attention bias with the 
dot-probe task which results in increased reliability (MacLeod & Grafton, 2017; 
MacLeod, Grafton, & Notebaert, 2019; Price, Brown, & Siegle, 2018).. For instance, 
MacLeod et al. (2019) have presented a new version of the conventional dot-probe 
task, where instead of one single probe, two probes are presented in both locations 
for 200ms. Participants are required to respond to the probe they saw, thereby 
providing data on which stimulus location attention was located at the moment of 
processing. This task enhanced the reliability scores, such that the internal reliability 
of the assessment task was 0.92 compared to 0.10 of the conventional dot-probe 
assessment task. The test-retest reliability was improved from 0.08 on the 
conventional dot-probe assessment task to 0.98 on the dual dot-probe assessment 
task.  
Despite concerns regarding internal and external validity and reliability, the 
dot-probe task has gained popularity. It has been employed in a number of different 
psychopathologies to assess whether attention bias is also evident in other emotional 
and non-emotional disorders. Using the dot-probe task, evidence for attention bias 
toward psychopathology related stimuli over neutral stimuli was found in individuals 
with mood disorders (e.g., Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2013; Winer & Salem, 2016), 
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addictive behaviours (e.g., Yeomans, Javaherian, Tovey, & Stafford, 2005), eating 
disorders (e.g., Brooks, Prince, Stahl, Campbell, & Treasure, 2011), pain (e.g., Sun, 
Wang, & Luo, 2014; Todd, Sharpe, & Colagiuri, 2016), sleep disorders (e.g., Harris 
et al., 2015; Jansson-Fröjmark, Bermås, & Kjellén, 2013; MacMahon, Broomfield, & 
Espie, 2006), and schizophrenia (e.g., Jang, Park, Lee, Cho, & Choi, 2016). Since its 
development in 1986, the dot-probe task has taken deep roots across multiple areas 
of psychopathology as the gold standard for assessing attention bias.  
The Dot-Probe Task and the Modification of Attention Bias  
After utilising the dot-probe task to establish that attention bias was related to 
psychopathology, researchers have attempted to establish whether a change in 
attention bias would also induce a change in psychopathology. MacLeod, Rutherford, 
Campbell, Ebsworthy, and Holker (2002) were the first to show that attention bias 
can be modified. They adapted the word dot-probe task of Mogg et al. (1992) such 
that it manipulated selective attention. Mid-trait anxious participants were trained to 
either attend to negative or neutral words. This was achieved by always placing the 
probe in the same location after the negative word (in the case of the ‘attend-
negative’ condition) or always in the same location after the neutral word (in the case 
of the ‘attend-neutral’ condition). Furthermore, word pairs were either presented for a 
very short (20ms) or longer time (480ms). This was done to establish whether change 
of attention bias occurred at a conscious or pre-conscious level. The manipulation of 
selective attention was done in a total of 576 trials. Ninety-six of those trials were 
designated assessment trials. In the assessment trials the probe was presented in the 
same location, equally often following the negative and neutral words. Participants 
were required to make a discrimination judgement on the identity of the probe that 
consisted of either a single pixel or two adjacent pixels. Following the attention 
manipulation, participants were exposed to an anagram-based stress task, designed to 
elicit negative emotion. Emotion reactivity to this task was measured with two 
single-item scales, which assessed levels of anxiety and depression pre- to post-
stressor task. 
In the assessment trials, it was found that participants in the ‘attend-neutral’ 
condition reacted quicker to probes proceeded by neutral words relative to the 
negative words. The opposite pattern was found for participants in the ‘attend-
negative’ condition, this indicated that selective attention is malleable by employing 
predictive stimulus-probe contingencies in the attention training procedure with the 
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modified dot-probe task. Moreover, the change of attention bias was only significant 
when longer exposure times were used (480ms), not when shorter exposure times 
(20ms) were used. This finding suggests that attention bias is changed at a conscious 
level. For those who conducted the task with the longer exposure times, the stress-
anagram task significantly increased the self-reported scores on the single-item 
anxiety and depression scales from pre- to post-stressor task. Participants in the 
‘attend-neutral’ condition showed a trend for a smaller difference in the anxiety and 
depression scores pre- to post-stress induction compared to participants in the 
‘attend-negative’ condition. This interaction was only marginally significant, and, 
therefore, the procedure was replicated by a second experiment that only used 500ms 
exposure times to increase power.  
In the replication study, the interaction became significant. There was no 
increase in anxiety and depression scores from pre- to post-stress induction in 
participants belonging to the ‘attend-neutral’ condition. However, there was a 
significant increase in anxiety and depression scores from pre- to post-stress 
induction in participants belonging to the ‘attend-negative’ condition. MacLeod et al. 
(2002) concluded that selective attention can be reliably manipulated in an attention 
bias modification (ABM) paradigm when using a training version of the dot-probe 
task. Moreover, the change of attention bias occurred only at a conscious level 
(stimulus exposure of 500ms) rather than a pre-conscious level (stimulus exposure of 
20ms). Furthermore, ABM did not have a direct effect on psychopathological 
symptoms, as participants in both conditions reported similar anxiety and depression 
levels directly after ABM. However, the difference in anxiety and depression as a 
result of a stress anagram task was significantly higher when selective attention was 
trained towards negative stimuli compared to neutral stimuli. These initial results 
supported the notion that attention bias does not only correlate with emotion 
vulnerability, attention bias and emotional vulnerability seem to be causally related.  
This finding elicited an exponential growth in the number of studies and 
citations per year on ABM that used the dot-probe task. From zero studies and 
citations in 2000 to approximately 80 studies and 2000 citations per year in 2016 
(Clarivate Analytics, 2018). This growth can be attributed to the positively framed 
and promising reviews written on the first studies that manipulated selective attention 
with a dot-probe task and measured the effect of ABM on anxiety symptoms (Bar-
Haim, 2010; Beard, 2011). Furthermore, the reviews suggested that a negative 
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attention bias, in combination with stress induction, increases the levels of anxiety. 
However, it was also concluded that negative attention bias patterns can be altered 
through ABM, which in turn lowers stress reactivity. These promising conclusions 
were supported by the meta-analyses conducted by Hakamata et al. (2010) and 
Hallion and Ruscio (2011) who found that ABM had a significant medium effect on 
anxiety. Additionally, it was found that ABM had a smaller effect on healthy subjects 
(d = 0.48; non-anxious: d = 0.36; high-anxious: d = 0.62) compared to patient 
samples (d = 0.78) and that word stimuli seemed to be more effective (d = 1.29) than 
face stimuli (d = 0.37; Hakamata et al., 2010). Furthermore, a single session (g = 
0.11) seems to be less successful compared to multi-session ABM (g = 0.40; Hallion 
& Ruscio, 2011). Overall, the dot-probe task seemed to be promising in manipulating 
attention bias, with a subsequent effect on psychopathology.   
After 2016, the number of publications and citations started to drop for the 
first time (Clarivate Analytics, 2018). Meta-analyses conducted later on larger 
numbers of studies were more pessimistic about the effect of ABM on anxiety 
(Cristea, Kok, & Cuijpers, 2015; Heeren, Mogoașe, Philippot, & McNally, 2015; 
Mogoaşe, David, & Koster, 2014). These concluded that ABM had a small effect on 
anxiety symptoms after a stressor, the effect was even smaller directly after ABM, 
which is in line with MacLeod et al. (2002). Moreover, this effect decreased 
significantly, to non-significant in Cristea et al. (2015) after controlling for 
publication bias. Cristea et al. (2015) even went as far as concluding that the effect of 
ABM is non-existent, and that the small positive effects found were merely driven by 
‘experimenter effects’ (i.e., response bias and demand characteristics). It seems that 
the initial enthusiasm regarding ABM as a promising intervention for 
psychopathology has reduced. What remains is the lack of understanding on the 
mechanisms that underlie ABM and the need to explain why there is a lot of variance 
in the effect of the dot-probe training task on psychopathology symptoms and 
emotional vulnerability when ABM is implemented. 
Grafton et al. (2017) as well as MacLeod and Clarke (2015) explained that 
this variance in effects of ABM on emotional reactivity is evident because past 
research did not always include a pre- and post-assessment of attention bias. That is, 
not all studies measured whether a change in attention bias occurred. Given that the 
reduction in emotion vulnerability seems to be dependent on a change in attention 
bias, no conclusion can be drawn about the efficacy of ABM when attention bias 
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change was not assessed. For instance, the conclusions of the meta-analysis 
conducted by Cristea et al. (2015) on ABM has been criticised by Grafton et al. 
(2017) for not controlling for successful attention bias change. The meta-analysis 
concluded that ABM has small effects on mental health problems and may not be 
clinically relevant after controlling for publication bias. However, when Grafton et 
al. (2017) re-analysed the studies that were part of the meta-analysis of Cristea et al. 
(2015) it was revealed that a change in attention bias predicted a change in emotion 
vulnerability. According to Grafton et al. (2017), studies successful in changing 
attention bias in ABM were also successful in changing emotional vulnerability, and 
studies unsuccessful in changing attention bias in ABM were also unsuccessful in 
changing emotion vulnerability. A limitation of Grafton et al. (2017), however, is that 
they did not calculate the possible influence of a publication bias. 
Overall, over the course of the development of ABM research, the tone has 
changed quickly from investigating the causal relationship between selective 
attention and anxiety on a mechanistic level (MacLeod et al., 2002) to the 
effectiveness of ABM as a clinical intervention for anxiety disorders (e.g., Cristea et 
al., 2015). ABM began as an experimental paradigm with a strong theoretical 
background that manipulated selective attention to explain its influence on 
psychopathology. Since, research on ABM has exponentially grown in a relatively 
short time from a mechanistic level to a clinical intervention, where it was labelled as 
non-effective (e.g., Cristea et al., 2015). In colloquial terms, people run before they 
can walk and this area of research needs to go back and explore mechanisms of 
effective walking before running is progressed again.  
Generally, it appears that not everybody is successful in modifying attention 
bias when delivering the training procedure in the ABM paradigm. The importance 
of understanding factors that influence the attentional processes, which underlie the 
modification of negative attention bias, has been repeatedly addressed in literature 
(e.g., Heeren et al., 2015; Lowther & Newman, 2014; MacLeod & Clarke, 2015). In 
particular, Koster, Fox, and MacLeod (2009) stressed that the methodology to modify 
cognitive biases needs to be innovated and refined as well as that it is necessary to 
advance the understanding of the nature of these biases to guide the modification. 
Therefore, the processes that underlie a change in selective attention need to be 
understood before ABM is used as an intervention tool to change emotional 
reactivity related to psychopathology.  
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Overview of the Current Research Program 
According to MacLeod and Clarke (2015) two questions need to be addressed 
when researching ABM. The first question is of most importance here: whether an 
attentional training successfully elicits a change in selective attention. As described 
above, Clarke, Notebaert, and MacLeod (2014), as well as Grafton et al. (2017), 
critiqued the latest meta-analyses and reviews for not controlling for the 
establishment of attention bias change. It is of high importance that meta-analyses 
take into account a change in attention bias. Not all studies were successful in 
changing attention bias (i.e., Britton et al., 2013; Grey & Mathews, 2009) or 
measured whether successful attention bias happened due to ABM (i.e., Hirsch, 
Hayes, & Mathews, 2009; Schmidt, Richey, Buckner, & Timpano, 2009). Without 
this change in attention bias, the second question is not applicable: whether this 
change in attention bias also significantly modifies emotional reactivity. Therefore, 
this thesis will focus on the first question, and will not investigate the second 
question. 
Before ABM can be implemented in clinical practice, it is necessary to 
conduct extensive research on processes that underlie attention bias change. This is 
the notion of evidence-based practice. Currently, basic research on the processes that 
underlie ABM is limited. The research reported in this thesis aims to develop a strong 
basic experimental foundation and create an in-depth understanding of how selective 
attention behaves in an ABM paradigm. By providing this foundation, current and 
future methods of ABM can develop with a stronger experimental background and 
with a better understanding of underlying processes and other factors that moderate 
attention bias change. In particular, the objective of this thesis is to better understand 
the processes that underlie selective attention change in the ABM paradigm by: (a) 
investigating how the main learning mechanisms of the dot-probe tasks influence 
selective attention when modifying attention bias in the ABM paradigm; and (b) 
investigating how attention processes, which possibly underlie attention bias, change 
when employing different training procedures in the ABM paradigm. The thesis will 
be structured into two studies, study one addresses point (a) with five experiments, 
whereas study two will address point (b) with one experiment.  
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Study 1: The Investigation into the Main Mechanism of the Dot-Probe 
Task 
The dot-probe task assesses and trains selective attention by using different 
stimulus-probe associations. By utilising a non-predictive stimulus-probe association, 
that is, each of the two stimuli presented on the screen are randomly and equally 
often associated with the probe location (50% congruency), the dot-probe task 
assesses whether participants prefer to attend to one of the two stimuli. By utilising a 
predictive stimulus-probe association, that is, one of the two stimuli is consistently 
associated with the probe location (100% congruency), the dot-probe task trains 
participants to selectively attend to the stimulus that predicts the location of the 
probe. During the training phase, it is assumed that participants learn the stimulus-
probe association, hence, learn to attend to the predictive stimulus to increase their 
performance on the task.  
A series of five experiments was conducted in order to test the best conditions 
to establish learning of the stimulus-probe associations employed in the dot-probe 
task. The main objective of these experiments was to create a template wherein the 
dot-probe task was successful in acquiring, changing, and assessing attention bias 
towards stimuli by changing the stimulus-probe contingencies. To enable the 
assessment of attention bias during training, a 95% congruency was used instead of a 
fully predictive contingency of a 100% congruency. Additionally, this allowed for 
testing transfer of attention bias from assessment to training and back to an 
assessment phase. To create a template, each experiment differed in its design to 
establish the impact of that change on participants’ learning of the stimulus-probe 
contingencies. Design changes included variations in the experimental procedure 
(i.e., different contingency orders) or variations in dot-probe task parameters (i.e., 
different stimuli or probe durations).  
Secondary to the main objective, individual differences in stimulus-probe 
associative learning within the dot-probe task were assessed. Aside from levels of 
emotional vulnerability related to psychopathology, levels of contingency awareness 
and attention control were assessed to enhance the understanding of differences 
found in contingency learning. There is some controversy about the role of 
contingency awareness and contingency learning (see for review: Lovibond & 
Shanks, 2002). Some studies indicate that awareness of contingency is necessary for 
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contingency learning (e.g., Purkis & Lipp, 2001). This idea is supported by the 
strong single-process model of learning (Brewer, 1974). Other studies, however, 
support the weak single-process or a dual-process model (Razran, 1955; Squire, 
1992), wherein contingency awareness does not condition learning (e.g., Walther & 
Nagengast, 2006). The three models are displayed in Figure 1.  
  
Figure 1. Process Models of the Relationship between Contingency Learning and 
Awareness. Adapted from Lovibond and Shanks (2002). 
Contingency learning as used by Lovibond and Shanks (2002), in Pavlovian 
conditioning, can be used to inform stimulus-probe associative learning in the dot-
probe task. In theory, someone can learn that there is a contingency without making 
any change in their selective attention. In Pavlovian learning, this would still be 
considered contingency learning. However, with respect to contingency learning in 
an ABM context, contingency learning is referred to as the change in selective 
attention in line with the training contingency. Therefore, contingency learning and 
attention bias change are considered as the same concept in this research project. 
Studies that tested the involvement of contingency awareness in ABM have 
found that explicit instructions about the contingencies between the stimuli and the 
probes led to stronger learning of selective attention in ABM (Grafton, Mackintosh, 
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Vujic, & MacLeod, 2014; Krebs, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010; Lazarov, Abend, 
Seidner, Pine, & Bar-Haim, 2017). However, the explicit instructions resulted in a 
decreased subsequent effect of ABM on emotional vulnerability (Grafton et al., 
2014). Contingency awareness of the stimulus-probe association within the dot-probe 
task has not yet been investigated without giving explicit instructions. It may be that 
awareness of the stimulus-probe contingency in training needs to be acquired 
implicitly. Research into the role of acquired contingency awareness in the 
trainability of selective attention is currently lacking. 
Attention control seems to be another important factor that is associated with 
the existence of attention bias and attention bias change. Attention control may be an 
important mechanism that controls the processes that underlie negative attention bias 
(Eysenck et al., 2007; Taylor, Cross, & Amir, 2016). Impaired or dysregulated 
attention control has shown to be an important factor in the maintenance and 
aetiology of disorders like depression (De Raedt & Koster, 2010) and anxiety 
(Basanovic, Notebaert, Grafton, Hirsch, & Clarke, 2017; Derryberry & Reed, 2002; 
Taylor et al., 2016). Poor attention control can consist of a number of impaired 
attention processes such as difficulty with concentrating and alertness (Fan, 
McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002; Hertel & Rude, 1991), impaired 
switching of attention (Murphy et al., 1999; Rokke, Arnell, Koch, & Andrews, 2002; 
Taylor et al., 2016), poor attention engagement with, and poor disengagement from 
stimuli in the environment (Basanovic et al., 2017). Studies have shown that 
attention control may moderate the link between negative attention bias and 
emotional vulnerability. For instance, Taylor et al. (2016) found no direct link 
between attention bias and social anxiety. However, they found that at high levels of 
social anxiety there were individual differences in the shifting subscale of the 
Attention Control Scale, developed by Derryberry and Reed (2002). These individual 
differences were associated with differential patterns of attentional disengagement 
from threat stimuli. Explicitly, at high levels of attention control-shifting, high 
socially anxious individuals disengaged faster from threat-relevant compared to 
neutral social cues. In contrast, at low levels of attention control-shifting, those high 
in social anxiety disengaged slower from threat-relevant compared to neutral stimuli.  
Other studies have further shown that individual differences in attention 
control and attention biases are associated mechanisms of attentional and emotional 
vulnerability (Basanovic et al., 2017; Everaert, Grahek, & Koster, 2017; Sanchez, 
20 AN INVESTIGATION INTO ATTENTION BIAS MODIFICATION  
 
Everaert, De Putter, Mueller, & Koster, 2015). For instance, Everaert et al. (2017) 
found that deficient inhibitory control over negative stimuli was related to negative 
attention bias, which in turn predicted an interpretation bias as well as subsequently 
depressive symptoms. While, Basanovic et al. (2017) found that attention control 
predicts the magnitude of attention bias change. These findings converge with the 
possibility that individual differences in attention control are a boundary condition of 
attention bias patterns, therefore, the dot-probe task may not be effective in changing 
the attention bias for individuals with low attentional control.  
Study 1 explored whether individual differences in contingency awareness 
and attention control influenced contingency learning, which would result in 
different patterns of attention bias acquisition, change, and assessment when using 
the dot-probe task. 
Study 2: The Investigation into the Attentional Processes of Attention 
Bias 
In order to investigate the processes that underlie attention bias change, it is 
necessary to discuss the processes that underlie selective attention and negative 
attention bias. Posner (1980) proposed three processes that underlie selective 
attention: (1) attentional engagement with stimuli; (2) attentional disengagement 
from stimuli; and (3) attention shift from one to the other stimulus. Accordingly, 
either a negative attention bias can consist of an enhanced engagement with negative 
stimuli, difficulty disengaging from negative stimuli or both processes may be biased 
independently. That is, we are quicker to locate negative stimuli than neutral stimuli 
in our environment and/or we have more trouble relocating our selective attention 
away from negative stimuli than from neutral stimuli. Previous studies have 
acknowledged that negative attention bias is possibly related to one or more of these 
processes (see for review: Cisler & Koster, 2010).  
Experimental investigators do not agree whether attention bias associated 
with heightened anxiety vulnerability is characterised by enhanced engagement of 
attention with negative stimuli, which supports the single biased attentional 
engagement account, or by impaired disengagement of attention from negative 
stimuli, which supports the single biased attentional disengagement account (Clarke, 
2009). Methodological issues of disentangling the two attention bias types have 
limited this investigation. Because the traditional dot-probe task does not 
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differentiate between an engagement and disengagement bias, several researchers 
have attempted, however, failed to modify the dot-probe task with the aim to 
disentangle these two processes.  
For instance, Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, and De Houwer 
(2004) developed the emotional spatial cueing (ESC) task, wherein two rectangles 
would be presented to the left and right side of the fixation cross for 500ms. After the 
initial fixation, one of the two rectangles located next to the fixation cross would 
function as a cue, as it became a coloured rectangle. The cue stayed on the screen for 
200ms, a mask and finally the target followed this. The target was presented in either 
the same (labelled as valid trials: 75%) or opposite location (labelled as invalid trials: 
25%) of the cue. The trials were either presented with a threat stimulus that consisted 
of a 100dBA white-noise burst (aversive but not painful) or a neutral tone at 71dBA. 
Both audio stimuli where presented after the target for 200ms each and were 
delivered through headphones (3:1 on valid and invalid trials). Participants were 
instructed to respond to the location of the target and were told that the cue was, in 
most cases, predictive of the target. Attention bias to threat was assessed by 
calculating the difference between RTs of validly, and invalidly cued trials with and 
without the aversive noise burst. In addition, the initial fixation of participants was 
ensured by including an extra task, that is, the fixation cross would sometimes be 
replaced by a number, which participants needed to say out loud. Furthermore, by 
making the predictivity of the cue explicit, it was assumed that participants’ attention 
would have been in the location of the cue. The importance of initial fixation lies in 
the disentanglement of the attentional processes. Without it, it would be impossible 
to distinguish whether participants’ attention engaged quicker or disengaged slower 
with a stimulus or whether the attention was already at a specific location of the 
screen. 
The findings of the ESC task indicated that participants responded quicker on 
the validly compared to the invalidly cued trials. Furthermore, participants responded 
quicker on the valid trials that included the aversive noise burst compared to the 
valid trials that did not include the aversive noise burst. Therefore, it was concluded 
that attention was captured by threat (Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, et al., 2004; 
Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2006; Salemink et al., 2007), which is 
evidence for the single biased attentional engagement account. It was a positive 
initiative to control for initial fixation, with the aim to disentangle attentional 
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engagement with, and disengagement from threatening stimuli. Nevertheless, by 
comparing RTs of trials with and without an additional threat stimulus, there is still a 
possibility that both processes drove the differential responding. The attentional 
disengagement process that directed attention away from the validly cued trials 
without a threat stimulus could drive attention bias. However, it is also possible that 
the attention engagement process drove attention bias, where the validly cued trial 
with a threat stimulus captured attention. Furthermore, even though participants were 
instructed that the cue predicted the location of the target most of the time, it is 
possible that participants did not shift their attention to the cue. Therefore, it cannot 
be assumed that initial fixation was achieved, thus, this task does not fully 
disentangle the attentional processes that underlie attention bias to threat. 
Another example of an unsuccessful design that aimed to disentangle 
enhanced attentional engagement with, and difficulty disengagement from negative 
stimuli was attempted with the use of a single stimulus dot-probe task (Fox, Russo, 
Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). In 
this version of the task, participants had to respond to probes that were presented 
either in the same (valid) or opposite (invalid) location of the previously presented 
schematic face. The schematic face contained either an angry, happy, neutral or 
scrambled expression and was presented for 500ms or 1000ms in the left or right 
position of the fixation cross. Typically, studies utilising this task show that anxious 
individuals have a slower response to probes that appear on the opposite location of 
the screen compared to the presented stimulus when that stimulus was negative 
rather than neutral (Fox et al., 2001). Furthermore, there was no differential 
responding to probes that were presented in the same location as the previously 
presented negative or neutral stimuli. This resulted in the conclusion that heightened 
anxiety vulnerability is characterised only by difficulty in disengaging attention from 
negative information (Fox et al., 2002; Yiend & Mathews, 2001), which is evidence 
for the single biased attentional disengaging account. However, the evidence of 
biased attentional disengagement could be misinterpreted as evidence of biased 
engagement. In other words, differential responding to a probe following negative 
stimulus vs neutral stimulus does not disentangle whether responses were slower due 
to an attention bias away from the validly cued trials with neutral valence rather than 
attentional capture towards the validly cued trials with negative valence. 
Furthermore, since this task only presents one stimulus at the time, it is unlikely that 
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is assesses attention bias. According to the attention bias theories described earlier, 
selective attention can only be biased if more than one stimulus is competing for 
attentional resources. 
The methods described above are inadequate to disentangle attentional 
engagement with, and disengagement from negative, compared to neutral stimuli 
(Clarke, Macleod, & Guastella, 2013; Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008). 
According to Clarke et al. (2013), a task adequate in unravelling the two processes 
needs to adhere to three criteria. The first criterion states that such a task needs to 
control for systematic individual differences of general responding, for instance, the 
generally slower responding of anxious individuals in the presence of a threat 
(labeled "freezing"; Clarke et al., 2013; Mogg et al., 2008). The second criterion 
states that such a task should control for differences of initial focus on stimuli with 
different valence (Clarke et al., 2013). The third criterion states that such a task needs 
to include neutral baseline trials. These are needed to compare whether attention 
shifts slower or quicker to negative relative to neutral information.  
A task proposed by both Rudaizky, Basanovic, and MacLeod (2014) as well 
as Grafton and MacLeod (2014) included these three criteria for disentangling the 
attention processes and further investigated whether the biased attentional 
engagement or disengagement accounts could be supported. Rudaizky et al. (2014) 
labelled the task attentional engagement bias and disengagement bias assessment 
task while Grafton and MacLeod (2014) labelled the task the attentional response to 
distal vs proximal emotional information (ARDPEI) task. To minimise confusion, 
this task will be labelled here as attentional process assessment (APA) task. The APA 
started each trial with two red frames, which were presented on the left and right side 
of the screen for 500ms. In one of the two frames, a little box was presented. The cue 
probe, which was either a horizontally or vertically presented line, would appear in 
that box after 250ms. Participants were instructed to attend to the box and remember 
the orientation of the cue probe. This ensured that the initial fixation of every 
participant in each trial was controlled for. Subsequently, two stimuli would appear 
for 250ms in the same location as the frames. These were either a negative or a 
neutral valence picture from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) 
together with an abstract form of art. The neutral-abstract picture pair functioned as 
the baseline trial. Finally, the target probe (horizontally or vertically presented) 
appeared on either the left or right side of the screen and would stay on until a 
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response was made. Participants needed to match the orientation of the target probe 
to the cue probe as quickly as possible without making any mistakes. 
The APA task allowed the calculation of two independent bias indices: one 
for the engagement bias and one for the disengagement bias. With this task, 
Rudaizky et al. (2014) demonstrated that elevated anxiety levels were independently 
associated with enhanced attentional engagement with, and impaired disengagement 
from negative relative to neutral stimuli. They concluded that both processes are 
unrelated to each other and that both independently underlie emotional vulnerability 
in anxiety. Similarly, Grafton and MacLeod (2014) found that individuals high in 
trait anxiety showed facilitated engagement with, and impaired disengagement from 
negative information compared to no attention bias in those with low trait anxiety. 
Both attentional bias types were found unrelated to each other. The finding that the 
attentional engagement bias was only found at a 500ms SOA, whereas the attentional 
disengagement bias was only found at a 100ms SOA, strengthened this. The 
conclusion that both attentional bias types were evident and independent patterns of 
attention bias related to anxiety is in contrast with both the single biased attentional 
engagement account (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998) and the single biased attentional 
disengagement account (e.g., Fox et al., 2001). This improved methodology provided 
new evidence to support a dual biased attentional process account, wherein each 
bias type seems to be independently associated with heightened anxiety vulnerability. 
Besides the single vs dual attention bias account debate, certain additional 
questions of interest in this research project have not yet gained much interest. 
Firstly, what process is (or which processes are) modified by a training procedure in 
the ABM paradigm? There are several possible outcomes. It is possible that the 
training procedure with the conventional dot-probe task only changes the attentional 
disengagement bias. For instance, it may be the case that the attention training, which 
repeatedly probes the neutral when competing with a negative stimulus, facilitates 
the attentional disengagement from negative stimuli. Furthermore, it is possible that 
the training only changes the attentional engagement bias, such that the training 
strengthens inhibition of the attentional engagement process with negative 
information. Lastly, it is possible that the dot-probe task trains both the inhibition of 
attention engagement and the facilitation of disengagement simultaneously, reducing 
both biases. The second question asks whether different training tasks have different 
effects on the change in attentional processes when ABM is employed. There is a 
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possibility that a training task, other than the dot-probe task, influences the 
attentional engagement and/or disengagement bias differently. This needs to be 
investigated as it is possible that different training approaches employ varying 
strategies that affect multitude of learning mechanisms and change different 
attentional processes. It is imperative to investigate these questions, as the answers 
may explain the variability of results in the ABM literature.  
The second study, described in Chapter 4 of this thesis, addresses these two 
questions. The experiment was designed to gain an understanding of what process, or 
processes, are changed by the dot-probe task in an ABM procedure. The change of 
the two processes in the ABM paradigm was measured with the APA task (Grafton & 
MacLeod, 2014; Rudaizky et al., 2014) pre- and post-attention bias training. The dot-
probe task was compared with another attention training task to investigate whether 
different training tasks change different attentional processes that underlie attention 
bias. In turn, this can provide important insights into whether the attentional 
engagement or disengagement processes are modified by a training procedure in the 
ABM paradigm and whether different training task have different effects on the 
change in attentional processes when ABM is employed. This knowledge will have 
sizable implications for the experimental and clinical fields, as it explains the 
mechanisms of change that underlie attention bias modification.  
A Short Overview of the Thesis Outline 
The two studies outlined in this thesis will provide insights into the question 
how an attentional training procedure can successfully elicit a change in selective 
attention. The first study will investigate how the main learning mechanism of the 
dot-probe task influences selective attention when attention bias is modified in the 
ABM paradigm. This study will be divided into two chapters. Chapter 2 will discuss 
the three experiments that investigated the main learning mechanism with non-
emotional stimuli. This chapter is written as a manuscript and is submitted to a 
journal where it is currently under review. Chapter 3 will discuss the two 
experiments that investigated the same learning mechanisms with emotional stimuli. 
The second study will be discussed in Chapter 4. This study investigated, in one 
experiment, how the attentional engagement and disengagement processes changed 
when different training procedures in the ABM paradigm were employed. The 
general discussion will discuss the findings of both studies in Chapter 5.  
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Abstract 
Background and Objectives: Attention bias has been associated with 
psychopathology and attention bias modification (ABM) training has shown 
promising results in changing attention bias and subsequently decreasing 
psychopathology. The dot-probe task is most commonly used to assess and change 
attention bias. This paper investigated the stimulus-probe associative learning 
mechanisms stipulated in the dot-probe task. Methods: Three experiments were 
conducted wherein the stimulus-probe associative learning was tested in a dot-probe 
task utilising two non-emotional images to eliminate elements of individual 
differences that come with emotional stimuli. In particular, the degree to which 
selective attention can be trained towards a non-emotional stimulus, the degree to 
which an acquired bias could be extinguished or reversed through exposure to a 
subsequently reversed training contingency, and the potential role of contingency 
awareness in attention bias acquisition were examined. Results: Evidence for 
attention bias training towards non-emotional stimuli emerged in the second 
contingency training, but not in the first training. Training effects were only evident 
on within-training assessment trials and did not transfer to post-training assessment 
trials suggesting that the contingencies used in the assessments seemed to influence 
selective attention. Furthermore, contingency awareness was associated with 
attention bias acquisition. Limitations: Awareness was measured at the end and not 
after every part of the experiment. Hence, it cannot be determined whether the lack 
of attention bias induction was due to the lack of contingency awareness. 
Conclusions: It was concluded that selective attention is very malleable and post-
training assessments may not be optimal to assess attention bias change. 
 
Keywords: Attention bias modification training (ABM), selective attention, 
dot-probe task, contingency awareness, contingency learning, stimulus-probe 
association 
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There is substantial evidence that attention bias for negative information is a 
reliable characteristic of emotional psychopathology (Aspen et al., 2013; Duque & 
Vázquez, 2015; Mark, Williams, Fraser, Watts, & Mathew, 1997; Schoth et al., 2012; 
Wabnitz et al., 2016). Given the proposed causal role of attention bias to negative 
information in the maintenance of emotional pathology, the dot-probe task has been 
developed to assess the presence of attention bias towards or away from threat in 
those high and low in emotional vulnerability (MacLeod et al., 1986). The dot-probe 
task assesses attention bias by presenting two stimuli in separate screen positions for 
a brief duration, one of them emotionally salient, the other one neutral. Subsequently, 
a probe appears in the location previously occupied by one of the two stimuli with a 
50% congruency. Thus, both stimuli are followed by the probe equally often and 
have no predictive value. An attention bias towards emotion is evident when on 
average participants react quicker to probes presented in the location of an 
emotionally salient, compared to a neutral stimulus. Therefore, the dot-probe task can 
be used to assess whether the presence of attention bias is related to 
psychopathology, as predicted by attention and emotion theories (e.g., Buehlmann & 
Deco, 2008; Duncan, 2006; Williams et al., 1988).  
Furthermore, the dot-probe task can also be used to train attention bias 
(MacLeod et al., 2002). In an attention bias training procedure, one stimulus type, 
which is either emotional or neutral in content, reliably predicts the location of the 
probe. For instance, after consistently presenting the probe in the neutral stimulus 
location it becomes advantageous to attend towards the neutral and away from the 
emotional stimuli. MacLeod et al. (2002) were the first to use the dot-probe task as a 
training tool. Participants were either trained to attend to neutral or negative stimuli 
and different attention bias patterns between participants were confirmed in a 
subsequent assessment. This attention training procedure has been labelled attention 
bias modification (ABM). Additionally, they found that compared to participants 
trained to attend to negative stimuli, those trained to attend to neutral stimuli were 
less emotionally vulnerable when completing a subsequent stress task. MacLeod et 
al. (2002) hereby established a causal link between changes in attention bias and 
changes in emotional vulnerability. 
Many researchers have replicated the finding that successful bias change 
leads to changes in emotional vulnerability and highlighting its potential clinical 
utility in the treatment of emotional disorders (see for meta-analyses: Bar-Haim, 
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2010; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Hakamata et al., 2010). However, many studies have 
also failed to observe emotional benefits following ABM (e.g., Cristea et al., 2015; 
Heeren et al., 2015; Mogoaşe et al., 2014). Some suggest that ABM may not be as 
effective as initially thought, for instance, the meta-analysis conducted by Cristea et 
al. (2015) found significant medium effect sizes that, after the exclusion of outliers, 
and adjustment for publication bias, decreased, and often became non-significant. 
However, past studies did not always assess whether a change in attention bias had 
actually occurred during training. MacLeod and Clarke (2015) reviewed studies that 
did and did not report such a change and showed that those that did report a change 
also reported significant reductions of emotion vulnerability (with the exception of 
studies looking at spider fear). Though their conclusion was not statistically tested, 
more compelling support for the importance of a successful attention bias change in 
the ABM paradigm was provided by Grafton et al. (2017). They reanalysed the meta-
analysis done by Cristea et al. (2015), controlled statistically for unsuccessful 
attention bias change, and found that ABM reliably impacted emotion vulnerability 
after successful bias change. However, a limitation of Grafton et al. (2017) is that 
they did not test the influence of a possible publication bias. Nevertheless, these 
results strongly imply that it is important to assess whether attention bias changed 
due to training in the ABM paradigm, before assessing its effect on emotion 
vulnerability (Clarke et al., 2014; MacLeod & Clarke, 2015).  
Given that the clinical outcome appears to be dependent on the success of 
changing attention bias, it is important to understand the conditions most conducive 
to achieving such change. Over the course of the development of ABM research, the 
focus has changed quickly from investigating the causal relationship between 
selective attention and anxiety on a mechanistic level (MacLeod et al., 2002) to 
assessing the effectiveness of ABM as a clinical intervention for anxiety disorders 
(e.g., Cristea et al., 2015). However, the need to investigate the conditions under 
which paradigms, like the dot-probe task, produce the best training results remains 
imperative (Koster & Bernstein, 2015). The main mechanism that underlies selective 
attention training with the dot-probe task is the learning of stimulus-probe 
associations. These associations direct participants’ selective attention to prefer the 
predictive stimulus, which is the stimulus that is consistently presented in the probe 
position. It is assumed that it becomes advantageous for the participants to attend 
towards the predictive stimulus as it increases the performance on the dot-probe 
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tasks. As a result, an attention bias is induced towards the stimulus that is 
consistently paired with the probe. In other words, participants learn that a certain 
stimulus predicts the location of the probe, and, therefore, learn to attend to this 
predictive stimulus.  
It is important to determine the best conditions to establish the stimulus-probe 
association in the dot-probe task as this may enhance success in modifying attention 
bias. Therefore, the aim of this study is to establish a template wherein the dot-probe 
task was successful in establishing, changing, and assessing an attention bias towards 
stimuli by changing the stimulus-probe contingencies. To establish such a template, 
this study employed a dot-probe task utilising only non-emotional stimuli. Non-
emotional stimuli were chosen because this avoided potential effects of individual 
differences resulting in higher homogeneity of the results. Emotional stimuli, like 
words or pictures can hold a variety of meanings. For instance, the word ‘web’ can 
be interpreted as ‘world wide web’ or as ‘spider web’. Both interpretations can be 
perceived as neutral, positive or negative depending on personal likes, dislikes, and 
experiences. Since relatively faster RTs to probes after predictive stimuli compared to 
non-predictive stimuli represents learning of the stimulus-probe association, 
individual differences in stimulus interpretations are likely to confound the results. 
Therefore, non-emotional stimuli were used in the current study. These non-
emotional stimuli consisted of black outlines of two shapes: a circle and a triangle.  
Moreover, attention bias trainability assessed in previous studies solely relied 
on attention bias change measured from pre- to post-training assessments as most 
studies used a 100% contingency in the training phase. That is, the probe always 
followed one of the two stimuli. This set-up is unable to determine how attention bias 
transfers from assessment to training, and back to assessment within an ABM 
procedure. Furthermore, it may be problematic to assess trainability as a function of 
attention bias change measured from pre- to post-training assessments using the dot-
probe task. Previous research has voiced concerns about the internal consistency of 
the dot-probe task (Chapman et al., 2017; Kappenman et al., 2014; Rodebaugh et al., 
2016; Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 2009; Waechter et al., 2014), in particular the 
assumption that attention bias to threat is stable over time has been disputed 
(Rodebaugh et al., 2016; Zvielli et al., 2015). Therefore, the change from pre- to 
post-training can also contribute to the instability of attention bias. In the current 
study, the stimulus-probe contingency used in training was one of 95% congruency. 
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That is, the probe would replace one stimulus in 95% of the trials (labelled as 
congruent trials) and the other stimulus in 5% of the trials (labelled as incongruent 
trials). Thus, instead of relying on attention bias measured at pre- and post-training, 
training of selective attention would be indicated by quicker responding to probes on 
congruent relative to incongruent trials within the training phase.  
The ABM paradigm used in the current study consisted of five phases, a 
baseline assessment, the first training (training 1), the first post-training assessment 
(assessment 1), the second (reversed contingency) training (training 2), and finally, a 
second post-training assessment (assessment 2). The baseline assessment tested the 
assumption that attention is not biased towards circles or triangles. Then, the two 
training phases tested the degree to which selective attention could be trained 
towards a non-emotional stimulus as well as the degree to which an acquired bias 
could be reversed through exposure to a reversed training contingency. The reversed 
training was added to the ABM paradigm to test whether an existing attention bias 
could be changed as tested in a conventional ABM. Firstly, this attention bias needed 
to be acquired in the first training as non-emotional stimuli, without any pre-existing 
bias were used. The two post-training assessment phases tested the degree to which 
an acquired attention bias was transferred from training to assessment. According to 
attentional theories of associative learning (Kruschke, 2003; Le Pelley, 2004; 
Mackintosh, 1975), it was expected that the change in selective attention created in 
training would be evident in post-training assessments. These theories predict that 
participants will react faster to probes, which follow stimuli that previously held 
predictive value.  
In addition, participants’ awareness of the stimulus-probe contingency may be 
imperative to learning the stimulus-probe association in the dot-probe task (Lovibond 
& Shanks, 2002). Previous research has provided mixed indications about the 
potential effect of stimulus-probe contingency awareness on the trainability of 
selective attention. Some argue that providing explicit instructions will generate 
potential resistance as well as conscious avoidance and, therefore, result in a less 
efficient training of attention bias (MacLeod, Mackintosh, & Vujic, 2009). 
Additionally, Koster et al. (2009) stated that selective attention training appears to 
“operate automatically, in the sense of proceeding swiftly without intention, and so is 
not readily amenable to volitional control” (p. 3). Despite these conventions, studies 
have shown that giving explicit instructions about the contingencies between the 
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stimuli and the probes led to stronger learning of selective attention in ABM (Grafton 
et al., 2014; Krebs et al., 2010; Lazarov et al., 2017). However, the explicit 
instructions resulted in a decreased subsequent effect of ABM on emotional 
vulnerability (Grafton et al., 2014). It may be that awareness of the stimulus-probe 
contingency in training needs to be acquired implicitly. Research into how many 
participants acquire awareness without explicit instructions and what the role of 
acquired contingency awareness is in the trainability of selective attention is 
currently lacking.  
In summary, it was hypothesised that an attention bias towards one of two 
non-emotional stimuli could be generated within the initial training. Next, it was 
hypothesised that in the reversed contingency training, attention bias would be 
modified to the previously incongruent, now congruent stimulus. Furthermore, it was 
hypothesised that the attention bias produced in the training would be detectable in 
the post-training assessments. Finally, the current study also examined the 
association between contingency awareness and changes in patterns of selective 
attention to determine whether awareness of stimulus-probe association within 
training is associated with greater attention bias acquisition and change. 
Experiment 1 
Methodology  
Study Design 
The study design was a mixed factorial design, with one between-group and 
two within-group factors. The two within group factors were the order of 
contingency delivery (initial vs reversed), and the different assessments (within-
training and post-training). The between-group factor was Group, where the 
experimental group was compared with a control group that received the same 
number of trials with a non-predictive contingency throughout. The baseline 
assessment was analysed separately to check the assumption that non-emotional 
stimuli do not compete for attention, and that, therefore, no attention bias was present 
at baseline. 
Participants 
One-hundred, and seventeen undergraduate students enrolled at Curtin 
University, Australia, volunteered to participate in exchange of course credit or $15. 
Thirteen of the 60 participants in the experimental group were deleted from the data 
set as they made more than the pre-determined 20% errors (MPE = 48, SD = 25.5, 
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range: 23.6 – 100). The remaining 47 participants averaged mistakes on 12% of the 
trials (SD = 3.57, range: 4.82 – 18.8). In the control group, 6 of the 57 participants 
made errors on more than 20% of trials (MPE = 21.6, SD = .973, range: 20.7 – 23.0). 
The other 51 averaged mistakes on 11% of trials (SD = 4.3, range: 3.39 – 20). The 
final sample consisted of 98 participants (72% female, Mage = 22.1, SD = 5.11, age 
range: 18 – 45).  
Procedure 
A maximum of four participants were tested at a time. On arrival, they were 
provided with an information sheet and completed a consent form. Participants rated 
all shapes before completing 10 practice and 560 dot-probe trials. For the 
experimental group, the dot-probe trials consisted of the baseline assessment, 
training 1, assessment 1, training 2, and assessment 2. The phases ran sequentially 
with a slight pause (+/- 100ms) during the loading of the next task component, which 
could potentially have alerted participants to a possible change in the task 
parameters. The control group completed 560 trials with 50% contingency. 
Subsequently, participants rated the shapes again, and completed the contingency 
awareness check. The total experiment took about twenty minutes. Finally, they were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. The Human Research Ethics 
Committee at Curtin University approved this experimental procedure, and all other 
experiments reported in this chapter.  
Materials 
Stimulus Materials used in the Dot-Probe Task 
The dot-probe task was presented on a white background and the probes 
consisted of two black dots, either presented horizontally (‘..’) or vertically (‘:’). The 
size of the probes was 5mm in diameter (total stimulus size was 5x15mm). Pictures 
of a circle and a triangle were used as non-emotional stimuli. In the practice trials, 
pictures of a diamond and a square were used. The shapes were black outlines with 
white filling, presented on a white background and sized at 300x225 pixels.  
Dot-Probe Task  
The experiment was presented on a personal computer with a 19 inch monitor 
(screen resolution 1920x1080) controlled by DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003) to 
ensure millisecond timing accuracy. Responses were collected on a QWERTY-
keyboard with either the left and right shift key. The match between response key 
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and probe was counterbalanced across participants. Every trial started with a 500ms 
presentation of a fixation cross in the middle of the screen, followed by the two 
shapes presented next to each other for 500ms (960 pixels apart, measured from the 
centre of the stimuli). Then a probe was presented in the location of one of the two 
shapes, thus in the left or right location. Participants were instructed to respond as 
quickly as possible, without making mistakes, to the orientation of the probe. The 
probe would disappear after a response was made or after 1500ms. As described 
earlier, the experiment consisted of assessment and training phases. The assessment 
procedure consisted of 80 trials with a 50% stimulus-probe contingency, that is, the 
stimulus type did not predict the location of the probe. The training procedure 
consisted of 160 trials with a 95% stimulus-probe contingency, that is, on 95% of the 
trials, the probe followed the same stimulus (ntrials = 152; congruent trials) and on 
5% of the trials, the probe followed the other stimulus (ntrials = 8; incongruent trials). 
The order in which the training contingencies were delivered was counterbalanced 
across participants such that half were first trained towards a circle and away from a 
triangle while the remainder were first trained towards a triangle and away from a 
circle.  
The mean of 5000 random split-half reliabilities and the corrected Spearman-
Brown reliabilities, in this as well as the following experiments, were assessed with 
the R package ‘splithalf’ version 0.3.1 according to Parsons (2018) and are shown in 
Table 4 of the Appendix at the end of this chapter. 
Stimulus Ratings  
Participants rated all four shapes prior to, and post the dot-probe task, using a 
15cm visual analogue scale (VAS) ranging from 0 “I do not like this shape at all” to 
100 “I very much like this shape”. This was done to measure the explicit valence of 
the shapes. These rating can be found in the Table 3 of the Appendix at the end of 
this chapter. 
Contingency Awareness Check 
Three questions were included at the end of the experiment to assess explicit 
awareness of any contingency: “Did you notice any regularities during the computer 
task?”. Answer options were yes or no, if answered yes, this was followed up with 
the open ended question: “What did you notice?”. Lastly, a multiple-choice question 
was asked: “Did the dots follow more after a certain shape?”, six contingency 
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options were given where participants could choose from: a) “No, the dots were 
presented equally often after both shapes”, b) “Yes, the dots came more often after 
the circle”, c) “Yes, the dots came more often after the triangle”, d) “This differed 
throughout the experiment, first more after the circle and then after the triangle”, e) 
“This differed throughout the experiment, first more after the triangle and then after 
the circle”, f) “I don’t know”, and g) “Other, namely…” (open response format). 
Participants in the experimental group were dichotomised into an aware or not aware 
category. Participants who selected any option indicating that there may have been a 
contingency involved were categorised as aware, even if they got it wrong, whereas 
the remainder were categorised as unaware. This liberal criterion was adopted 
because the contingency awareness check came at the end of the experiment, after 
multiple contingency changes. This was done to take into account that it was hard for 
participants to remember exactly what happened throughout the procedure.  
Data Preparation 
Participants were excluded from the analyses if they made more than the pre-
determined 20% of errors. Errors were defined as an incorrect button press, failure to 
respond within 1500ms, responses quicker than 100ms or an extreme score – values 
more than three standard deviations above or below each participant’s mean reaction 
time (RT) - and were entered as missing values. Analyses based on the proportion of 
errors were not significant, and are, therefore, not included in this paper.  
Analyses were based on a bias index score. For all participants, the 
computation of this bias index score was based on the contingency in training 1. As 
such, the bias index score was calculated by subtracting mean RTs of congruent trials 
in training 1 from the mean RTs of incongruent trials in training 1. Hence, if selective 
attention was directed to the congruent stimulus in training 1, a significant positive 
bias index score would be expected, and if this effect was transferred to assessment 
1, a positive bias index score would also be expected in assessment 1. If the training 
of selective attention in training 2 was successful in changing selective attention to 
the other stimulus, a significant negative bias index score would be expected in 
training 2. Similarly, a negative bias index score would be observed in assessment 2 
if this change of selective attention was transferred to this final assessment.  
For the control group, trials were labelled as congruent and incongruent to 
match the experimental group. That is, in the assessments, half of the participants 
were randomly allocated to an arbitrary condition wherein one stimulus was labelled 
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as congruent, and the other stimulus as incongruent. In the training, 5% of the trials 
that matched the serial position of incongruent trials in the experimental groups were 
randomly allocated to serve as incongruent trials (1 trial in a block of 20 trials). This 
way, the same number of trials were used in both groups to calculate an overall 
average of congruent (ntrials = 152) and incongruent trials (ntrials = 8). Table 2 in the 
Appendix at the end of this chapter shows the mean RTs for each trial type of 
experiments 1, 2 and 3.  
Statistical Analyses 
Preliminary analyses showed that there was no evidence of order effects as to 
whether participants in the experimental group were first trained towards circles, and 
then triangles or vice versa. No significant differences were found between order 
conditions in a 5x2 (Phase [baseline vs training 1 vs assessment 1 vs training 2 vs 
assessment 2]) x (Stimulus order [circle-triangle vs triangle-circle]) ANOVA, all F < 
2.29, p > .075, η² < .179. In the control group, there was no significant attentional 
preference for circles or triangles in all 5 phases: the difference scores between RTs 
of trials where the probe followed the circle or the triangle were not different from 
zero, t < 1.78, p > .076.  
The mean bias index score in baseline was compared between groups in a 
separate independent t-test. The mean bias index scores of the rest of the experiment 
were subjected to a 2 x 2 x 2 (Contingency [initial vs reversed) x (Assessment 
[within-training vs post-training]) x (Group [experimental vs control]) ANOVA. The 
effect of contingency awareness on training was not assessed for each experiment 
separately as only few participants became aware (see section Combined Analyses 
and the Role of Contingency Awareness). An alpha level of .05 was set for all 
statistically analyses. 
Results  
Baseline Patterns of Attention Bias 
Figure 2 displays the bias index scores for the control and experimental group 
throughout the experiment. An independent t-test with equal variance not assumed 
between Groups confirmed that no difference in bias index scores at baseline was 
evident between the control and experimental group, t(86) = 1.05, p = .298, 95%CI(-
6.20, 6.49), d = 0.21.  
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Figure 2. Mean Bias Index Scores in the Experimental and Control Groups of Experiment 1 
as a Function of Phase. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
** p < .01 (different from zero). 
Changes in Attention Bias in Response to Attention Bias Modification  
As further illustrated in Figure 2, the ANOVA resulted in a significant main 
effect for Group, F(1,96) = 6.57, p = .012, η² = .064, a significant interaction 
between Contingency and Group, F(1,96) = 8.02, p = .006, η² = .077, and a marginal 
interaction between Contingency, Assessment, and Group, F(1,96) = 3.19, p = .077, 
η² = .032. Pair-wise comparisons indicated that the experimental group was not 
significantly different from the control group in training 1, F(1,96) = .801, p = .373, 
η² = .008, nor in assessment 1, F(1,96) = .517, p = .474, η² = .005. However, the 
experimental group was significantly different from the control group in training 2, 
F(1,96) = 10.9, p = .001, η² = .102, and in assessment 2, F(1,96) = 4.77, p = .031, η² 
= .047. Post-hoc one-sample t-tests split per group showed that the bias index score 
was significantly different from zero for the experimental group in training 2, t(46) = 
3.35, p = .002, 95%CI(7.53, 30.3), however not in assessment 2, t(46) = 1.29, p 
= .204, 95%CI(-2.82, 12.8). It seems that attention bias towards the stimulus that 
predicted the probe was evident in training 2, but not maintained in the subsequent 
assessment task. 
Discussion 
The first experiment was designed to test whether participants learned that a 
stimulus predicted the location of the probe, and, therefore, learned to attend to this 
predictive stimulus. Non-emotional stimuli (shapes) were used since these do not 
support a pre-existing attention bias. The findings confirmed this assumption: there 
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was no attention bias evident in the baseline assessment, participants reacted 
similarly to probes presented in the location of both non-emotional stimuli. 
Furthermore, the results showed that there was no acquisition of attention bias in 
response to the first training. However, an attention bias was evident in the second 
training: participants responded quicker to the probes in congruent trials, compared 
to probes in incongruent trials. There was no evidence that the attention bias induced 
in the training transferred to the post-training assessment. Given that no attention 
bias was acquired in training 1, transfer to assessment 1 was not expected. However, 
the attention bias acquired in training 2 did not transfer to assessment 2.  
It seems surprising that the dot-probe task was unsuccessful in training an 
attention bias in the first training, while it was successful in the second training. This 
may be an effect of the initial baseline assessment which pre-exposed participants to 
80 non-predictive trials. Thus, participants were potentially less sensitive to the 
subsequent introduction of the stimulus-probe contingency in training 1. Such pre-
exposure effects have been shown to slow down learning (Baker & Mackintosh, 
1979; Lubow & Moore, 1959; Mackintosh, 1975). A second question to consider is 
why the stimulus-probe association learned in training 2 does not carry-over to the 
assessment post-training as predicted by attentional theories of associative learning 
(Kruschke, 2003; Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975). These theories predict that 
participants will react faster to probes that followed stimuli, which previously held 
predictive value. However, it seems that participants learn to attend to a certain 
stimulus during the training phase because it predicts the probe. During assessment, 
participants may learn that this predictive relationship no longer exists, which results 
in a reduction of attention bias.  
Nevertheless, it is problematic that the assessment post-training does not 
capture the attention bias induced in the training. Most studies that measured 
successful modification of attention bias in an ABM paradigm relied on a bias 
change score calculated from bias scores measured in assessments pre- to post-
training (e.g., Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Previous studies that found non-significant 
bias change from pre- to post-training assessments in ABM may have successfully 
changed the attention bias in training, however, this change may not have been 
detected in the post-training assessment. These results suggest that the assessment 
may function as a re-training of selective attention to attend to both stimuli equally, 
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instead of assessing attention bias. However, such a finding requires replication 
before any more concrete conclusions can be drawn.  
Experiment 2 
The main aim of the second experiment was to test the pre-exposure 
hypothesis. If it is the case that pre-exposure interferes with bias acquisition in 
training 1, then the removal of the baseline assessment should result in an attention 
bias as a result of this first training. The additional aim of the second experiment was 
to replicate the absence of transfer of an acquired bias from training to assessment 
observed in experiment 1. In summary, this second experiment used the same 
procedure as the experimental group of Experiment 1 with the omission of the 
baseline assessment. The data of this new group were then compared to the first 480 
trials of the control group of Experiment 1.  
Methodology 
Participants 
Forty-six undergraduate students, enrolled at Curtin University, Australia, 
volunteered to participate in exchange of course credit or $15. Six of the participants 
were deleted from the data set as they made more than the pre-determined 20% 
errors (MPE = 26, SD = 2.95, age range: 22.7 – 30.8). The final sample consisted of 
40 participants who made on average 10% errors (SD = 3.74, range: 2.92 - 17.9), 30 
participants were female (Mage = 21.0, SD = 2.56, age range: 18 – 29). 
Procedure 
The same procedure was followed as described in Experiment 1, the only 
differences being that participants did not complete a baseline assessment, and that 
all participants were in the experimental condition. It took participants approximately 
15 minutes to complete the experiment.  
Materials 
The same materials were used as described in Experiment 1. 
Data Preparation and Statistical Analyses 
Analyses, statistical outcomes, and thresholds were based on the same criteria 
as described in the methodology of Experiment 1. Preliminary analyses showed that 
there was no evidence of order effects as to whether participants were first trained 
towards circles, and then triangles or vice versa. The analysis revealed a main effect 
for Phase, F(3,36) = 7.57, p = .001, η² = .354, which did not interact with stimulus-
order, all F < .611, p  > .439, η² < .016. Hence, the mean bias index scores of each 
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block were subjected to a 2 x 2 x 2 (Contingency [initial vs reversed]) x (Assessment 
[within-training vs post-training]) x (Group [experimental vs control]) mixed-design 
ANOVA. 
Results 
Changes in Selective Attention in Response to Attention Bias Modification  
Figure 3 shows the mean bias index scores for each group at each assessment 
point.  
 
Figure 3. Mean Bias Index Scores in the Experimental and Control Groups of Experiment 2 
as a Function of Phase. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
*** p < .001 (different from zero). 
The ANOVA showed a main effect of Contingency, F(1,89) = 7.01, p = .010, 
η² = .073. The Contingency by Group interaction, F(1,89) = 7.25, p = .008, η² = .075, 
and the Contingency by Assessment by Group interaction were significant, F(1,89) = 
5.97, p = .017, η² = .063. Similar to the previous experiment, pair-wise comparisons 
between Groups indicated that the experimental group differed from the control 
group in training 2, F(1,89) = 9.18, p = .003, η² = .093, but not in training 1, F(1,89) 
= 1.08, p = .302, η² = .012, or in either assessment post-training, F < 1.05, p > .309, 
η² < .012. Omitting the baseline assessment seems not to facilitate training of 
selective attention in training 1, which is inconsistent with the pre-exposure 
hypothesis.  
Discussion 
The second experiment was designed to further investigate stimulus-probe 
associative learning in the dot-probe task. It was tested whether by omitting the 
baseline assessment participants would learn that a certain stimulus predicted the 
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location of the probe, and, therefore, attend to this predictive stimulus. Consistent 
with the results of Experiment 1, an attention bias was acquired in the second 
training and not in the first, and there was no transfer from the training to the post-
training assessment. Additionally, eliminating the baseline assessment did not 
facilitate the acquisition of an attention bias towards the congruent stimulus in 
training 1. These findings are inconsistent with the pre-exposure hypothesis and the 
opposite of what was expected based on the pre-exposure literature (Baker & 
Mackintosh, 1979; Lubow & Moore, 1959; Mackintosh, 1975). 
The failure to see an attentional bias in training 1 may be caused by the 
simplicity of the task which meant that participants did not use the stimuli to 
facilitate the identification of the probe location. While training of spatial selective 
attention was the goal of the current experiments, the participants’ task was to 
differentiate between two probes, a task that can be performed without attending to 
the preceding stimuli. Given that the probes were relatively large and on the screen 
for a relative long time, they were potentially easy to detect without requiring the use 
of the stimuli to predict their location. If this were true, increasing the difficulty to 
detect the probes could potentially motivate participants to use the stimuli to 
facilitate probe detection and so contribute to greater changes in selective attention in 
line with the contingency. As such, the purpose of Experiment 3 was to examine the 
hypothesis that a more difficult dot-probe task would facilitate the acquisition and 
change of attention bias in training 1 and 2. Furthermore, would Experiment 3 
replicate the absence of transfer of acquired bias from training to post-training 
assessment, then there would be strong evidence to suggest that an assessment post-
training may underestimate the attention bias acquired during training.  
Experiment 3  
Based on the results of the previous two experiments, Experiment 3 was 
designed to test the hypothesis that increasing the difficulty of probe identification 
would increase the reliance on the preceding stimuli, and so enhance the effects of 
training on selective attention. To increase the likelihood that the shapes would be 
processed as a predictor of the probe, the dot-probe task was modified. Specifically, 
the detection of the probe was made more difficult by changing probe size and 
exposure duration from 15mm and 1500ms to 4 mm and 250ms, respectively.  
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Methodology 
Participants 
Sixty-eight Mechanical Turk workers volunteered to participate in exchange 
of $5 USD. Because the task was harder to perform, more errors were anticipated, 
and therefore, the pre-determined exclusion criterion was changed from 20% to 30%. 
Of the 68 participants in the study, 22 were deleted from the data set as they made 
more than 30% of errors (MPE = 70.9, SD =23.7, range: 33.3 – 99.8). The final 
sample consisted of 46 participants (33% female, Mage = 33.6, SD = 6.92, age range: 
20 – 48) who made 12% errors on average (SD = 6.13, range: 1.6 – 26.6).  
Procedure 
The same procedure was followed as described in Experiment 2, the only 
differences was that the whole procedure was hosted online via Turk prime (Litman, 
Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017), and the pre-and post-ratings of the shapes were 
omitted. Instead, strategy to perform the dot-probe task was assessed at the end of the 
experiment. Similarly, no control group was tested. It took participants 
approximately 20 minutes to complete the experiment.  
Materials 
The same materials were used as described in Experiment 1, unless otherwise 
specified. 
Strategy 
One open-ended question (“Did you use a certain strategy?”) was included to 
assess the strategy used by the participant to perform the dot-probe task. 
Dot-Probe task 
The same dot-probe task was used as in the previous experiments; the only 
difference was that the probe was decreased in size from 15mm to 4mm, and the 
exposure duration of the probe from 1500ms to 500ms.  
Data Preparation and Statistical Analyses 
Analyses, statistical outcomes and errors were based on the same criteria as 
described in the methodology of Experiment 1. Preliminary analyses showed no 
effect of stimulus order in training, all F < 1.33, p > .279, η² < .088.  The mean bias 
index scores of each block were subjected to a 2 x 2 (Contingency [initial vs 
reversed) x (Assessment [within-training vs post-training]) repeated measures 
factorial ANOVA. 
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Results 
Changes in Selective Attention in Response to Attention Bias Modification  
Illustrated in Figure 4, the ANOVA did not result in any significant effects, all 
F < 1.36, p < .250, η² < .030. Increasing the difficulty level of the task seemed to 
impede the acquisition of attention bias, even in training 2.  
 
Figure 4. Mean Bias Index Scores in the Experimental Group of Experiment 3 as a Function 
of Phase. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
Strategies Used to Perform the Dot-Probe Task 
Qualitative responses were categorised into four themes and are reported in 
Table 1, these were: (1) No strategy used (“No”); (2) Focused on the probes (“No I 
just reacted to dots as they came”); (3) Focused on certain location of the screen (“I 
tried to focus on one side and then look at the other if the dots weren't on the first 
side”); (4) Shape predicted the probe (“Yes, trying to figure out which shape they 
came after most of the time”).  
Table 1.  
Strategies Used to Perform the Dot-Probe Task in Those Aware and Not Aware of the 
Stimulus-Probe Contingency 
Themes 
Aware of 
Contingency 
Not Aware of 
Contingency 
No strategy used n = 5 (36%) n = 21 (68%) 
Focused on the probes n = 5 (36%) n = 7 (22%) 
Focused on certain location of the screen n = 1 (7%) n = 3 (10%) 
Shape predicted the probe n = 3 (21%) n = 0 (0%) 
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The kind of strategy used differed for those categorised as aware and not 
aware of the contingency, X2(3) = 9.05, p = .029, ɸ = .448. However, since the 
number of participants in each theme is very low, no inferences are made on this 
data. 
Discussion 
Contrary to what was hypothesised, the more difficult dot-probe task did not 
support training of an attention bias in training 1 or training 2. The results suggest 
that participants do not alter their pattern of attention selectivity in response to the 
training or assessment phases of the more difficult version of the dot-probe task. 
Increasing the difficulty to detect the probes did not motivate participants to use the 
stimuli to facilitate probe detection and so, did not contribute to greater changes in 
selective attention in line with the contingency in training 1 or 2. As such, the 
hypothesis that a more difficult dot-probe task would facilitate the acquisition and 
change of attention bias in training 1 and 2 was rejected. 
A limitation of this experiment was that compared to the previous two 
experiments the variability of the bias scores was slightly larger and more people 
needed to be excluded based on poor accuracy (Exp. 1: 22% and Exp. 2: 15% with a 
20% error cut-off point; Exp. 3: 32% with a 30% error cut-off point). This resulted in 
lower power of the design. The difference in variability may be due to the different 
sample used (undergraduate Australian students vs American M-Turk workers) as 
well as a different delivery of the dot-probe task (controlled laboratory vs 
uncontrolled home environment). However, the data obtained in the lab were not all 
that less noisy, it seems that noisy data is a general issue when using the dot-probe 
task. Sample sizes need to be increased, especially as it is essential to look at 
verbalisers only (i.e., those who report to be aware of the contingency). To address 
the sample size issue, the data of the three experiments were combined into one 
analysis. This could potentially illuminate the effects by increasing the power of the 
design.  
Combined Analyses and the Role of Contingency Awareness 
The three experiments described above resulted in somewhat inconsistent 
findings. The general pattern found was that training effects were only registered on 
the within-training assessment trials of training 2, not training 1, and that this effect 
did not transfer to post-training assessment trials. However, these effects were not 
replicated in the last experiment where a more difficult dot-probe task was used. 
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However, the variability in the last experiment was larger compared to the previous 
two experiments and it may have lacked the power to replicate the findings. Since the 
three experiments trained the same stimulus-probe associations, the data of the three 
experiments were combined to increase the power of the design.  
To explore whether contingency awareness is associated with the acquisition 
and change of attention bias, participants of all experimental groups were 
dichotomised into aware and not aware of a stimulus probe category and the data of 
training 1 and 2 were analysed. It was hypothesised that those who reported some 
level of awareness of a stimulus-probe contingency would show greater bias of 
selective attention to the congruent probe within the training assessments compared 
to those who reported no awareness at all of the stimulus-probe associations.  
Results 
Changes in Selective Attention in Response to Attention Bias Modification  
Figure 5 displays the attention bias index scores for the two within-training 
and post-training assessment phases collapsed across experiments. 
 
Figure 5. The Attention Bias Index Scores for the Two Within-Training and Post-Training 
Assessment Phases Collapsed Across Experiments 1, 2 and 3. Error bars represent standard 
error of the mean.  
** p < .01 (different from zero). 
The one-sample t-tests showed that the attention bias was successfully 
induced in training 2, t(132) = 3.07, p = .003 two-tailed, 95%CI(-35.9, -7.74), but not 
in the other phases, all t < 1.31, p > .134. Paired samples t-test between the bias 
assessed in training 2 and assessment 2 showed that there was a significant difference 
between the two phases, t(131) = -2.30, p = .023 two-tailed, 95%CI(-33.1, -2.50), d = 
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0.28. These results imply that across the three experiments an attention bias was not 
trained in training 1, but only in training 2, and that the bias did not transfer to the 
subsequent assessment.  
Awareness of Stimulus-Probe Contingency and its Influence on Attention Bias 
Modification 
Figure 6 displays the attention bias index scores for each experiment across 
the two training phases for those categorised as aware or not aware of the stimulus-
probe contingency. 
 
Figure 6. The Attention Bias Index Scores for Experiment 1, 2 and 3 across the Two Within-
Training Phases for Those Categorised as Aware or Not Aware of the Stimulus-Probe 
Contingency. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
** p < .01; * p < .05 (different from zero). 
In Experiment 1, 47% were categorised as aware (n = 22), in Experiment 2, 
56% (n = 23), and in Experiment 3, 31% (n = 14). The 2 (Training [training 1 vs 
training 2]) x 2 (Awareness [aware vs not aware]) x 3 (Experiment [exp.1 vs exp.2 vs 
exp.3]) repeated measures ANOVA resulted in a main effect of Training, F(1,126) = 
11.1, p = .001, η² = .081, and a significant interaction between Training and 
Awareness, F(1,126) = 6.28, p = .013, η² = .047. Pair-wise comparisons indicated 
that there was a significant difference between those categorised as aware or not 
aware in training 2, F(1,126) = 6.81, p = .010, η² = .051, but not in training 1, 
F(1,126) = .709, p = .401, η² = .006. This effect did not interact with Experiment, 
F(2,126) = 2.35, p = .100, η² = .036. All other effects were not significant, F < 2.23, 
p > .138, η² < .017. These results indicate that across the three experiments, the bias 
index scores measured in the second training interacted with contingency awareness. 
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Those aware of a stimulus-probe association showed faster responding to the probe 
that followed the predictive stimulus, indicating greater training of selective 
attention.  
Discussion 
The final combined analysis supported the general observation that across 
studies attention bias training to non-emotional stimuli was only evident in the 
second training, not in the first training. This suggests that the null findings of 
training 1 did not occur due to the baseline assessment (Experiment 1 vs Experiment 
2 and 3), or the difficulty level of the dot-probe task employed (Experiment 1 and 2 
vs Experiment 3). Additionally, the results showed that the training effect in the 
second training was observed only in the within-training assessment and not in the 
post-training assessment. This implies that the attention bias induced within-training 
does not transfer to the assessment post-training, suggesting that the expression of 
selective attention is highly sensitive to changes in contingency, and may not 
persevere once a training contingency is entirely removed.  
Secondly, the hypothesis that contingency awareness may be associated with 
the acquisition and change of attention bias in training was explored. Firstly, it was 
found that between 30 to 50% of the participants reported some awareness of a 
stimulus-probe contingency across studies. Secondly, analyses indicated that there 
was a significant difference in changes in selective attention between those 
categorised as aware versus those categorised as not aware of the stimulus probe 
contingency. Participants who reported awareness of a stimulus-probe contingency 
showed a significant attention bias in training 2, whereas the attention bias was not 
significantly different from zero in those who reported no awareness of any 
contingency. Importantly, this result did not interact with Experiment. These findings 
imply that awareness of the stimulus-probe contingency is associated with attention 
bias acquisition.   
General Discussion Experiments 1, 2 and 3 
Three experiments were conducted to investigate attentional responses to 
stimulus-probe associations in the dot-probe task, with the over-arching aim of 
establishing a template to investigate the initial acquisition, retraining, and 
assessment of selective attention. In doing so, these studies also examined how 
attention bias assessed during blocks of training trials transferred to discrete 
assessment blocks. It was hypothesised that an attention bias towards a non-
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emotional stimulus can be trained by placing the probe 95% of the time in the same 
location of one of two visually distinct stimuli (circle or triangle). Furthermore, it 
was hypothesised that by reversing the stimulus-probe contingency, an attention bias 
can be retrained to the opposite stimulus in a second training. Next, it was 
hypothesised that the post-training assessment would capture the attention bias 
created in the previous training. Moreover, this study explored the association 
between contingency awareness assessed at the end of the experiment and selective 
attention manipulated in the training phases. 
Across experiments, evidence for an acquired bias in selective attention was 
found only in the second, and not in the first training. These results provided partial 
support for the first hypothesis, the dot-probe task was able to train attention bias to a 
non-emotional congruent stimulus, however not in both training phases. The 
possibility that pre-exposure to 80 non-predictive baseline assessment trials impeded 
learning of an attention bias in training 1 due to the learned irrelevance of the 
stimulus-probe contingency was tested in Experiment 2, however, the results did not 
favour this hypothesis. Overall, with or without a baseline assessment procedure, 
participants did not show evidence of an attentional preference for the congruent 
relative to the incongruent stimuli in training 1. The third experiment examined 
whether a more difficult version of the dot-probe task than used in the first two 
experiments would encourage participants to use the stimuli as predictors of the 
probes. This may in turn aid learning of the stimulus-probe contingency in training 1. 
However, no evidence of an acquired attention bias towards the congruent stimuli in 
any experimental phase was observed in Experiment 3. Therefore, Experiment 3 
provided no evidence that increasing the difficulty of the task to make probes harder 
to distinguish, would facilitate learning of a stimulus-probe contingency.  
However, we did find evidence that awareness of the stimulus-probe 
contingency accompanied acquisition of an attention bias. It was found that 
participants, who reported at the end of the experiment that they were aware of a 
stimulus-probe contingency, showed evidence of bias change in the direction 
consistent with training, however, only in training 2, and again, not in training 1. 
Participants unaware of the predictive function of the stimuli did not acquire an 
attention bias. It is possible that over time, participants became more aware of the 
stimulus-probe contingency as the experiment progressed, and after they experienced 
a shift in contingency, which can explain the null findings in training 1. Nevertheless, 
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an important limitation was that awareness was measured only at the end and not 
after every part of the experiment. This approach cannot determine whether the lack 
of attention bias induction in training 1 was due to the lack of contingency awareness 
in that phase. Therefore, future studies could usefully seek to measure contingency 
awareness in every phase, preferably without influencing participants’ further 
stimulus-probe learning. This may be done by measuring visual mismatch negativity 
using an EEG, an event‐related potential (ERP) sensitive to violations of learned 
statistical contingencies (Arad, Abend, Pine, & Bar-Haim, 2018). Arad et al. (2018) 
found that mismatch negativity clearly indicated contingency awareness during 
ABM. Another means of assessing contingency awareness may be to use online 
expectancy rating trials, wherein participants are asked to predict the location in 
which the next probe will appear. These could be implemented by presenting 
intermittent test trials where two question marks will appear instead of a probe 
requiring participants to indicate the probable location of the probe. Such an 
approach could in principle determine whether contingency awareness precedes 
training of attention bias.  
Across experiments it was also found that at least half of the participants in 
the experimental groups did not become aware of the contingency. Given that 
individual differences in acquiring awareness of the contingency may play a role in 
the malleability of selective attention, further research is needed to determine what 
underpins individual differences in the probability that they will become aware of the 
contingency. Or more specifically, why some people fail to become aware. This in 
turn can provide helpful insights in the efficacy of attention bias training. Further 
research into individual differences of acquiring contingency awareness in ABM is 
particularly important since previous research has given mixed indications about the 
influence of awareness of the stimulus-probe contingency on the trainability of 
selective attention in ABM. Some studies showed that the contingency awareness 
needs to be acquired implicitly to reliably modify selective attention in training (Bar-
Haim, 2010; Hertel & Mathews, 2011). Others showed that giving explicit 
instructions led to stronger changes in selective attention in ABM, though, these 
instructions also reduced the effects of ABM on subsequent emotion reactivity 
(Grafton et al., 2014; Lazarov et al., 2017). This study adds to these findings by 
showing that no consistent changes in attention in line with the contingency were 
found among those who did not indicate awareness of a stimulus-probe association, 
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while such changes were evident in those who reported awareness. This indicates 
that an awareness of the possible presence of a stimulus-probe contingency was 
associated with change in selective attention in line with the training contingency. 
Besides, in accordance with the attentional theories of associative learning 
(Kruschke, 2003; Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975) it was hypothesised that any 
pattern of selective attention evident within training would be maintained and 
observed during the subsequent post-training assessment phase where participants 
would react faster to probes after stimuli that previously held predictive value. 
However, no support was found for this hypothesis across the three experiments 
where the stimulus-probe contingency changed from a predictive contingency in 
training to a non-predictive contingency in assessment. The bias index scores were 
not significantly different from zero in the assessment following the successful 
training. Our results were in line with those of Le Pelley, Vadillo, and Luque (2013), 
who found that the predictiveness of a stimulus generated in a previous task was 
quickly extinguished, and did not yield significant differences in a subsequent dot-
probe task. As such, the current results clearly suggest that the post-training 
assessment of attention bias is unlikely to represent the pattern of bias acquired 
during training, because the pattern of bias is reactive to the assessment.  
It may be of interest to develop different post-assessment procedures where, 
for instance, subtle changes to the contingencies are introduced, rather than an abrupt 
change. According to the exploration-exploitation decision making hypothesis (Daw, 
O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Laureiro-Martínez, Brusoni, Canessa, 
& Zollo, 2015), when the contingency radically changes, the context will also change 
radically from training to assessment, and participants aware of the contingency will 
explore other strategies to maximise task performance. Instead, if the context 
gradually changes by incrementally altering the contingency, participants may be less 
likely to alter the strategy used in training. Consequently, the bias acquired in 
training may be more likely to be evident in post-training assessment. Future 
research should investigate how attention bias change can be assessed without the 
assessment influencing the attention bias patterns acquired during training. Besides 
changing the contingency more subtly, attention bias can possibly be measured in a 
more direct way, overcoming the need for any change in contingencies, for instance, 
by employing a free viewing task measuring eye-gaze as suggested by Armstrong 
and Olatunji (2012).  
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Conclusion 
Across three experiments evidence was found for attention bias training 
towards non-emotional stimuli in a second, reversed contingency training, but not in 
the initial training. Training effects were only registered on within-training 
assessment trials and did not transfer to post-training assessment trials. This suggest 
that the non-predictive contingency during assessments seemed to extinguish patterns 
of selective attention acquired during training. Therefore, it was proposed that 
selective attention is very malleable and dependent on the stimulus-probe 
contingency used in the ABM procedure. It was suggested that future research should 
use other methods to assess attention bias change after training. Furthermore, at least 
50% of participants did not acquire awareness and attention bias was not induced in 
those who did not report contingency awareness. It would be beneficial for future 
research to investigate individual differences in acquiring contingency awareness, as 
well as how contingency awareness is associated with attention bias acquisition.  
The series of experiments reported here investigated stimulus-probe 
associative learning mechanisms that underlie ABM training as well as assessment 
and can inform ABM efficacy. However, it is suggested that these results are 
replicated with the use of emotional stimuli, controlling for individual differences, 
before applying these findings in a clinical context.  
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Appendix Chapter 2 
Table 2 
Mean Reaction Time Scores of Congruent and Incongruent Trials in all Experiments 
and Groups of Chapter 1 
Group Aware  Block Trial M(SD) S, K 
Experiment 1 
(n = 47) 
Yes  
(n = 22) 
Baseline Congruent 523(56.7) -.215, -.604 
Incongruent 524(52.7) -.576, -.090 
Training 1 Congruent 520(54.2) -.266, -.787 
Incongruent 519(69.5) .456, -.421 
Assessment 1 Congruent 526(64.3) .720, -.173 
Incongruent 530(63.0) .603, -.827 
Training 2 Congruent 513(57.2) .168, -.678 
Incongruent 540(71.2) -.717, .721 
Assessment 2 Congruent 502(50.9) .379, .115 
Incongruent 511(59.8) .508, .425 
No  
(n = 25) 
Baseline Congruent 553(65.5) .039, -.970 
Incongruent 558(67.7) .028, -1.28 
Training 1 Congruent 531(49.4) .585, -.526 
Incongruent 538(66.6) .695, -.372 
Assessment 1 Congruent 547(62.7) .802, .281 
Incongruent 550(64.4) .621, .240 
Training 2 Congruent 522(48.5) .555, -.841 
Incongruent 534(67.8) .758, -.154 
Assessment 2 Congruent 520(57.4) -.115, -1.05 
Incongruent 521(54.8) .175, -.319 
Experiment 2 
(n = 50 ) 
Yes 
(n = 23) 
Training 1 Congruent 521(62.3) .187, -.848 
Incongruent 534(69.3) .217, -1.32 
Assessment 1 Congruent 509(55.9) .439, -.991 
Incongruent 511(60.1) 1.02, .481 
Training 2 Congruent 498(57.7) .140, -1.09 
Incongruent 531(69.5) .436, .008 
Assessment 2 Congruent 492(49.4) .469, .406 
Incongruent 498(52.1) .564, 1.09 
No  
(n = 17) 
Training 1 Congruent 522(56.8) .284, -.570 
Incongruent 520(68.1) 1.55, 2.34 
Assessment 1 Congruent 514(57.7) .550, -1.10 
Incongruent 511(61.7) -.117, -1.45 
Training 2 Congruent 497(57.4) .171, -1.44 
Incongruent 514(59.3) .433, -.320 
Assessment 2 Congruent 496(62.9) -.008, -1.41 
Incongruent 504(65.2) -.187, -.403 
Experiment 3 
(n = 45) 
  
Yes  
(n = 14) 
Training 1 Congruent 659(175) .866, .187 
Incongruent 677(170) .248, -1.28 
Assessment 1 Congruent 619(135) .495, -.817 
Incongruent 659(145) -.158, -1.28 
Training 2 Congruent 597(151) .000, -1.28 
Incongruent 673(178) .850, .128 
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Group Aware  Block Trial M(SD) S, K 
Assessment 2 Congruent 607(113) .160, -.587 
Incongruent 605(115) .081, -1.08 
No  
(n = 31) 
Training 1 Congruent 661(153) .847, -.022 
Incongruent 656(174) .863, .186 
Assessment 1 Congruent 636(138) .481, -.540 
Incongruent 635(131) .472, -.519 
Training 2 Congruent 612(129) .947, .766 
Incongruent 607(140) .777, .058 
Assessment 2 Congruent 608(137) 1.39, 2.73 
Incongruent 608(134) 1.63, 3.82 
Control  
(n = 51) 
 Baseline Congruent 508(54.4) 1.24, 4.45 
Incongruent 505(52.7) .711, 1.19 
Training 1 Congruent 507(47.6) .523, .793 
Incongruent 503(45.1) -.165, .258 
Assessment 1 Congruent 505(48.9) .634, 2.54 
Incongruent 512(48.3) 1.10, 3.95 
Training 2 Congruent 503(48.0) 1.07, 2.85 
Incongruent 497(58.9) .680, 2.00 
Assessment 2 Congruent 515(52.0) .022, .448 
Incongruent 506(505) .146, .660 
Note: M(SD) = Mean reaction times (standard deviations). 
The distribution of the scores were measured with Skewness (S) and Kurtosis (K). 
The standard errors of the Skewness was between .333 and .597, the standard errors of the 
Kurtosis was between .656 and 1.15.  
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Table 3 
Range, Mean Scores (M), Standard Deviations (SD) and the Distribution of Scores the Valence Ratings Pre- and Post-Experiment of all Shapes 
in Chapter 1 
 
Shape 
Pre-experiment Post-experiment 
 Range, M (SD) S, K Range, M (SD) S, K 
Control group Circle 29-100, 72.8 (18.1) -156, -.826 4-100, 60.8 (23.0) -.433, -.050 
Triangle 25-100, 61.5 (20.3) .065, -.726 3-100, 56.5 (21.4) -.032, -.292 
Diamond 23-100, 70.7 (15.0) -.945, 1.19 10-100, 64.4 (21.9) -.511, -.587 
Square 12-100, 62.8 (21.2) -.271, -.010 7-100, 58.2 (21.7) -.167, -.102 
Experiment 1 Circle 37-100, 74.5 (18.0) -.533, -1.07 11-100, 65.3 (22.4) -.769, .228 
Triangle 16-100, 64.6 (17.6) -.549, .436 2-100, 55.7 (23.9) -.575, -.287 
Diamond 24-100, 69.8 (16.4) -.267, .218 29-100, 68.2 (17.7) -.440, -.257 
Square 15-100, 61.6 (22.4) -.429, -.547 8-100, 60.8 (20.4) -.224, .057 
Experiment 2 Circle 38-100, 76.7 (17.3) -.615, -.517 28-100, 67.1 (19.0) -.283, -.532 
Triangle 25-100, 64.5 (19.1) -.626, -.468 20-100, 62.5 (21.3) -.500, -.494 
Diamond 27-100, 69.0 (17.6) -.168, -.347 0-100, 63.4 (22.5) -.746, .531 
Square 30-100, 71.4 (18.0) -.125, -.693 33-100, 67.3 (16.6) .350, -.709 
Note: The distribution was measured with Skewness (S) and Kurtosis (K). 
The standard error of the skewness was between .333 and .350, the standard error of the Kurtosis was between .656 and .688.  
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Table 4 
Split Half Reliability of the Dot-Probe Task with 5000 Random Iterations in Chapter 1. 
Experiment Group Phase Awareness Mean split half 
(95%CI) 
Spearman-Brown 
(95%CI) 
Experiment 1  Experimental   Baseline Total (n  = 47) -0.14 (-0.35, 0.10) -0.36 (-1.06, 0.19) 
Aware (n = 22) 0.12 (-0.20, 0.46) 0.17 (-0.52, 0.63) 
Not aware (n = 25) -0.44 (-0.66, -0.16) -1.79 (-3.80, -1.38) 
Assessment 1 Total (n  = 47) -.016 (-0.14, 0.09) -0.44 (-1.38, 0.17) 
Aware (n = 22) -0.27 (-0.60, 0.10) -0.93 (-3.01, 0.18) 
Not aware (n = 25) -0.02 (-0.31, 0.30) -0.10 (-0.89, 0.47) 
Assessment 2 Total (n  = 47) 0.08 (-0.13, 0.31) 0.13 (-0.32, 0.47) 
Aware (n = 22) 0.35 (0.06, 0.62) -0.85 (-2.20, 0.10) 
Not aware (n = 25) -.027 (-0.52, 0.05) 0.50 (0.11, 0.76) 
Control  Total (n  = 51) 0.04 (-0.18, 0.26) 0.05 (-0.45, 0.42) 
Experiment 2 Experimental   Assessment 1 Total (n  = 40) -0.01 (-0.22, 0.23) -0.04 (-0.55, 0.38) 
Aware (n = 23) 0.11 (-0.18, 0.44) 0.16 (-0.44, 0.61) 
Not aware (n = 17) -0.16 (-0.47, 0.25) -0.49 (-1.77, 0.40) 
Assessment 2 Total (n  = 40) -0.09 (-0.31, 0.15) -0.24 (-0.91, 0.27) 
Aware (n = 23) -0.08 (-0.37, 0.26) -0.25 (-1.20, 0.41) 
Not aware (n = 17) -0.10 (-0.43, 0.32) -0.32 (-1.52, 0.48) 
Experiment 3 Experimental   Assessment 1 Total (n  = 46) 0.24 (0.00, 0.46) 0.37 (0.00, 0.63) 
Aware (n = 14) 0.37 (-0.01, 0.72) 0.51 (-0.02, 0.84) 
Not aware (n = 31) 0.16 (-0.15, 0.45) 0.24 (-0.35, 0.62) 
Assessment 2 Total (n  = 46) -0.16 (-0.39,0.09) -0.44 (-1.27, 0.17) 
Aware (n = 14) -0.12 (-0.50, 0.35) -0.42 (-1.98, 0.52) 
Not aware (n = 31) -0.14 (-0.42, 0.19) -0.40 (-1.45, 0.32) 
Note. The R package ‘splithalf’ version 0.3.1 was used to calculate the above split half reliabilities of the Dot-Probe task with function ‘splithalf_diff’ 
(Parsons, 2018). The following additional arguments were used: halftype = "random", no.iterations = 5000, RTmintrim = 100, RTmaxtrim = 2500. 
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The first three experiments in this thesis investigated a working template 
wherein the dot-probe task acquires and changes attention bias by using different 
stimulus-probe contingencies in an attention bias modification (ABM) paradigm. 
Non-emotional stimuli were used to establish this template without the interference 
of individual differences related to emotional stimuli. The findings of the dot-probe 
task employed with non-emotional stimuli in the previous three experiments alluded 
to the possibility that individual differences, which are not related to emotion, also 
appear to influence attention bias acquisition and change. This was revealed by the 
apparent fragility of the stimulus-probe associative learning mechanism that was 
demonstrated by the inconsistent results found in the previous experiments. One 
individual difference that explained variance in attention bias acquisition was 
contingency awareness. Attention bias to congruent non-emotional stimuli was 
acquired during training in participants, who reported awareness of a stimulus-probe 
contingency. No attention bias was acquired in those who did not report awareness of 
this contingency. This finding suggests that contingency awareness is necessary for 
attention bias change to occur in a dot-probe task that used non-emotional stimuli. 
However, not all variance in the results were explained by contingency awareness, 
for instance, it is still unclear why an attention bias was induced in the second and 
not in the initial contingency training or why the acquired attention bias was no 
longer evident in the post-training assessment. Therefore, it is likely that other 
individual differences or task parameters are important in achieving attention bias 
acquisition with non-emotional stimuli.  
The following two experiments incorporated emotion into the design. This 
was done by including emotional stimuli in the dot-probe task. The emotional stimuli 
used in the current experiment in the dot-probe task were angry and neutral facial 
expressions. To control for other biases in facial recognition, like race (Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001), age (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2006), and gender biases (Herlitz & 
Rehnman, 2008), only middle-aged male Caucasian faces were chosen. These stimuli 
increase the applicability of the findings in a clinical setting. However, the inclusion 
of emotion into the design also increases the number of individual differences that 
can confound the effect of stimulus-probe associations on attention bias acquisition 
and change using the dot-probe task.  
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The main individual difference that influences the relation between emotion 
and attention bias acquisition and change is psychopathology. That is, greater 
attention bias towards emotional stimuli is found in individuals with higher than 
those with lower or no pathology symptomology (e.g., Bantin et al., 2016; Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007; MacLeod et al., 1986). Furthermore, this difference in magnitude of the 
pre-existing bias has also shown to affect the efficacy of ABM training. There seems 
to be a positive association between magnitude of pre-existing attention bias and 
magnitude of attention bias change when trained away from threatening stimuli 
(Mogoaşe et al., 2014; Price et al., 2016). This suggest that ABM is most effective in 
changing negative attention bias with participants who have a greater pre-existing 
negative attention bias, which is mostly found in individuals with higher levels of 
psychopathology. 
To assess the effect of individual differences in psychopathology and 
contingency awareness on the acquisition and change of attention bias, measures of 
social anxiety and contingency awareness were included at the start and end of the 
experiment, respectively. Levels of social anxiety were measured as the relevance of 
the stimuli content is important in the existence of attention bias related to 
psychopathology (Pergamin-Hight et al., 2015). Attentional biases towards angry 
faces have been shown to be an important factor in the aetiology and maintenance of 
social anxiety disorder (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Wong & Rapee, 2016), which is one 
of the most prevalent of all anxiety disorders (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 
2005). Furthermore, given that social anxiety is the most resistant to existing 
treatments (Wong & Rapee, 2016), research into a different types of social anxiety 
disorder treatments (i.e., ABM) may be particularly relevant.  
The objectives of the two experiments discussed in this chapter involved 
establishing a working template wherein the dot-probe task could be used to 
successfully assess and train (pre-existing) attention bias towards emotional stimuli. 
The current experiment consisted of five phases (similar to the three experiments 
described in Chapter 2). These were the baseline assessment, the first training 
(training 1), the first post-training assessment (assessment 1), the second (reversed 
contingency) training (training 2), and finally, a post-training assessment (assessment 
2). With this design it was assessed whether participants had a pre-existent bias 
towards angry faces at baseline, whether selective attention can be trained towards 
emotional or neutral stimuli, and whether an acquired bias could be extinguished or 
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reversed through exposure to a subsequently reversed training contingency. 
Especially, compared to participants in the no-training control group, those trained to 
attend to angry faces (in the initial or reversed training) would show an attention bias 
to angry faces in the within-training assessment, while those trained to attend to 
neutral faces (in the initial or reversed training) would show an attention bias to 
neutral faces in the within-training assessment. The second objective was to assess 
whether individual differences in contingency awareness and social anxiety were 
associated with pre-existing negative attention bias at baseline, attention bias 
acquisition within the initial and reverse training and the magnitude of attention bias 
change from pre- to post-training.  
It was hypothesised that selective attention would be biased towards angry 
faces at baseline and the magnitude of the pre-existing bias would be positively 
associated with levels of social anxiety. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that levels 
of social anxiety and pre-existing attention bias would be positively associated with 
magnitude of attention bias acquisition and change. Next, it was hypothesised that 
contingency awareness would be a prerequisite for attention bias acquisition, which 
would occur through stimulus-probe contingency learning. In other words, only those 
aware of the stimulus-probe contingency would show quicker responding to the 
probe preceded by predictive stimuli relative to the probe that was preceded by 
unpredictive stimuli during training. Lastly, if consistent with the previous 
experiments, an acquired pattern of selective attention would no longer persists when 
the contingency is not predictive (i.e., in the post-training assessments). Hence, we 
would expect to see evidence of bias acquisition in the within-training assessment, 
but this attention bias change would not be maintained in the post-training 
assessment. However, if the introduction of emotional stimuli aids the transfer of 
acquired attention bias from training to post-training assessment, it would be 
expected to see evidence of attention bias acquisition and change in the within-
training and post-training assessment phases of the ABM design. 
Experiment 4 
Methodology 
Study Design 
Participants received either non-contingency control training or they were 
either trained to attend to angry faces in the first training and to neutral faces in the 
second training (angry-neutral condition [labelled as AN]) or reversed (neutral-angry 
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condition [labelled as NA]). The order of the contingency in training in the 
experimental group was counterbalanced. The study design was a mixed factorial 
design, with one between-group and two within-group factors. The two within 
factors were the order of contingency delivered (initial vs reversed), and the different 
assessment points (within-training and post-training). The between-group factor was 
Condition, where the two active training conditions of the experimental group were 
compared with a control group. The baseline assessment was analysed separately to 
test the hypothesis that a pre-existing attention bias to emotional stimuli was present 
at baseline, especially for those high in social anxiety. 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-five Mechanical Turk workers participated in the 
experiment. Thirty participants who made more than the pre-determined 30% of 
errors and one participant who attempted the task twice were deleted from the 
sample, resulting in a total sample of 94 who made on average 12% errors (SD = 
6.06, range: 2.14 - 28.0). Participants (Mage = 32.5, SD = 6.60, range: 22 – 49, 33% 
female) were randomly assigned to two experimental groups (n = 59 [AN: n = 33; 
NA: n = 26]) or the control group (n = 33).  
Procedure 
Participants started with a screen calibration procedure to ensure consistency 
in stimulus parameters across screen sizes and resolutions. First, participants 
completed 39 anxiety-related questions from the Social Interaction Anxiety scale and 
the Social Phobia Scrutiny Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). This was followed by 8 
practice and 400 experimental trials of the dot-probe task. The experimental group 
completed a baseline assessment, a training, a post-training assessment, the reversed 
contingency training, and a post-assessment. The control group completed the same 
number of non-predictive assessment trials. The experiment ended with the 
contingency awareness check and demographic questions. The whole procedure was 
programmed in Inquisit 4 (2015) and hosted online via TurkPrime (Litman et al., 
2017). It took participants approximately 35 minutes to complete the experiment and 
they were reimbursed with 5 USD. The protocol was approved by the Human 
Research Ethics Committee at Curtin University. 
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Materials 
Stimuli Used in Dot-Probe Task 
Compared to the non-emotional shapes used in the dot-probe task described 
in Chapter 2, eight Caucasian male models were selected from the NimStim database 
(Tottenham et al., 2009), each depicting a neutral and an angry expression (closed 
mouth). These stimuli were sized at 300x385pixels.  
Dot-Probe Task 
The same dot-probe task was used as described in Experiment 3 (see Chapter 
2). Every trial would start with a 500ms presentation of a fixation cross in the middle 
of the screen, followed by the two stimuli presented next to each other for 500ms. 
The two stimuli were separated on the screen by 80mm. Then, a probe (4mm in size) 
would be presented in the locus of one of the two stimuli. The probe would disappear 
after a response was made or after 500ms. This limitation in probe duration was 
included in the previous experiment to increase reliance on the stimuli to predict the 
location of the probe. It was decided not to change this task parameter, so that the 
experiments were consistent and the effect of the inclusion of emotional stimuli can 
be assessed. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible, without 
making mistakes, to the orientation of the probe (either horizontally like ‘..’ or 
vertically like ‘:’). Similar to the dot-probe task described in Chapter 2, the 
experiment consisted of assessment and training phases. The assessment procedure 
consisted of 80 trials with a 50% stimulus-probe contingency, that is, the stimulus 
type did not predict the location of the probe. The training procedure consisted of 
160 trials with a 95% stimulus-probe contingency, that is, on 95% of the trials, the 
probe followed the same stimulus (ntrials = 152; labelled as congruent trials) and on 
5% of the trials, the probe followed the other stimulus (ntrials = 8; labelled as 
incongruent trials). The order in which the training contingencies were delivered was 
counterbalanced across participants such that half were first trained towards angry 
and away from neutral faces (AN condition) while the remainder were first trained 
towards neutral and away from angry faces (NA condition).  
Contingency Awareness Check 
The contingency awareness measure was the same as used in the previous 
experiments. Three questions were included at the end of the experiment to assess 
explicit awareness of any contingency: “Did you notice any regularities during the 
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computer task?”. Answer options were yes or no, if answered yes, this was followed 
up with the open ended question: “What did you notice?”. Lastly, a multiple-choice 
question was asked: “Did the dots follow more after a certain shape?”, six 
contingency options were given where participants could choose from (e.g., “No, the 
dots were presented equally often after both shapes”). As described in the previous 
chapter, participants of the experimental group were dichotomised into an aware or 
not aware category. Participants who selected any option indicating that there may 
have been a contingency involved were categorised as aware, even if they got it 
wrong, whereas the remaining were categorised as unaware. To reiterate, this liberal 
criterion was adopted because the contingency awareness check came at the end of 
the experiment, after multiple contingency changes. It was to take into account that it 
was hard for participants to remember exactly what happened throughout the 
procedure.  
Strategy 
The same open-ended question (“Did you use a certain strategy?”) was 
included as the previous experiment to assess the strategy used by the participant to 
perform the dot-probe task. 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale 
Social interaction anxiety was measured with the Social Interaction Anxiety 
Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998). The SIAS consists of 19 items (e.g.: "I have 
difficulty making eye-contact with others") wherein scores ranged from 0 (not at all) 
to 4 (extremely). After the reverse scoring of two items, the possible range of scores 
was between 0 and 76. The internal consistency of the scale was excellent (α = .965). 
Social Phobia Scrutiny Fear  
Social phobia scrutiny fear was measured with the Social Phobia Scrutiny 
(SPS) scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). The SPS consists of 20 items (e.g.: "I feel self-
conscious if I have to enter a room where others are already seated") wherein scores 
ranged from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). The possible range of scores was between 
0 and 80. The internal consistency of the scale was excellent (α = .944). 
Data Preparation and Statistical Analyses 
Analyses, statistical outcomes, and errors were based on the same criteria as 
described in the methodology of Experiment 3 (see Chapter 2). The mean RTs for 
each trial type per Condition are reported in the Appendix Table 10 at the end of this 
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chapter. Out of these mean RTs, bias index scores (BIS) were calculated, where the 
overall mean RTs of trials where the probe was placed in the same location as the 
angry face (labelled as angry-trial) were subtracted from the overall mean RTs of 
trials where the probe was placed in the same location as the neutral face (labelled as 
neutral-trial). A positive BIS indicated an attention bias towards angry faces, 
whereas a negative BIS indicated an attention bias towards neutral faces. Two 
participants had extreme outlier scores (a value more than 3 times the interquartile 
range) in the BIS measured at baseline and were excluded from the following 
analysis. The mean BIS measured at baseline was compared to zero in a one-sample 
t-test, used to test whether attention was biased at baseline towards angry compared 
to neutral faces. One other extreme outlier was detected in the first training phase and 
was excluded from the analysis that investigated whether attention bias was acquired 
and changed as a result of the stimulus-probe contingencies employed in the ABM 
paradigm. In this analysis, the mean BIS were subjected to a 2 x 2 x 3 (Contingency 
[initial vs reversed) x (Assessment [within-training vs post-training] x (Condition 
[AN vs NA vs control]) repeated measures mixed-design analyses of variance 
(ANOVA).  
There were no extreme outliers in the SPS and SIAS scores, hence no 
participants were excluded based on this criterion. Analyses were conducted for the 
two active training conditions in the experimental group, since the control group did 
not receive any training. Firstly, attention bias change scores were calculated for 
attention bias change from baseline to the first post-training assessment (ABChange1), 
and bias change from the first to the second post-training assessment (ABChange2). 
These change scores were calculated by subtracting the BIS in the post-training 
assessment from the BIS in the pre-training assessment. Secondly, it was examined 
whether there was an association between social anxiety and an elevated degree of 
attention bias to angry faces at baseline, greater attention bias acquisition within 
training 1 and 2, as well as greater malleability of attention bias change as indicated 
by the ABchange1 and ABChange2 scores. Pearson’s correlations were computed between 
the SIAS and SPS sum scores and the BIS in all phases per active training condition 
(Bonferroni corrected p < .010). Thirdly, to examine whether the magnitude of pre-
existing bias was associated with attention bias change away from threat, Pearson 
correlations were calculated between BIS measured at baseline and in training phases 
where participants were trained to attend to neutral stimuli. Thus, pre-existing bias 
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was correlated with the BIS measured in training 1 and ABChange1 in the NA condition 
and with the BIS measured in training 2 and ABChange2 in the AN condition. However, 
given that the ABChange1 include the BIS from the baseline phase in its calculation, a 
high correlation (> .850) would indicate multicollinearity, not a true effect.  
The 2 x 2 x 2 (Contingency [initial vs reversed]) x (Assessment [within-
training vs post-training] x (Awareness [aware vs not aware]) mixed-design analyses 
of variance (ANOVA) was not analysed as only eight participants in the experimental 
group (< 15%) were categorised as aware.  
Results 
Attention Bias at Baseline, Training and Assessment Phases 
A one-sample t-test showed that there was no general attention bias towards 
angry, relative to neutral facial expressions at baseline (M = -10.3, SD = 77.2), t(89) 
= -1.27, p = .209, 95%CI(-26.5, 5.87). The mean emotional bias index scores in each 
experimental phase are shown in in Figure 7. The ANOVA, which tested the rest of 
the ABM paradigm, resulted in a marginal significant effect between Contingency 
and Assessment, F(1,87) = 3.03, p = .085, η² = .034. Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons 
showed that there was no significant difference between the within-training and post-
training assessments points in the initial contingency, t(89) = .918, p = .361, 95%CI(-
10.6, 28.6), d = 0.15, however, marginally in the reversed contingency, t(89) = 1.90, 
p = .060, 95%CI(-.663, 30.3), d = 0.27. All other effects in the omnibus ANOVA 
were not significant, F < .838, p > .363, η² < .010. The stimulus-probe associations 
do not seem to influence attention bias acquisition or change.  
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Figure 7. Mean Bias Index Scores in the Experimental and Control groups of Experiment 4 
as a Function of Phase.  
Negative scores indicate an attention bias towards the neutral faces, whereas positive scores 
indicate an attention bias towards angry faces. Error bars represent standard error of the 
mean. 
* p < .050 (different from zero). 
Social Anxiety and its Association with Pre-Existing Attention Bias at Baseline  
A score greater than 22 and 18 is considered the clinical cut-off point for the 
SIAS and SPS, respectively. On the SIAS, 49% of participants were above the 
clinical cut-off point in the AN condition, compared to 35% in the NA, and 67% in 
the control condition, whereas, on the SPS, these percentages were 33%, 23%, and 
58%, respectively. One-way ANOVAs indicated that there were significant 
differences between conditions on these social anxiety scores as shown in Table 2, 
SIAS: F(2,89) = 4.48, p = .014, η² = .091, and SPS: F(2,89) = 3.11, p = .049, η² 
= .065. Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons between the three conditions revealed that in 
both social anxiety measures, significantly lower social anxiety scores were found in 
the NA condition than in the control condition, for both measures t > 2.49, p < .043, 
95%CI(.207, 18.9), d > 0.70. No other significant differences were found in social 
anxiety scores, all other comparisons, t < 1.44, p > .460, 95%CI(-3.62, 14.0), d < 
0.33 (Bonferroni corrected). Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the self-
reported social anxiety measures. 
 
  
* 
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Table 5.  
Descriptive Statistics of the Self-Reported Social Anxiety Measures 
Condition  Range M(SD) Distribution 
S, K 
Angry-Neutral (n  = 33)  SIAS 0 - 70 26.1(18.2) .552, -.467 
 SPS 0 - 53 17.7(15.6) 1.03, .112 
Neutral-Angry (n  = 26) SIAS 0 - 63 18.9(15.1) .975, .465 
 SPS 0 - 42 12.5(10.5) 1.22, 1.46 
Control (n  = 33) SIAS 0 - 62 32.8(19.0) -.400, .409 
 SPS 0 - 53 22.1(16.3) .354, -.854 
Note: SIAS = social interaction anxiety scale; SPS = social phobia scale; M(SD) = Mean 
(standard deviation). Distribution is represented with Skewness (S) and Kurtosis (K), the 
standard errors of the distribution measures were between .409 and .798.   
Social anxiety was not associated with BIS assessed at baseline, the 
correlations were not significant, both r < -.113, p > .291 (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Association between Social Anxiety and Emotional Bias Scores Measured at 
Baseline for Each Condition in Experiment 4. The solid lines represent the linear line of best 
fit. 
Social Anxiety and its Association with Attention Bias Acquisition and Change 
After Bonferroni correction, none of the correlations between the SIAS and 
SPS scores and the BIS measured within the dot-probe training assessments or as a 
change score were significant in the active training conditions, all r < .356, p > .042 
(see Figure 9 and 10).  
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Figure 9. Associations between Social Anxiety and Emotional Bias Index Scores Measured 
within Each Training Pre- to Post-Training for Each Active Training Condition in 
Experiment 4. The solid lines represent the linear line of best fit. 
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Figure 10. Associations between Social Anxiety and Emotional Bias Index Scores Measured 
as an Attention Bias Change Score Pre- to Post-Training for Each Active Training Condition 
in Experiment 4. The solid lines represent the linear line of best fit. 
The hypotheses, which stated that higher levels of social anxiety were related 
to pre-existing negative attention bias and increased magnitude of attention bias 
change were not supported. 
Pre-Existing Attention Bias and its Association with Attention Bias Acquisition 
and Change 
There were no significant correlation in the NA training condition between 
the BIS assessed at baseline and the BIS assessed within training 1, r(24) .189, p 
= .354 or between the BIS assessed at baseline and BIS within training 2 in the AN 
training condition, r(28) = .095, p = .617 (see Figure 11). The BIS assessed at 
baseline correlated significantly with the ABChange1 in the NA training condition, r(24) 
= -.948, p < .001. However, given that the ABChange1 calculation included the BIS 
from the baseline phase, this high correlation indicates multicollinearity (> .850), not 
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a true effect. The BIS assessed at baseline did not correlate with the ABChange2 in the 
AN training condition, r(28) = -.067, p = .724.  
 
Figure 11. Association between Pre-Existing Attention Bias and Emotional Bias Index 
Scores Measured within and Pre- to Post-Training away from Threat for Each Condition in 
Experiment 4. The solid lines represent the linear line of best fit. 
These results suggest that the magnitude of the pre-existing bias was not 
associated with attention bias acquisition or change when participants were trained 
away from threat.  
Strategies Used to Perform the Dot-Probe Task 
Qualitative responses were categorised into four themes and are reported in 
Table 6. These were: (1) No strategy used (e.g., “No”); (2) Focused on the probes 
(e.g., “I blocked out the faces as best as possible and focused on the dots”); (3) 
Focused on certain location of the screen (e.g., “I focused on the left face to watch for 
dots, and if they weren't there I switched my eyes over to the right side quickly”); (4) 
Faces predicted the probe (e.g., “I would look as quick as possible and tried to see if 
certain faces would bring certain dot patterns”). In addition, some participants (n = 
3) explicitly reported that the task was too difficult to perform (e.g., “No, this was so 
very difficult!”). 
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Table 6.  
Strategies Used to Perform the Dot-Probe Task in Each Condition 
Themes Angry-Neutral Neutral-Angry Control 
No strategy used n = 14 (42%) n = 9 (35%) n = 14 (42%) 
Focused on the probes n = 9 (27%) n = 10 (38%) n = 10 (30%) 
Focused on certain 
location of the screen n = 8 (24%) n = 6 (23%) n = 8 (24%) 
Shape predicted the 
probe n = 2 (6%) n = 1 (4%) n = 1 (3%) 
The type of strategy used did not differ per training condition, X2(6) = 1.27, p 
= .974, ɸ = .117 and are not further analysed because of the small numbers.  
Discussion 
The aim of this experiment was to test whether predictive and non-predictive 
stimulus-probe associations were adequate in inducing, changing and assessing (pre-
existing) attention bias in participants. Compared to the previous experiments that 
used non-emotional shapes (circles and triangles), this experiment used emotional 
stimuli depicting angry and neutral faces. The results showed that attention bias was 
not acquired or changed through the stimulus-probe contingencies used in the 
emotional dot-probe task. No attention bias was induced as a result of the 95% 
stimulus-probe contingency training and there was no attention bias evident in the 
assessment phase post-training. The principles of associative learning theories may 
predict the lack of contingency training found in this experiment. These principles 
state that attention paid to the stimulus, which preceded the probe, increases the 
strength of the associative connection between them (Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972). It is possible that not all participants paid attention to the stimulus 
and as a result did not learn the stimulus-probe associations. This is somewhat 
supported by the self-reported strategies, which showed that participants did not use 
any strategy to perform the dot-probe task or focused either on the probes or a certain 
location of the screen. Merely, an approximate of 5% of participants reported a 
strategy that involved the stimuli to perform the dot-probe task.  
It is possible that some participants did not pay attention to the stimulus to 
predict the location of the probe because the task parameters of the dot-probe task 
were too strict. Compared to the conventional dot-probe task, which does not limit 
the probe duration, the probe duration in the current task was limited to 500ms. This 
was included to replicate the task parameters used in Experiment 3, which intended 
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to increase the reliance on the non-emotional stimuli to predict the probe. However, 
this manipulation of task parameter combined with the inclusion of emotional stimuli 
may have increased the difficulty level of the dot-probe task to a level that made the 
task too hard for participants to complete. Some participants explicitly reported, in 
the strategy assessment, that they had trouble carrying out the task because it was too 
difficult. The increase of difficulty was also represented in the increase of average 
RTs from Experiment 3 to Experiment 4 (See Appendix Tables 10 and 11). It is 
possible that the difficulty level of the dot-probe task needs to be tailored, so that 
participants do not ignore the stimuli that precede the probe, because the task is 
either too difficult or too easy to perform. Furthermore, the conventional ABM 
paradigm does not include a reversed training contingency. This switch in stimulus-
probe contingency, in the middle of the paradigm, may hinder stimulus-probe 
associative learning. Therefore, to achieve stimulus-probe associative learning 
related to attention bias acquisition and change, it is suggested that the probe 
duration in the dot-probe task may need to be increased and the ABM paradigm may 
need to be simplified by omitting the reversed contingency phases. 
The secondary objective was to examine whether individual differences in 
social anxiety were associated with pre-existing attention bias, and whether 
individual differences in social anxiety, pre-existing attention bias and contingency 
awareness were associated with attention bias acquisition and change. In contrast to 
the previous experiments that used non-emotional stimuli, individual differences in 
contingency awareness did not explain any variance in the lack of attention bias 
found throughout the ABM paradigm. Most participants reported no awareness of 
any contingency. Combined with the self-reported results on the strategy used, it is 
likely that most participants did not become aware of the contingency as they did not 
pay any attention to the stimulus that preceded the probe. Moreover, the previous 
experiments found evidence for attention bias acquisition to the congruent stimulus 
in those that reported awareness of the stimulus-probe association. Therefore, the 
lack of attention bias acquisition and change in the current experiment may be 
associated with the lack of participants’ awareness of the stimulus-probe 
contingency. Furthermore, in contrast to what was hypothesised, there was no 
evidence of pre-existing attention bias at baseline nor was there an association 
between social anxiety and magnitude of pre-existing attention bias. Additionally, 
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there were no association between pre-existing attention bias and attention bias 
acquisition and change when participants were trained away from threat.  
The lack of associations between individual differences in social anxiety and 
pre-existing attention bias is in contrast to what was hypothesised based on the 
attention and emotion theories discussed in Chapter 1 and previous meta-analyses 
conducted (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007). According to Bantin et al. (2016), the 
common reason for this null finding is that a non-selected sample often consists of 
individuals with relatively homogeneous and low levels of social anxiety. However, 
our sample consisted of relatively high number of socially anxious individuals and 
there was a high variability of scores. Nonetheless, according to recent reviews, most 
studies that used the standard dot-probe task to assess attention bias did not find an 
attention bias toward threat relative to non-threat stimuli in anxious individuals at 
baseline (Dudeney, Sharpe, & Hunt, 2015; Mogg & Bradley, 2016; Mogg, Waters, & 
Bradley, 2017; Roberts, Farrell, Waters, Oar, & Ollendick, 2016; Van Bockstaele et 
al., 2014). Other evidence also suggests that anxious individuals do not consistently 
show an attention bias toward threat and sometimes show threat-avoidance or no bias 
at all (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Dudeney et al., 2015; Kruijt, Parsons, & Fox, 2019; 
Waters, Bradley, & Mogg, 2014).  
Contrary to what was hypothesised, levels of social anxiety were not 
associated with attention bias acquisition or attention bias change. However, this may 
be explained by the lack of pre-existing attention bias. Studies showed that the 
magnitude of pre-existing attention bias was positively associated with the efficacy 
of ABM training away from threat (Mogoaşe et al., 2014; Price et al., 2016). It may 
be that the association between social anxiety and attention bias acquisition and 
change is mediated by the existence of pre-existing attention bias. Without a pre-
existing attention bias to angry faces, the stimulus-probe association in the dot-probe 
task may not be effective in inducing or changing attention bias. However, the 
possibility remains that participants did not attend to the face stimuli in the dot-probe 
task to predict the location of the probe. Without attention paid to the stimuli, the dot-
probe task cannot assess an existing attention bias, nor induce or change it. It is 
possible that the task parameters used with non-emotional stimuli, like the limited 
probe duration of 500ms, were too strict when assessing an attention bias in 
emotional stimuli. The task may be too difficult (i.e., too fast) for participants to pay 
attention to the stimuli, which predict the location of the probe. 
INVESTIGATION INTO ATTENTION BIAS MODIFICATION 79 
To summarise, it was found that attention bias was not acquired or changed in 
the training and assessment phases when different stimulus-probe contingencies were 
employed during those phases. In other words, participants were not quicker to 
respond to the congruent stimuli that predicted the location of the probe compared to 
the incongruent stimuli that were unpredictive of the probe’s location. There was a 
lack of contingency awareness, which may be the result of the lack of attention to the 
stimulus or due to the increased difficulty of the task. Individual differences in social 
anxiety did not explain any variance in pre-existing attention bias, neither did they 
explain any variance in the attention bias within training or in attention bias change 
measured pre-to post-training. It is suggested that a decrease in the difficulty level of 
the dot-probe task and ABM paradigm would facilitate stimulus-probe associative 
learning and subsequently lead to attention bias acquisition and change.   
Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 was designed with the aim of decreasing the difficulty level of 
the procedure and assessing whether this manipulation would increase stimulus-
probe contingency learning and awareness in participants completing the dot-probe 
task. As a result, it was hypothesised that participants would acquire an attention bias 
during training and a change in attention bias from pre- to post-training. To decrease 
the difficulty level of the procedure, the ABM paradigm was simplified by 
eliminating the reversed contingency training and post-training assessment. 
Therefore, the ABM paradigm consisted of a baseline assessment, a training and a 
post-training assessment phase, which resembles a conventional ABM paradigm. 
Apart from testing whether the change in task parameters would facilitate 
contingency learning and awareness and so, attention bias acquisition and change, 
this experiment also replicated a standard ABM study, which is highly valued (e.g., 
Simons, 2014). Furthermore, the exposure time of the probe in the dot-probe task 
was increased from 500ms to 700ms. The 500ms probe duration limitation was 
included in the previous procedure to replicate the procedure of Experiment 3. 
Initially, the limitation in probe duration was included to increase reliance on the 
stimuli to predict the location of the probe. However, the lack of results found in 
Experiment 4 may suggest that the dot-probe task was too difficult and hindered 
stimulus-probe associative learning. Furthermore, participants may not have paid 
attention to the stimulus and, therefore, no stimulus-probe association was 
established. This may have caused the lack of attention bias acquisition and change 
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throughout the ABM procedure as well as the lack in associations between these 
dependent variables and individual differences in emotional vulnerability and pre-
existing bias. 
In the previous experiment, no association between magnitude of pre-existing 
attention bias and levels of social anxiety were found at baseline. These findings did 
not support the attention and emotion theories discussed in Chapter 1 and previous 
meta-analyses (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007). To investigate whether emotion 
vulnerability is associated with attention bias or attention bias acquisition and 
change, levels of trait and state anxiety were assessed in addition to the measures of 
social anxiety. Trait and state anxiety are reliably measured with the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). 
The STAI assesses whether individuals feel anxious in that moment (STAI-state) or 
in general (STAI-trait). This measure is one of the best-established and most widely 
used psychometric instruments for assessing anxiety vulnerability. Since the sample 
is non-selected, it was investigated whether the inclusion of the STAI could find and 
association between attention bias at baseline and different levels of anxiety 
vulnerable as previously found in Mogg, Bradley, and Hallowell (1994).  
In addition to contingency awareness and the anxiety measures, individual 
differences in attention control were assessed to investigate whether individual 
differences in attention control are associated with stimulus-probe associative 
learning. Research has shown that cognitive control and cognitive biases are 
associated mechanisms of attention and emotional vulnerability (Basanovic et al., 
2017; Chen, Clarke, Watson, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2014; Everaert et al., 2017; 
Sanchez et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 2016). For instance, Everaert et al. (2017) found 
that deficient inhibitory control over negative stimuli was related to negative 
attention bias, which in turn predicted an interpretation bias as well as subsequently 
depressive symptoms. Additionally, studies have found that attention control predicts 
the magnitude of attention bias change in response to ABM (Basanovic et al., 2017; 
Chen et al., 2014). Basanovic et al. (2017) demonstrated that individual differences 
in control of attentional inhibition were positively associated with individual 
differences in the magnitude of attentional bias change.  
The same attention control task was used in the current experiment as 
described in Basanovic et al. (2017). It was explored whether individual differences 
in attention control can explain variance in pre-existing attention bias, attention bias 
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acquisition and change as well as contingency awareness. In particular, those with 
impaired (compared to higher) attentional control of selectivity and inhibition may 
have a pre-existing attention bias at baseline, whereas, individuals with higher 
(compared to lower) levels will show increased learning of the contingency 
employed in training and an increased awareness of this contingency. Furthermore, 
attention bias may be more malleable in individuals with higher (compared to lower) 
levels of attention control, such that they will show increased magnitude of attention 
bias change from pre-to post-training.  
In sum, it was tested whether a change in task parameters and study design 
would decrease the difficulty level of the dot-probe task and ABM procedure and 
facilitate contingency learning and awareness in emotional stimuli. As a result, 
attention bias could successfully be acquired and changed using the dot-probe task. It 
was hypothesised that the increased probe duration and the exclusion of the reversed 
training and post-training assessment would facilitate attention bias acquisition 
within training and attention bias change from pre-to post-training assessment. In 
particular, those trained to attend to angry faces would show an attention bias to 
angry faces in the within-training and post-training assessment, while those trained to 
attend to neutral faces would show an attention bias to neutral faces in the within-
training and post-training assessment. No attention bias acquisition and change was 
hypothesised for those in the no-training control group. However, if consistent with 
the previous non-emotional experiments (described in Chapter 2), an acquired pattern 
of selective attention during training will no longer persist when the contingency is 
not predictive (i.e., in the post-training assessments). Furthermore, it was 
hypothesised that individuals with high levels of state, trait and social anxiety would 
show a greater pre-existing attention bias towards angry faces than neutral faces at 
baseline compared to those with low levels of the same constructs. Moreover, it was 
hypothesised that anxiety vulnerability was positively associated with attention bias 
acquisition and change. Next, it was hypothesised that individual differences in 
attentional control of selectivity and inhibition would be negatively associated with 
pre-existing attention bias and positively associated with attention bias acquisition 
and change. Lastly, it was hypothesised that those aware of the contingency showed 
higher attention control of inhibition and selection than those not aware of the 
contingency. 
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Methodology 
Participants 
Of the initial 133 MTurk workers who started the experiment online, 13 
completed only the self-report measures, leaving 120 participants who made on 
average 20.6% of errors in the dot-probe task (SD = 20.9, range: 2.50 – 100) and on 
average 8.98% of errors on the attention control task (SD = 14.27, range: 1.56 – 100). 
Nineteen participants were deleted as they made more than the pre-determined 30% 
of errors in the dot-probe task (M = 61.3%, SD = 24.7, range: 32.3 – 100). The 
remaining 101 participants made on average 12.9% of errors in the dot-probe task 
(SD = 5.78, range: 2.50 - 30.0). The mean age of the final sample was 35.4 (SD = 
10.6, range: 18 – 65), 52.5% were male. 
Procedure 
Participants started with a screen calibration procedure which ensured that 
stimuli would be presented similarly across participants regardless of their screen 
size and resolution. Then, participants completed the 79 anxiety-questions from the 
SIAS, SPS, and STAI. This was followed by 8 practice and 400 main trials of the 
dot-probe task. The two experimental groups completed a baseline assessment, a 
training (attend-angry vs attend-neutral), and a post-assessment phase. The control 
group completed the same number of non-predictive assessment trials. Then, they 
completed the contingency awareness check and the 128 trials of the attention 
control assessment task. The procedure would end with five demographic questions. 
The whole procedure was programmed in Inquisit 4 (2015) and hosted online via 
Turk prime (Litman et al., 2017). It took participants approximately 35 minutes to 
complete the experiment and they were reimbursed with 5 USD. The Human 
Research Ethics Committee at Curtin University approved the protocol. 
Materials 
Dot-Probe Task 
The same dot-probe task was used as described in Experiment 4, however, the 
exposure time of the probe was increased from 500ms to 700ms. This task parameter 
was manipulated to decrease the difficulty level of the dot-probe task. 
Self-Reported Measures 
The following self-report measures were administered in addition to the 
measures described in Experiment 4.  
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Spielberger’s State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
State and trait anxiety was assessed pre-experiment with Spielberger’s State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983). The STAI is a 40-item 
questionnaire that provides measures of current (state) anxiety and dispositional 
(trait) anxiety. The 20-item state anxiety subscale (STAI-S) asks participants to 
indicate the degree to which they are experiencing a variety of anxiety symptoms 
"right now" (e.g., "Right now, I am worried"). Whereas the 20-item trait anxiety 
subscale (STAI-T) asks participants to indicate the degree to which they are 
experiencing a variety of anxiety symptoms "in general" (e.g., "In general, I feel 
secure"). Answer options were provided on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not 
at all) to 4 (very much so). Scores on each subscale ranged from 20 to 80, with 
higher scores representing higher levels of state or trait anxiety. STAI has been 
shown to have good reliability and validity (c.f. Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 
2007).  
Attention Control Assessment Task 
The same attention control assessment (ACA) was used as described in 
Basanovic et al. (2017). The stimuli used in the attentional control assessment task 
consisted of two shapes: a circle and a diamond. The shapes had equivalent spatial 
areas of 34 cm2 and were represented as a white outline 5mm thick on a black 
background (Basanovic et al., 2017). The ACA task assesses whether participants 
have high attentional control of selectivity and inhibition. The level of selectivity is 
indicated by the cost of selecting a target that is presented in a certain shape in the 
presence (selectivity trial) vs absence of another shape (non-selectivity trial). The 
level of inhibition is indicated by the cost of selecting a target presented in the 
opposite (inhibition trial) or same location of a shape (non-inhibition trial; see Figure 
12 for an example of each trial). The task consisted of four blocks, an inhibition, non-
inhibition, selectivity block and a non-selectivity block with 32 trials in each block.  
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Figure 12. The Four Trials within the Attention Control Assessment Task.  
The figure was taken from Basanovic et al. (2017). 
In each trial, participants were instructed to fixate on the fixation cross and 
press the spacebar to start the trial. They then needed to respond to a target arrow 
presented on the screen that was pointing either up- or downward with the 
corresponding arrow keys on the keyboard. The target arrow was presented in 
different positions related to the shape according the block type. The order of the 
blocks was counterbalanced as described in Basanovic et al. (2017).  
An index of control of attentional inhibition (ACInhibtion) was measured from 
RTs of inhibition and non-inhibition trials. In inhibition trials, participants needed to 
respond to a target presented in the location opposite to the shape. These trials, 
therefore, required participants to inhibit a pre-potent attentional movement towards 
the shape and execute an attentional movement to a location opposite to the salient 
shape stimulus (Basanovic et al., 2017). In non-inhibition trials, participants needed 
to respond to a target in the location of the shape (there was no need to inhibit the 
pre-potent attentional movement). Average RTs from non-inhibition trials were 
subtracted from the average RTs of inhibition trials. Smaller scores on the index of 
ACInhibition indicate a smaller cost to perform inhibition trials as compared to non-
inhibition trials, and thus reflected greater control of attentional inhibition 
(Basanovic et al., 2017).  
An index of control of attentional selectivity (ACSelectivity) was obtained from 
the mean RTs of selectivity and non-selectivity trials. In selectivity trials, participants 
needed to allocate their attention to a specified stimulus under conditions that 
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delivered competing stimuli. In non-selectivity trials, participants needed to allocate 
their attention to a specified stimulus under conditions that did not deliver competing 
stimuli. Average RTs from non-selectivity trials were subtracted from the average 
RTs from the selectivity trials, in which Smaller ACSelectivity indicates a smaller cost to 
perform selectivity trials as compared to non-selectivity trials, and thus reflected 
greater control of attentional selectivity.  
Data Preparation and Statistical Analyses 
Analyses, statistical outcomes, and errors were based on the same criteria as 
described in the methodology of Experiment 1, Chapter 2. The mean RTs for each 
trial type per Condition and Awareness category are reported in the Appendix Table 
11. Out of these, the same bias index score (BIS) was calculated as described in 
Experiment 4 (mean RTs neutral trails – mean RTs angry trials). Two participants had 
an extreme attention bias score (a value more than 3 times the interquartile range) at 
baseline and another three participants had extreme scores in the second assessment 
phase and, therefore, were excluded from the following analysis. To test whether 
attention was biased at baseline towards angry compared to neutral faces, the mean 
BIS measured at baseline was compared to zero in a one-sample t-test. To further 
investigate whether attention bias changed in the training and assessment phases, the 
mean BIS were subjected to a 2 x 3 (Assessment [within training vs post-training] x  
(Condition [angry-neutral vs neutral-angry vs control]) repeated measures mixed-
design analyses of variance (ANOVA). 
To examine whether elevated levels of anxiety were associated with an 
elevated pre-existing attention bias to angry faces at baseline, within training, and 
with attention bias change measured from pre- to post-training (ABChange: mean BIS 
post-training assessment – mean BIS baseline assessment), correlations were 
computed between the sum scores of the STAI state, STAI trait, SIAS and SPS and 
the BIS measured at baseline, BIS measured within the training and with the ABChange 
score.  
In the attention control analyses, the same exclusion criteria were used as 
described in Basonovic (2017). Eleven participants were deleted from the final 
sample size as they made more than 10% of errors on the attention control task (MPE 
= 31.2%, SD = 26.4, range: 10.2 – 100). The remaining 91 participants made 4.67% 
of errors in the ACA task (SD = 2.13, range: 1.56 – 9.38). To examine whether 
elevated levels of attentional control of inhibition and selectivity were associated 
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with attention bias acquisition and change, it was established whether there was an 
association between ACInhibition and ACSelectivity and the BIS measured within training 
and the ABChange score for each training condition separately. Correlations were 
computed between these variables (Bonferroni corrected, p < .017).  
To examine whether there was a significant difference between participant 
categorised as aware and not aware in attentional control scores of inhibition and 
selection, a  2 x 2 ANOVA with mean attention control (ACInhibition vs ACSelectivity) by 
Awareness (aware vs not aware) was tested. To test the hypothesis that awareness of 
the stimulus-probe contingency was a prerequisite of the trainability of participants’ 
attention bias another BIS score was calculated. This BIS score was based on the 
congruency of the stimulus, not the emotional content. The congruency BIS (C-BIS) 
was calculated by subtracting the RTs of congruent trials of the RTs of incongruent 
trials. A positive score represents attention bias to the congruent stimulus, whereas a 
negative score represents an attention bias to the incongruent stimulus. To increase 
power of the analysis, it was necessary to use the C-BIS. As this score allows us to 
test whether there were differences in attention bias acquisition and change in those 
aware or not aware of the contingency, without including the two different training 
conditions in the analysis. A 2 x 2 (Assessment [within-training vs post-training] x 
(Awareness [aware vs not aware]) ANOVA was conducted.  
Results 
Attention Bias at Baseline, Training and Assessment Phases 
Figure 13 displays the mean BIS in each experimental phase for each training 
condition. 
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Figure 13. Emotional Bias Index Score at Baseline, within Training and Post-training 
Assessment Phase for Each Condition in Experiment 5.  
Negative scores indicate an attention bias towards the neutral faces, whereas positive scores 
indicate an attention bias towards angry faces. Error bars represent standard error of the 
mean. 
The one-sample t-test conducted with the mean BIS showed that in general 
participants did not prefer to attend to angry or neutral faces at baseline (M = -4.81, 
SD = 42.3), t(98) = -1.13, p = .260, 95%CI(-13.2, 3.62). Furthermore, the ANOVA 
resulted in no significant effects, all F < 2.97, p > .088, η2 < .031. These results 
indicate that the training phase of the dot-probe task was unable to induce an 
attention bias to the congruent stimuli in the two experimental conditions compared 
to the control. This suggest that the probe duration manipulation from 500ms to 
700ms and simplification of the ABM paradigm did not facilitate attention bias 
acquisition and change.  
Anxiety and its Influence on Attention Bias Modification 
On the SIAS, 44% of participants were above the clinical cut-off point in the 
‘attend-angry’ condition, compared to 58% in the ‘attend-neutral’ condition, and 51% 
in the control condition. On the SPS, these percentages were 36%, 58%, and 31%, 
respectively. Only 8 of all participants had a STAI-state score above the clinical cut-
off point (> 39) and 13 out of all participants had a STAI-trait score above the 
clinical cut-off point. A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) indicated that there 
was no significant difference between conditions on the means of the anxiety scores 
shown in Table 7, all F < 1.01, p > .369, η2 < .020.  
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Table 7. 
Descriptive Statistics of the Self-Reported Social, State, and Trait Anxiety Measures 
  Range M(SD) Distribution S, K 
Attend-
angry 
(n = 36) 
  
SIAS  0 – 74 23.5(18.8) 1.01, .714 
SPS 0 – 74 17.0(17.8) 1.75, 2.99 
STAI state 20 – 70 32.0(14.1) 1.30, .618 
STAI trait 20 – 76 36.2(15.9) 1.08, .510 
Attend-
neutral  
(n = 26) 
 
SIAS  2 – 73 29.1(22.2) .486, -1.06 
SPS 0 – 80 23.3(20.7) .987, .744 
STAI state 20 – 72 34.5(13.9) .993, 1.18 
STAI trait 20 – 76 38.5(15.9) .812, -.140 
Control  
(n = 39) 
SIAS  0 – 76 26.1(21.2) .668, -.646 
SPS 0 – 80 17.7(17.9) 1.50, 2.49 
STAI state 20 – 72 34.5(13.0) 1.05, .079 
STAI trait 20 – 80 39.2(16.6) .770, -.337 
Note: M(SD) = Mean (standard deviation). 
SIAS = social interaction anxiety scale. SPS = social phobia scale. STAI state = state sub-
scale of the state/trait anxiety inventory. STAI trait = trait sub-scale of the state/trait anxiety 
inventor.  
Cronbach’s alpha of the measures were excellent (SIAS = .979, SPS = .969, STAI-S = .972, 
and STAI-T = .971).  
Distribution is represented with Skewness (S) and Kurtosis (K), the standard errors of the 
distribution measures were between .378 and .887.  
None of the self-reported anxiety measures correlated with the BIS measured 
at baseline, all r < -.127, p > .212. This suggest that anxiety vulnerability was not 
associated with pre-existing attention bias. Figure 14 displays the overlay scatterplots 
of all anxiety measures and the BIS measured at baseline.  
 
Figure 14. Association between State, Trait, and Social Anxiety and Emotional Bias Scores 
Measured at baseline. The solid lines represents the linear line of best fit. 
None of the correlations between the STAI state, STAI trait, SIAS, and SPS 
scores and the BIS measured within-training assessment and the ABChange score were 
significant in the active training conditions, all r < .256, p > .151 (see Figure 15). 
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This indicates that anxiety vulnerability was not associated with attention bias 
acquisition and change. 
 
Figure 15. Association between State, Trait, and Social Anxiety and Emotional Bias Index 
Scores Measured within Each Training and as a Change Score form Pre- to Post-ABM for 
Each Active Training Condition in Experiment 5. The solid lines represents the linear line of 
best fit. 
Attention Control and its Influence on Attention Bias Modification 
The mean RT of each trial type is presented in Table 8. The overall mean 
ACInhibition was 39.3 (SD = 63.8) and ranged from -84.9 to 297, the overall mean of 
ACSelectivity was 258 (SD = 69.5) and ranged between 88.4 and 454. Moreover, 
ACInhibition and ACSelectivity did not correlate, r(84) = .133, p = .221, suggesting that 
these are two indices represent two independent constructs of attentional control. 
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Table 8.  
Mean Reaction Time Scores of Attention Control Trials in all Conditions 
Condition Trial type M(SD) Distribution (S, K) 
Attend-angry (n = 34) Inhibition 777(126) .627, 1.25 
Non-Inhibition 730(88.5) .482, .668 
Selectivity 828(114) .463, 1.31 
Non-Selectivity 560(79.1) .477, .571 
Attend-neutral (n = 24) Inhibition 761(100) .980, 1.20 
Non-Inhibition 733(103) 1.28, .472 
Selectivity 798(96.6) 1.33, 2.30 
Non-Selectivity 558(73.4) 1.24, 1.99 
Control (n = 34) Inhibition 766(108) 839, .667 
Non-Inhibition 727(95.1) .722, -.541 
Selectivity 834(123) .756, -.676 
Non-Selectivity 574(81.5) .866, .740 
Note: M(SD) = Mean reaction time (standard deviation from the mean). 
Distribution is represented with Skewness (S) and Kurtosis (K), the standard errors of the 
distribution measures were between .403 and .918. 
The ANOVA that tested attention control differences between conditions 
found a main effect for Attention Control Type, F(1, 84) = .593, p < .001, η2 = .876, 
such that participants showed smaller cost of attentional inhibition (M = 33.8, SE = 
6.08, 95%CI[21.8, 45.8]) and a higher cost of attentional selectivity (M = 256, SE = 
7.68, 95%CI[241, 272]). There was no interaction between Attentional Control Type 
and Condition, F(2, 84) = .575, p = .565, η2 = .014. This indicates that there were no 
differences in attention control between training conditions. Furthermore, as shown 
in Figure 16, the pre-existing attention bias measured at baseline did not correlate 
with attentional control measures, both r < .109, p > .312. The hypothesis that stated 
that higher levels of attentional control are related to lower pre-existing attention bias 
was rejected. 
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Figure 16. Association between Attentional Control of Inhibition and Selectivity and the Pre-
Existing Attention Bias measured at Baseline in Experiment 5. The solid lines represents the 
linear line of best fit. 
There were no significant correlations between ACSelectivity and the BIS within 
training or the ABChange score in neither training condition, all r < -.216, p > .321. 
None of the correlations between ACInhibition and the BIS or ABChange scores were 
significant for the ‘attend-angry’ condition, all r < .219, p > .253. In the ‘attend-
neutral’ condition, there was a significant positive correlation between ACInhibition and 
the BIS measure within training, r(21) = .634, p = .001, however, not with the 
ABChange score, r(21) = -.184, p = .402. Figure 17 displays the overlay scatterplots of 
both attention control measures and the BIS measured within training (top row) and 
ABChange scores (bottom row) for each active training condition.  
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Figure 17. Association between Attention Control and Congruency Bias Index Score 
Measured within Training (top row) and as a Bias Change Score (bottom row) for Each 
Active Training Condition in Experiment 5. The solid lines represents the linear line of best 
fit. 
The association between levels of attention control of inhibition and 
trainability toward neutral faces when measured within the training was in line with 
predictions. Specifically, those with lower attentional cost of inhibition (better 
attention control) responded quicker to the probes in congruent (neutral face) rather 
than to probes in the incongruent (angry face) trials during training. This suggest that 
better attention control was associated with attention bias acquisition in the targeted 
direction during the within-training assessment. 
In addition, the ANOVA with mean attention control by contingency 
awareness resulted in a main effect of attentional control, F(1, 51) = 496, p < .001, η2 
= .907 and a trending interaction effect, F(1, 51) = 3.13, p = .083, η2 = .058. It seems 
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that those aware of the stimulus-probe contingency have a marginal higher cost of 
attentional selectivity (M = 275, SE = 12.7, 95%CI[250, 301]) than those not aware 
of the contingency during ABM (M = 244, SE = 10.3, 95%CI[224, 265]), t(51) = 
1.89, p = .064, 95%CI(-1.91, 63.7). This difference was not evident in the attentional 
cost of inhibition (aware: M = 28.2, SE = 11.6, 95%CI[4.95, 51.5] and not aware: M 
= 23.6, SE = 9.39, 95%CI[14.8, 52.5]), t(51) = .364, p = .717, 95%CI(-35.4, 24.5). 
This suggest that attentional control does not facilitate contingency awareness as 
hypothesised. In contrast to what was expected, the results indicated that lower 
attentional control of selectivity was evident in those aware of the contingency 
compared to those not aware.  
Awareness of Stimulus-Probe Contingency and its Influence on Attention Bias 
Modification 
Approximately 40% of participants acquired awareness of the stimulus-probe 
contingency; this was significantly more compared to the previous experiment, X2(1) 
= 9.67, p = .002, ϕ = .289. Interestingly, the number of participants who became 
aware in the ‘attend-neutral’ training condition (n = 5; 23%) was significantly lower 
compared to those in the ‘attend-angry’ training condition (n = 17; 77%), X2(1) = 
5.55, p = .019, ϕ = .307. Additionally, there were significant differences in state and 
trait anxiety between those aware and not aware of the contingency, all F > 5.10, p 
< .028, η2 > .082, however, no differences in the social anxiety measures, F < 2.52, p 
> .118, η2 < .042. Participants aware of the contingency displayed lower levels of 
state (M = 27.7, SD = 10.4) and trait anxiety (M = 31.6, SD = 11.1) than those 
unaware of the contingency (state: M = 36.6, SD = 14.5 and trait: M = 41.3, SD = 
18.0).  
The ANOVA resulted in a trending main effect of assessment point, F(1.57) = 
2.98, p = .090, η2 = .050, such that there was a larger C-BIS found in the training 
phase (M = -10.1, SE = 8.53, 95%CI[-27.2, 6.93]) than in the assessment phase post-
training (M = 3.70, SE = 4.36, 95%CI[-5.03, 12.4]). The interaction effect did not 
reach significance, F(1.57) = .017, p = .896, η2 < .001. This suggest that there were 
no differences in congruency bias in training and post-training assessment phases 
between those in the experimental group that became aware (n = 22) or not aware (n 
=37) of the training (see Figure 18).  
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Figure 18. Congruency Bias Index Scores for those Aware and Not Aware of the Stimulus-
Probe Contingency in Experiment 5.  
Negative scores indicate an attention bias to congruent stimuli, whereas positive scores 
indicate an attention bias to incongruent stimuli. Error bars represent standard error of the 
mean. 
Strategies Used to Perform the Dot-Probe Task 
Qualitative responses were categorised into four themes and are reported in 
Table 9, these were: (1) No strategy used (e.g., “No”); (2) Focused on the probes 
(e.g., “I had to ignore the faces to be able to focus on the tiny dots. When I started 
looking at faces I messed up.”); (3) Focused on certain location of the screen (e.g., “If 
I didn't see the dots on one side I quickly shifted to the other side.”); (4) Faces 
predicted the probe (e.g., “I tried looking for an angry face once I noticed they were 
coming that side, but that wasn't entirely predictable. So I think I might have slowed 
down”).  
Table 9.  
Strategies Used to Perform the Dot-Probe Task in Each Training Condition 
Themes Attend-angry Attend-neutral Control 
No strategy used n = 19 (53%) n = 15 (58%) n = 24 (62%) 
Focused on the probes n = 12 (33%) n = 6 (23%) n = 8 (21%) 
Focused on certain 
location of the screen n = 3 (8%) n = 2 (8%) n = 5 (13%) 
Shape predicted the probe n = 1 (2%) n = 1 (4%) n = 1 (3%) 
Note: One missing value in the ‘attend-angry’ condition, two missing values in the ‘attend-
neutral’ condition and one missing value in the control condition.  
The type of strategy used did not differ per training condition, X2(6) = 2.12, p 
= .908, ɸ = .148 and are not further analysed because of the small numbers.  
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Discussion  
Compared to Experiment 4, in Experiment 5 we changed the task parameters 
(probe duration from 500ms to 700ms) and study design (the reversed training and 
post-training assessment phases were omitted) to decrease the difficulty level of the 
dot-probe task and ABM procedure. In turn, it was hypothesised that, with emotional 
stimuli, these manipulations would facilitate contingency learning and the acquisition 
of contingency awareness. It was hypothesised that attention bias could successfully 
be acquired and changed using the stimulus-probe associations in the dot-probe task. 
However, consistent with Experiment 4, no attention bias was acquired or changed to 
angry faces in individuals trained to attend to angry faces and no attention bias was 
acquired or changed to neutral faces in those trained to attend to neutral faces. 
Furthermore, participants did not have a pre-existing attention bias to angry faces at 
baseline. It is possible that the manipulations did not help most participants to pay 
attention to the stimulus and as a result they did not learn the stimulus-probe 
associations.  
There were no associations between levels of anxiety vulnerability (state, 
trait, and social anxiety) and pre-existing attention bias or with the magnitude of 
attention bias acquisition (within-training) and change (from pre- to post-training). 
This finding was evident despite the high variety of anxiety vulnerability in the 
sample. This is troubling as the appropriateness of ABM training has been questioned 
for anxious individuals who lack a negative attention bias or who may already be 
threat-avoidant (Eldar et al., 2012; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). Given that some 
studies have found an association between emotional vulnerability and attention bias 
(see for overview: Bar-Haim et al. (2007)), whereas others have not (e.g., Amir, 
Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009; Badura-Brack et al., 2015; Boettcher, Hasselrot, 
Sund, Andersson, & Carlbring, 2013; J. Boettcher et al., 2013; Britton et al., 2015; 
Enock, Hofmann, & McNally, 2014; Kuckertz et al., 2014; McNally, Enock, Tsai, & 
Tousian, 2013; Yao, Yu, Qian, & Li, 2015), it is likely that other unknown factors 
moderate the relationship between emotion vulnerability and attention bias.  
One such factor may lay in the design of the dot-probe task (i.e., specific task 
parameters). It is possible that the dot-probe task with emotional stimuli needs to be 
tailored to facilitate learning of the stimulus-probe association. The results of 
Experiment 4 and 5 suggest that the decrease in probe duration may not have been 
sufficient to facilitate stimulus-probe contingency learning with the dot-probe task. It 
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is possible that a probe duration limitation in the dot-probe task with emotional 
stimuli hinders contingency learning. Furthermore, it may be that the probe size 
needs to be increased as most participants reported that they focussed on the small 
probes to perform the dot-probe task and ignored the faces as these distracted them 
from locating the small probes. Overall, these results revealed that a stimulus-probe 
association in the dot-probe task is not easily established. Future research is required 
to investigate which parameters (i.e., probe size and probe duration) in the dot-probe 
task are conducive to stimulus-probe associative learning and results in attention bias 
change. 
The probe duration manipulation and the simplification of the ABM design 
resulted in higher numbers of participants who acquired awareness of the stimulus-
probe contingency. Over 40% of participants became aware of the stimulus-probe 
contingency as opposed to less than 10% in Experiment 4. The manipulations in the 
procedure may have aided contingency awareness; however, it did not aid 
contingency learning as evidenced by the lack of attention bias acquisition and 
change in the ABM procedure. Thus, the hypothesis, which stated that stimulus-
probe associative learning would be facilitated by the employment of a simpler dot-
probe task in a simpler ABM paradigm through contingency awareness, was rejected. 
Contingency awareness did not facilitate attention bias acquisition and change from 
pre- to post-training. Participants, who reported themselves to be aware or not aware 
of the contingency, exhibited no different attention bias patterns across the ABM 
paradigm. Though, there was evidence to suggest that contingency awareness was 
associated with the training condition. More participants were aware of the 
contingency when they were in the ‘attend-angry’ (53%) compared to the ‘attend-
neutral’ training condition (19%). However, the results showed that this effect was 
not driven by the emotional content of the stimuli that predicted the probe in either 
active training condition. That is, in contrast to the predictions of the attention and 
emotion theories (described in Chapter 1) and the associative learning theories 
(Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), emotion did not capture attention, as 
evidenced by non-existent attention bias at baseline. Overall, the results suggest that 
the change in task parameters in the dot-probe task, however, not the emotional 
content of stimuli, facilitated contingency awareness for some participants. 
Moreover, it is likely that there are other individual differences, which require further 
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investigation. Other factors may explain why some individuals acquired awareness of 
the contingency, while others did not. 
The acquisition of contingency awareness seems to be dependent on 
individual differences in anxiety vulnerability and attention control. There were 
significant differences in state and trait anxiety between those aware and not aware 
of the contingency. Individuals low in state and trait anxiety were more likely to 
become aware of the stimulus-probe contingency. However, this difference did not 
result in differences in pre-existing attention bias at baseline or in attention bias 
acquisition and change. Furthermore, the acquisition of contingency awareness was 
related to attentional control of selectivity, however, not to attentional control of 
inhibition. The results showed that those aware of the stimulus-probe contingency 
had a marginally higher cost of attentional control of selectivity than those who 
reported not to be aware of the contingency during ABM. This suggest, contrary to 
the hypothesis, that lower attentional control is associated with acquiring 
contingency awareness. However, given that this effect was only marginally 
significant, it has to be interpreted with caution. More research is needed to 
determine predictors of the acquisition of stimulus-probe contingency awareness in 
those who complete the dot-probe task.  
It was found that individual differences in attentional control were associated 
with individual differences in attention bias trainability. However, this effect was 
limited to attentional control of inhibition (not selectivity) and the association was 
only found with attention bias measured within the training phase (not with bias 
change measured from pre-to post-training assessments). Importantly, the association 
was only evident in individuals that completed the ‘attend-neutral’ training condition. 
Since attention control was measured after the attention training it is possible that 
high levels of inhibitory control were developed in participants who inhibited the 
emotional distractor stimuli in order to attend to the neutral face that predicted the 
probe in training. The lack of the association in the ‘attend-angry’ condition may 
reflect that participants did not develop inhibitory control as they were not required 
to inhibit their attention from emotion. This finding is partially consistent with the 
prediction that higher attentional control is associated with attention bias acquisition 
and change, as this association was limited to attentional control of inhibition, 
limited to the attention bias measured in the training phase and only found in 
participants who completed the ‘attend-neutral’ training.  
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The result of the current study, which indicated that higher inhibitory 
attentional control was related to attention bias acquisition are partially in line with 
Basanovic et al. (2017) and Everaert et al. (2017). Basanovic et al. (2017) found a 
greater effect for attentional control of inhibition and a marginal effect for attentional 
control of selectivity, while Everaert et al. (2017) only measured attentional control 
of inhibition and found the same association with attention bias change. These 
findings indicated that there seems to be more evidence for the influence of 
attentional control of inhibition than selection on attention bias malleability. 
However, in contrast to the current findings, Basanovic et al. (2017) and Everaert et 
al. (2017) found that attentional control was associated with attention bias change 
measure from pre- to post-training (they had no measure within training). 
Furthermore, the current findings showed that attention training where emotional 
stimuli needs to be ignored increases attentional inhibitory control. This adds to the 
previous finding of Basanovic et al. (2017) and Everaert et al. (2017), which states 
that attention bias malleability was associated with attentional control of inhibition.  
The idea that ABM increases attentional control was tested in Chen, Clarke, 
Watson, MacLeod, and Guastella (2015). Chen et al. (2015) found that attention 
control of inhibition increased after ABM compared to placebo training. Moreover, 
the increase in attentional control assessed in Chen et al. (2015) did not mediate the 
direct relationship between ABM and attention bias change. This suggest that ABM 
possibly changes attention control, however, it may not be the sole mechanism that 
drives attention bias change. Given that the methodologies of the current experiment 
and the experiment conducted by Chen et al. (2015) are inadequate in assessing the 
mechanism, related to attention control, that drives attention bias change, further 
research is needed to establish the role of attentional control of inhibition and 
attention bias acquisition and change. 
General Discussion of Experiments 4 and 5 
In this chapter, two experiments were described which used the dot-probe 
task with emotional stimuli to investigate the influence of individual differences in 
contingency awareness, anxiety vulnerability and attention control on the stimulus-
probe associative learning mechanism that underlies attention bias acquisition and 
change. Based on the findings of the first three experiments described in Chapter 2, it 
was hypothesised that contingency awareness is a prerequisite of attention bias 
acquisition and change. Furthermore, based on previous literature and attention and 
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emotion theories described in Chapter 1, it was hypothesised that higher levels of 
anxiety vulnerability and attention control were associated with magnitude of 
attention bias at baseline, attention bias acquisition in training and attention bias 
change from pre- to post-training. The main findings in the two experiments, 
described in this chapter, indicated that attention was not biased at baseline or 
induced with a stimulus-probe association in training. Furthermore, only the 
individual difference in attention control of inhibition was associated with attention 
bias acquisition.  
The dot-probe task assesses a pre-existing negative attention bias by 
providing two stimuli with negative and neutral valence simultaneously on the 
screen. It is generally assumed that participants who have a negative attention bias 
attend more to the negative than the neutral stimuli. This aids them in locating the 
probe, which was in the congruent location with the negatively attended stimulus, 
however, hinders them in locating the probe in the negatively incongruent location 
with attended stimulus (i.e., when the probe is located in the same location as the 
neutral stimulus). This result in RT patterns is indicative of a negative attention bias 
(i.e., relative quicker responding to probes that were preceded by the negative, 
compared to the neutral stimuli). In addition, it is assumed that in training, 
participants learn to use the congruent stimuli to predict the location of the probe, 
which in turn changes attention bias patterns. However, across both experiments, 
selective attention was not biased at baseline, neither was attention bias acquired or 
changed as a result of the contingencies employed in the dot-probe training task. 
Furthermore, across both experiments, levels of state, trait and social anxiety were 
not associated with attention bias at baseline. This is in contrast to the attention and 
emotion theories (described in Chapter 1) and to numerous studies that found an 
attention bias toward emotional stimuli in emotionally vulnerable individuals (i.e., 
high in anxiety) when compared to non-vulnerable individuals (i.e., low in anxiety; 
Aspen et al., 2013; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Dudeney et al., 2015; Hallion & Ruscio, 
2011; Harris et al., 2015; Hughes, Hirsch, Chalder, & Moss-Morris, 2016; Rodgers & 
DuBois, 2016; Schoth et al., 2012). However, given that participants in our samples 
were not preselected on high or low anxiety, it is likely that the task was not 
optimally designed to capture significant attention bias differences in our sample 
(Bantin et al., 2016).  
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One obvious explanation of why the dot-probe task did not detect any pre-
existing bias nor induced an attention bias change in the sample, may be related to 
the possibility that not all participants attended to the stimuli in the dot-probe task as 
assumed. Therefore, participant’s RTs were not influenced by biased attention at 
baseline or during training. However, as this may be true for the participants who 
were excluded for poor accuracy, the picture is probably more complex than that. In 
Experiment 5, attention bias acquisition was associated with attention control, which 
clearly indicates that attention was being paid to the contingency by some 
participants or at least at some level. Emotional expressions in faces are processed 
very rapidly, as evidenced by the situation in the classic emotion-induced blindness 
paradigm (e.g., de Jong, Koster, van Wees, & Martens, 2009). In such paradigms, 
participants are unable to avoid processing of emotional distractors that appear in the 
same location as an upcoming target. However, in contrast to the dot-probe 
paradigm, in the induced blindness paradigm, participants do not need to associate 
the location of the facial stimuli with the location of the probe to facilitate 
responding. Therefore, participants may have processed the facial stimuli, however, 
they may not have processed the contingency (i.e., that the location of the probe was 
predicted by a certain facial expression). 
The findings of Experiment 5 suggest that those with higher inhibitory 
attentional control may process the facial stimuli and the stimulus-probe contingency. 
The results showed that participants who received stimulus-probe association 
training to drive selective attention to neutral stimuli, and thus had to ignore the 
emotional stimuli, showed greater inhibitory attentional control in a subsequent 
attention control task. However, the findings showed that attentional control of 
inhibition was not associated with contingency awareness, only those aware of the 
contingency during ABM had a marginal higher cost of attentional control of 
selectivity. Therefore, it is likely that some participants ignored the stimuli and only 
focus on the probes to perform the task, whereas, others do not. The factors 
predicting why only some participants attend to the stimuli remain unknown. 
Overall, the dot-probe task, in its current form, is unable to ascertain whether 
participants pay attention to the stimuli to predict the probe.  
It seems that manipulations in task parameters influence contingency 
awareness. However, the influence of contingency awareness on attention bias 
acquisition found in the experiments that used non-emotional stimuli (described in 
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Chapter 2) and found in previous studies (Grafton et al., 2014; Lazarov et al., 2017) 
was not replicated in the current experiments that used emotional stimuli. It is 
possible that the task parameters need to be further adjusted, so that more 
participants become aware of the contingency. This in turn will increase the power of 
the analysis that assesses whether different attention bias patterns are evident in those 
aware, versus not aware, of the stimulus-probe contingency.  
Conclusion Experiments 4 and 5 
The probe duration manipulation in the dot-probe task and the simplification 
of the ABM paradigm did not result in attention bias patterns at baseline, nor within- 
or post-training. It was discussed that not all participants attended the stimuli to 
predict the location of the probe. Furthermore, individual differences in anxiety 
vulnerability, contingency awareness and attention control of selectivity were 
assessed, however, these could not explain the lack of attention bias assessment, 
acquisition or change. Attentional control of inhibition was the only variable 
associated with attention bias acquisition in training. Moreover, only those who were 
trained to attend to neutral faces, while ignoring angry faces, showed an association 
with inhibitory attentional control assessed in a subsequent attention control task. 
This association was not evident in participants who were trained to attend to angry 
faces. This suggest that some participants, most likely those with high attention 
control of inhibition, paid attention to the stimuli, while others ignored them. The 
hypotheses considered attentional control as an individual trait that was expected to 
explain variance in attention bias acquisition. However, attention control of 
inhibition was related to the valence of the training (i.e., ‘attend-neutral’ condition), 
and therefore, may be a personal trait that can be strengthened by the neutral 
stimulus-probe associative learning mechanism. Overall, further research needs to be 
conducted to determine what adjustments need to be made in the task parameters of 
the dot-probe task to achieve stimulus-probe contingency learning that can reliably 
assess attention bias at baseline as well as induce or change an attention bias in 
training. Furthermore, future research needs to be conducted to establish how 
individual differences, such as contingency awareness, attentional control, attention 
to stimulus, and emotion vulnerability interact in the establishment of the stimulus-
probe association in the dot-probe task, which in turn results in a reliable attention 
bias assessment, acquisition and change. An integrated view of these factors could 
102 AN INVESTIGATION INTO ATTENTION BIAS MODIFICATION  
 
possibly enhance understanding of the mixed results found in regard to attention bias 
to threat assessment and ABM training.  
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Appendix Chapter 3 
Table 10. 
Mean Reaction Time, Standard Deviation and Distribution for Angry- and Neutral-
Target Trials per Training Condition Experiment 4 
Condition Phase Trial type M(SD) Distribution (S, K) 
Angry-Neutral 
(n = 32) 
Baseline  
(n = 31) 
Angry-trial 696(145) .273, -.226 
Neutral-trial 685(167) .919, 1.26 
Training 1 Angry-trial 678(142) -.148, -1.14 
 Neutral-trial 668(136) .200, -.597 
Assessment 1 Angry-trial 641(129) .237, .753 
 Neutral-trial 638(123) .128, -.267 
Training 2 Angry-trial 626(110) -.175, -.575 
 Neutral-trial 633(121) -.165, -.049 
Assessment 2 Angry-trial 631(151) 1.40, 3.61 
 Neutral-trial 628(146) 1.12, 2.03 
Neutral-Angry 
(n = 26) 
 
Baseline Angry-trial 740(153) .605, 1.90 
 Neutral-trial 725(145) .516, 1.29 
Training 1 Angry-trial 675(142) .160, -.909 
 Neutral-trial 675(147) .037, -.753 
Assessment 1 Angry-trial 655(131) -.034, -.684 
 Neutral-trial 653(126) .266, -.271 
Training 2 Angry-trial 624(118) -.110, -.953 
 Neutral-trial 635(124) .379, -.369 
Assessment 2 Angry-trial 622(125) .531, .663 
 Neutral-trial 610(122) .893, 1.66 
Control  
(n = 33) 
Baseline Angry-trial 740(153) .605, 1.90 
 Neutral-trial 725(145) .516, 1.29 
Training 1 Angry-trial 675(142) .160, -.909 
 Neutral-trial 675(147) .037, -.753 
Assessment 1 Angry-trial 655(131) -.034, -.684 
 Neutral-trial 653(126) .266, -.271 
Training 2 Angry-trial 624(118) -.110, -.953 
 Neutral-trial 635(124) .379, -.369 
Assessment 2 Angry-trial 622(125) .531, .663 
 Neutral-trial 610(122) .893, 1.66 
Note: M(SD) = Mean reaction time (standard deviation from the mean). 
The normality of the distribution was assessed with the Skewness (S) and Kurtosis (K) 
measures. Standard errors of Skewness were below .409, standard errors of Kurtosis were 
below .798.  
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Table 11. 
Mean Reaction Time, Standard Deviation and Distribution for Angry- and Neutral-
Target Trials per Training Condition Experiment 5 
Condition Phase Trial type M(SD) Distribution (S, K) 
Attend-
angry, 
aware of the 
contingency  
(n = 19) 
Baseline 
Assessment 
Angry-trial 671(150) 2.20, 6.97 
Neutral-trial 675(145) 1.71, 4.02 
Training Angry-trial 638(98) 1.33, 2.08 
Neutral-trial 669(156) 1.04,.712 
Post-
Assessment 
Angry-trial 638(112) .887,.199 
Neutral-trial 638(121) 1.04,.519 
Attend-
angry, not 
aware of the 
contingency  
(n = 17) 
Baseline 
Assessment 
Angry-trial 629(130) .923, .379 
Neutral-trial 620(140) 1.03, .376 
Training Angry-trial 614(97.8) .255, -.237 
Neutral-trial 608(71.7) -1.04, .293 
Post-
Assessment 
Angry-trial 601(70.6) -.471, .187 
Neutral-trial 584(69.6) -.351, .610 
Attend-
neutral, 
aware of the 
contingency   
(n = 5) 
Baseline 
Assessment 
Angry-trial 717(187) .223, -2.94 
Neutral-trial 706(186) .482, -2.37 
Training Angry-trial 648(84.7) .864, 1.70 
Neutral-trial 646(103) .496, -.677 
Post-
Assessment 
Angry-trial 608(102) 1.27, 2.35 
Neutral-trial 619(128) 1.06,.912 
Attend-
neutral, not 
aware of the 
contingency   
(n = 21) 
Baseline 
Assessment 
Angry-trial 615(164) .890, -.152 
Neutral-trial 605(138) .679, -.767 
Training  Angry-trial 575(107) .869, .160 
Neutral-trial 584(124) .675, -.557 
Post-
Assessment 
Angry-trial 557(93.1) .183, -.459 
Neutral-trial 559(130) 1.55, 3.58 
Control 
(n = 26) 
Baseline 
Assessment 
Angry-trial 635(169) .710, -.718 
Neutral-trial 624(150) .694, -.708 
Training Angry-trial 589(105) .620, -.276 
Neutral-trial 596(121) .502, -.762 
Post-
Assessment 
Angry-trial 567(94.9) .314, -.118 
Neutral-trial 571(129) 1.31, 2.30 
Note: M(SD) = Mean reaction time (standard deviation from the mean).  
The normality of the distribution was assessed with the Skewness (S) and Kurtosis (K) 
measures. Standard errors of Skewness were below .550, standard errors of Kurtosis were 
below 1.06.  
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Study 2 
The previous chapters gave an overview of the difficulties encountered when 
assessing, inducing, and changing attention bias in an attention bias modification 
(ABM) paradigm utilising the conventional dot-probe task. It was concluded that 
contingency learning in the dot-probe task was not always achieved and it may be 
dependent on factors like contingency awareness and attentional control. This 
uncertainty and dependence is problematic since contingency learning is necessary 
for successful, stable, and long-term attention bias change in order to subsequently 
reduce emotion vulnerability (MacLeod & Clarke, 2015). Thus, attention bias may 
not be acquired or changed via a bottom-up stimulus-probe associative approach. 
Other, higher-order processes, like contingency awareness and attention control seem 
to influence whether the dot-probe task can achieve its outcome. In addition, from 
widespread anecdotal reports, participant boredom has always been a concern 
regarding the dot-probe training task. Boredom is especially problematic because it 
has been shown that multiple training sessions can be efficacious in reducing anxiety 
symptoms (Amir et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2009) as well as that more frequent 
brief learning sessions are more suited to skills training than infrequent, longer 
sessions (Bjork, 2017). Given that the dot-probe task has been characterised as 
boring, repeated training sessions, as it is now, may not be suitable as a training tool 
for clinical adaptation. Participants may feel reluctant to complete the multiple 
sessions necessary to achieve attention bias change. 
Gamification of Attention Bias Modification 
Recently, aside from modifying attention bias with the conventional dot-
probe task, other variations of ABM tasks have been developed to modify attention 
bias. Researchers have attempted to create more engaging ABM tasks by employing 
principles of ‘gamification’. ABM tasks can be gamified by including motivational 
feedback (e.g., sounds, graphics that indicate completion rate), rewards for 
performance (points, badges, levels, special powers or privileges), and a cohesive 
story (with consistent actions, sounds, graphics, etc.; Boendermaker, Prins, & Wiers, 
2013). Essentially, these alterations increases participants’ motivation to engage with 
the task. It is acknowledged that motivation plays an important role in cognitive 
control, which in turn can increase performance on attentional tasks (Botvinick & 
Braver, 2015). Heightened motivation does not only facilitate memory and 
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perceptual attention, it also positively affects attentional control, such as action 
selection and inhibition, and other control functions that encode and maintain a 
representation of the current task (i.e., action-outcome contingencies, relevant 
stimulus-response associations, and target states or goals; Botvinick & Braver, 2015). 
The specific role of motivation in gamified ABM tasks, and whether it may be the 
driving factor in increasing effectiveness of attention bias change compared to a 
conventional dot-probe ABM task, has not yet been studied. Forman et al. (2018) 
pointed out some limitations of gamifying ABM. These were that the creation of 
gamified trainings requires skills and resources, as well as that it implicates the risks 
of undermining the integrity of the attention training, thus resulting in reduced 
efficacy. However, benefits of gamification over the conventional dot-probe task 
involve an increase of adherence to repeated trainings, which should increase 
efficacy.  
Studies that have tested the efficacy of gamified ABM tasks to alter attention 
bias and anxiety have shown promising results. Examples of gamified ABM training 
tasks are the person-identity-matching (PIM) task (Notebaert, Clarke, Grafton, & 
MacLeod, 2015), the intrinsically-motivating playable attentional control training 
(IMPACT; Enock, 2015), personal zen (Dennis & O'Toole, 2014), and the emotion-
in-motion task (Notebaert et al., 2018). All tasks included game features like a point 
system (Enock, 2015; Notebaert et al., 2015; Notebaert et al., 2018), colour changes 
reflecting success or failure (Enock, 2015; Notebaert et al., 2015), sound effects 
(Enock, 2015), or a story line (Dennis & O'Toole, 2014). In each gamified ABM 
training, participants were encouraged to try to improve their high score. Higher 
scores were obtained when participants successfully attended to a certain stimulus 
valence.  
The method by which participants were trained to a certain stimulus valence, 
and thus achieved a high score, was different across tasks. In the PIM task 
participants were presented with virtual cards depicting face pairs with happy and 
angry expressions. Selective attention towards or away from threat was modified by 
requiring participants to either match only angry faces (and ignore the happy faces) 
or only match the happy faces (and ignore the angry faces) across sequential card 
pairs (Notebaert et al., 2015). In the IMPACT task, faces, reflecting happiness and 
disgust expressions, continuously descended from the top to the bottom of the screen 
and participants were either trained to attend towards or away from threat by clicking 
INVESTIGATION INTO ATTENTION BIAS MODIFICATION 107 
on the target face twice to prevent them from hitting the bottom of the screen (Enock, 
2015; and replicated by Pieters et al., 2017). In the personal zen game, participants 
were shown two animated faces, one angry and one neutral, and were instructed to 
make a swipe motion that followed either the angry or neutral character. In the 
emotion-in-motion task, a target would move around the screen amid seven moving 
distractors. The target was either a happy facial expression amid angry facial 
expressions, or an angry facial expression amid happy facial expressions, resulting in 
two training conditions (‘attend-happy’ and ‘attend-angry’). Participants were 
instructed to follow the target with their mouse, however, the target would randomly 
disappear from one and appear in another frame position. Hence, participants needed 
to relocate the target and continue tracking it with their mouse (Notebaert et al., 
2018). 
Most gamified attention bias training resulted in attention bias change 
(Dennis & O'Toole, 2014; Enock, 2015; Notebaert et al., 2015; Pieters et al., 2017), 
this change was, however, only evident in the ‘attend-happy’ condition in the 
emotion-in-motion task (Notebaert et al., 2018). Furthermore, not all tasks were 
successful in significantly reducing emotional reactivity in the positive compared to 
the negative valenced training conditions as measured with a stressor post-training 
(Enock, 2015; Notebaert et al., 2015; Notebaert et al., 2018; Pieters et al., 2017). The 
PIM (Notebaert et al., 2015) and emotion-in-motion task (Notebaert et al., 2018) 
both found an attenuated effect in emotional reactivity in the ‘attend-happy’ 
compared to the ‘attend-angry’ training condition. Lastly, personal zen achieved a 
significant reduction in anxiety levels post-training (Dennis & O'Toole, 2014), 
however, this effect was only replicated in females (Dennis-Tiwary, Egan, Babkirk, 
& Denefrio, 2016).  
It appears that gamified ABM can be a promising step forward in changing 
attention bias patterns from the conventional dot-probe task. To further investigate 
the differences in attention bias change between the conventional dot-probe task and 
gamified ABM, the current study compared the dot-probe task with the latest 
gamified ABM task, the emotion-in-motion task. Previous studies that compared 
gamified ABM training tasks to the conventional dot-probe task have focussed on the 
effect on emotion vulnerability. However, less is known about how attention bias 
patterns change when the dot-probe task or gamified ABM tasks are used. Therefore, 
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the specific focus in the current study was to examine the possible differences in the 
processes that underlie attention bias change.  
Modification of the Attentional Engagement and Disengagement Processes 
The main aim of this experiment was to investigate the processes that have 
the potential to underlie attention bias change as a result of the dot-probe and 
emotion-in-motion task. Two processes that operate in the attentional system are the 
engagement and disengagement processes (Clarke et al., 2013). The engagement 
process is the mechanism that initially orientates attention. This process is biased 
when it contributes to attention being selectively drawn towards negative compared 
to neutral information. The disengagement process is the mechanism that relocates 
selective attention away from focal information. This process is biased when the 
ability to relocate attention away from current focal information is selectively 
impaired when processing negative information in comparison with when it is 
processing neutral information. The attentional engagement and disengagement 
processes in healthy individuals favour threatening over neutral stimuli. Cisler and 
Koster (2010) proposed that everyone experiences early detection of threatening 
stimuli and difficulties ignoring negative distractors. Moreover, Cisler and Koster 
(2010) stated that individuals with anxiety demonstrate the same bias in the 
attentional processes, however, significantly larger in magnitude compared to healthy 
controls. 
In order to gauge the extent to which changes in attention bias via ABM are 
achieved by modifying biased attentional engagement or disengagement, it is 
important to obtain baseline measures of these separate processes. As described in 
Chapter 1, some methodological difficulties were encountered when assessing the 
attentional engagement and disengagement processes. Clarke et al. (2013) proposed 
three criteria which are essential to disentangle the attentional engagement and 
disengagement process of selective attention. Firstly, the task needs to control for the 
systematic behavioural slowing of reaction-time unrelated to attentional processes 
(i.e., freezing) for anxious individuals in the presence of threat stimuli. This can be 
done by including control trials wherein threat and neutral stimuli are presented 
within an attended locus and no spatial movement of attention is required. Secondly, 
the task should include an initial fixation point before allowing subsequent 
attentional shifts. For the attentional engagement bias measure, attention should be 
equally often secured on emotional and neutral stimuli, before assessing relative 
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facility to shift attention towards this stimulus. For the attentional disengagement 
bias measure, attention should be initially equally often fixated on emotional and 
neutral stimuli, before assessing relative facility to shift attention away from this 
stimulus (Clarke et al., 2013). The third criterion holds that once initial fixation has 
been established, the task must allow assessment of the facility with which selective 
attention can be shifted in relation to emotional stimuli. This can be accomplished by 
including neutral baseline trials to which the speed of attentional shifting in relation 
to emotional stimuli can be compared to. Some prior studies did not include these 
features which limited the conclusions that could be drawn on the basis of these 
findings (Fox et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2002; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De 
Houwer, 2004; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). Grafton and MacLeod (2014) as well as 
Rudaizky et al. (2014) designed and tested an attention process assessment (APA) 
task in line with these three criteria and found that both the engagement and 
disengagement process of attention can be biased independently, especially in those 
high compared to those low in trait anxiety.  
The Attentional Process Assessment Task  
The attentional process assessment (APA) task assesses attentional 
engagement and disengagement with sixteen different trial types, for example trial 
see Figure 19. Each trial consists of a representational emotional (angry face) or 
neutral (neutral face) stimulus, always presented together with a non-representational 
abstract stimulus (facial silhouette). Initial attention is fixated with a cue probe, 
located equally often in the same location as the representational and non-
representational stimuli, before the stimuli appear. Further, a target probe is presented 
in the same location, equally often as the representational and non-representational 
stimuli, after the stimuli appeared.  
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Figure 19. Example of a Trial on the Attentional Process Assessment Task.  
The probes used in the task were smaller. The trial displayed is a disengagement bias 
assessment trial. An angry face (the representational stimulus) and facial silhouette (the 
non-representational stimulus) are presented. Attentional focus is initially anchored in the 
same location as the representational stimulus with the cue probe. The target probe is 
presented in the opposite location from the representational stimulus, in the same location as 
the non-representational stimuli. 
The first step involved the participants having to process a briefly presented 
cue probe that appeared in left or right screen location which then fixated their initial 
attention on that screen location. This enabled the presentation of the images of two 
different types of emotional expressions, either in the opposite location from, or the 
same location as the initial location of the cue probe. Then, by measuring the time 
taken by the participants to process a second probe, which appeared in the location of 
the representational or abstract image, it was possible to ascertain the degree to 
which attention became focused on the representational images located in the 
opposite location, compared to the degree to which attention remained focused on the 
representational images which remained in the same location as the initial fixation. 
This permits computation of an attentional engagement bias index that reflects the 
degree to which attention becomes focused to a greater extent on angry relative to 
neutral representational stimuli located in the opposite location as the initial fixation. 
Additionally, it allowed for the computation of an attentional disengagement bias 
index that reflects the degree to which attention remains focused on angry relative to 
neutral representational stimuli located in the same location as the initial fixation. 
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The APA task has been successfully used to assess both biased attentional 
engagement and disengagement related to anxiety with pictures from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; Rudaizky 
et al., 2014). 
Employing the APA task, pre- and post-ABM training, allows for the 
investigation into whether engagement by emotion, disengagement from emotion, or 
both processes change in response to ABM. Furthermore, this design would permit 
the identification of the attentional processes responsible for bias change. This in turn 
can inform future researchers to target specific processes, which result in more 
precise ABM training. Moreover, it is a possibility that different ABM training tasks 
change different biased processes. Further understanding of the role of these 
processes in attention bias change could increase the efficacy of ABM training 
paradigms. In addition, the current study tested the attentional process change 
achieved with the gamified emotion-in-motion task against those achieved by the 
conventional dot-probe task. The APA task that previously used stimuli from the 
IAPS was modified to present facial stimuli to match the stimuli previously used in 
the emotion-in-motion task.   
The present design will permit examination of the relative efficacy of the two 
different training tasks in achieving changes in each process and whether these 
different types of training lead to similar, or different changes in attention bias to 
facial information. The current study will determine whether changes in biased 
attentional disengagement are responsible for ABM induced changes in attentional 
bias (H1), whether changes in biased attentional engagement are responsible for 
ABM induced changes in attentional bias (H2), or whether a combination of the two 
processes are responsible for ABM induced changes in attention bias (H3). 
According to H1, ABM training away from threat will contribute to greater ease of 
disengagement from negative stimuli, while ABM training towards threat will lead to 
greater difficulty disengaging from such stimuli. According to H2, ABM training 
away from threat will contribute to greater ease of inhibiting engagement by negative 
stimuli, while ABM training towards threat will lead to enhanced engagement by 
such stimuli. According to H3, ABM training away from threat will contribute to 
greater ease of inhibiting engagement with, and disengagement from negative 
stimuli, while ABM training towards threat will lead to enhanced engaging with, and 
greater difficulty disengaging from such stimuli. Parallel to the above hypotheses, the 
112 AN INVESTIGATION INTO ATTENTION BIAS MODIFICATION  
 
study design will be able to establish whether the dot-probe task induces the same or 
different attentional change in biased processes as the emotion-in-motion task (H4).  
Methodology  
Study Design 
The study design was a pre- and post-test repeated measures design with 
three independent variables: Attentional Bias Type, Training Condition and Time. 
Two attentional bias types were assessed, the engagement and disengagement bias. 
The type of training was either the traditional dot-probe task (DPT) or the emotion-
in-motion (EIM) task. The direction of training was either ‘attend-neutral’ or ‘attend-
angry’. Hence, participants were randomly allocated to one of the four training 
conditions: (1) DPT-angry; (2) DPT-neutral; (3) EIM-angry; and (4) EIM-neutral. 
The dependent variables were the engagement and disengagement bias index 
calculated from RTs measured at two time points: pre- and post-training. State 
anxiety was measured at baseline to ensure group equivalence. 
Participants 
One-hundred and fifty-one undergraduate students participated in exchange 
of course credit. They were randomly assigned to complete one of the four training 
conditions. Five participants were unable to complete all trials and fourteen made 
more than 30% of errors in the attentional process assessment task (pre-test only: n = 
4; post-test only: n = 3, in both: n = 7). Hence, the final sample analysed consisted of 
132 participants (98 female, 33 male and 1 endorsing another gender), who were 
aged between 17 and 48 (M = 22.5 years, SD = 5.23). Sixty-five participants 
completed the dot-probe task, of whom 35 were trained to attend to neutral and 30 to 
attend to angry faces. Sixty-seven participants completed the emotion-in-motion task, 
of whom 35 were trained to attend to neutral and 32 were trained to attend to angry 
faces. A post-hoc sensitivity test with GPower software (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & 
Lang, 2009) showed that our sample size of 132 could find a small effect of d = 0.15 
(1-β = .80, α = .05) when conducting a repeated measures, within-between ANOVA 
with 4 groups and 2 measurements.   
Procedure 
The Curtin Human Ethics Research Commission approved the study. All 
tasks were run on a computer with a screen resolution of 1920x1080. The dot-probe 
task and attentional process assessment task were controlled by custom-written 
software run under DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003). The emotion-in-motion task 
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was provided by the CARE lab from the University of Western Australia and ran 
using BBC Basic software. Participants sat in a chair facing the monitor at a distance 
of approximately 60cm. Participants were tested with a maximum of four at a time in 
separate testing cubicles. On arrival, they were provided with an information sheet 
and completed the consent form. After providing their demographics, participants 
completed the state subscale of the State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S). One-
hundred and fourteen participants completed the rating task before starting the rest of 
the experiment, where participants rated all the facial stimuli used in subsequent 
tasks on valence and intensity. All participants completed the APA task that measured 
the attentional processes before they were randomly assigned to one of the four 
training conditions. After the training, participants completed the APA task again. 
The experiment finished with a debriefing, the entire procedure took approximately 
90 minutes.   
Materials 
Spielberger’s State-Anxiety Inventory 
State anxiety was assessed with the 20-item state subscale of the 
Spielberger’s State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S; Spielberger et al., 1983). The 
STAI-S asks participants to indicate the degree to which participants are 
experiencing a variety of anxiety symptoms “at this moment”. Scores on this 
subscale range from 20 to 80, with higher scores representing higher levels of state 
anxiety. STAI has been shown to have good reliability and validity (c.f. Grös et al., 
2007). Our sample showed a Cronbach’s alpha of .90, and a mean anxiety score of 
31.2 (SD = 7.54, median = 29.0) that ranged between 20 and 60.  
Stimulus Materials 
In all the attentional tasks, the same facial stimuli of an ethnic and gender 
diverse set was used (65% Caucasian, 25% Asian, and 10% African). This diverse 
stimulus set was chosen in this study to increase ecological validity. The total of 32 
representational faces (16 female and 16 male) with a neutral and angry expression 
with closed mouth were chosen from the NimStim database (Tottenham et al., 2009). 
For the APA task, an additional 32 non-representational abstract faces were found 
with a Google search using the terms “Facebook profile silhouette” and were 
modified using Adobe Photoshop CC 2015 to match the representational faces in size 
and skin colour. The background colour of all faces was a soft blue/green colour (R: 
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176, G: 211 and B: 187) that matched the background colour of the APA task. All 
facial stimuli were sized at 320x320pixels. 
All representational faces were checked for valence and intensity in a rating 
task prior to the start of the experiment. This was done to ensure that the stimuli 
represented the emotion as intended as well as that the intensity of the expressions 
were equal between stimuli. Participants conducted a simple categorisation task 
where every face would come up once and the participant had to press the ‘A’-key 
when it was a neutral face and the ‘L’-key when it was an angry face (this was 
counterbalanced across participants). Followed by a 1 to 9 rating of the intensity, 
with 1 being not intense at all to 9 being very intense.  
Attentional Process Assessment Task with Facial Stimuli 
The attentional process assessment (APA) task was used to assess 
engagement and disengagement bias pre-and post-training (Grafton & MacLeod, 
2014; Rudaizky et al., 2014). The task was modified into a face version, where angry 
and neutral facial expressions replaced the representational pictures of the IAPS, and 
the facial silhouettes replaced the abstract images of art that were used as non-
representational stimuli. An example trial is displayed in Figure 19.  
The task had sixteen different trial types, each presented twenty-four times, 
resulting in a total of 384 trails. Each trial started with two red frames (sized at: 
320x320 pixels), which were presented on the left (x, y coordinates: 300, 380) and 
right side (x, y coordinates: 1110, 380) of the screen for 500ms. In one of the two 
frames a little box was presented (sized at 100x100 pixels). The cue probe, which 
was either a horizontally or vertically presented line (sized at 15x5 pixels) would 
appear in that box after 250ms. Participants were instructed to attend to the box and 
remember the orientation of the cue probe. Subsequently, two facial stimuli 
(representational face vs abstract silhouette) would appear for 250ms in the same 
location as the frames. The representational face consisted of a neutral or angry facial 
expression. Thus, there were two general trials, one where an angry face was paired 
with a silhouette (threat-trial) and one where a neutral face was paired with a 
silhouette (baseline trial). In a threat trial, RTs of attentional shifts are influence by 
emotion, in the baseline trials, RTs function as a baseline measure of attentional shift 
without the presence of emotion. Finally, the target probe, which was the same as the 
cue probe (also horizontally or vertically presented), appeared either on the left or 
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right side of the screen and would stay on until a response was made. Participants 
needed to match the orientation of the target probe to the cue probe as quickly as 
possible without making any mistakes using the shift keys. That is, participants 
responded with the left shift key when the cue and target probes differed in their 
orientation and the right shift key when the orientation was the same (this was 
counterbalanced across participants). Participants were given two examples and six 
practice trials before the main task started. Given that participants required to process 
a briefly presented cue probe that initially appeared in either screen location, their 
attention is anchored in this location. Then, the APA task presented the angry or 
neutral face either in the same or opposite location of this initial fixation of attention. 
Next, timing how long the participant took to process the target probe, which 
appeared either in the same location of the representational (angry or neutral face) or 
abstract face (silhouette) determined the degree to which attention remains focused 
on the same located representational stimuli or becomes focused to the opposite 
representational stimuli. The data preparation section explains how the attentional 
engagement and disengagement index were calculated. 
Attention Bias Modification Training Procedures 
Participants were randomly allocated to two types of training, half of the 
sample completed the conventional dot-probe ABM task and the other half 
completed the gamified emotion-in-motion ABM task.  
The Conventional Dot-Probe Task with Facial Stimuli. Responses were 
collected on a QWERTY-keyboard with either the left and right shift key. The match 
between response key and probe was counterbalanced across participants. Every trial 
would start with a 500ms presentation of a fixation cross in the middle of the screen, 
followed by two facial expressions (angry and neutral) of the same poser presented 
next to each other for 500ms (960 pixels apart, measured from the centre of the 
stimuli). The facial stimuli used in the dot-probe task were the same as the stimuli 
used in the APA task. Then a probe, which was a small red line (15x5 pixels) either 
presented horizontally or vertically, would be presented in the location of one of the 
two faces, thus in the left or right location. Participants were instructed to respond as 
quickly as possible to the orientation of the probe, without making mistakes. The 
probe would disappear after a response was made or after 1500ms. The dot-probe 
task training procedure consisted of 384 trials with a 100% stimulus-probe 
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contingency to train selective attention to neutral or angry faces. For those in the 
‘attend-neutral’ condition, the probe was always preceded by a neutral face and for 
those in the ‘attend-angry’ condition, the probe was always preceded by an angry 
face. Given that the training was one of 100% congruency, no data is available on the 
attention bias during training. Figure 23 in the Appendix at the end of this chapter 
shows the collated average RT over 16th dot-probe training trials per training 
condition. We decided to collate the RT of 16 trials into one average score and plot 
that instead of all single RTs of every 384 trials, as the graph would become too 
messy. The number 16 was chosen because 384 trials can be divided by 16, resulting 
in 24 dotted time points. 
The Gamified Emotion-in-Motion Task with Facial Stimuli. The emotion-
in-motion task (see Figure 20) was designed to train selective attention toward or 
away from angry faces in a gamified setting (Notebaert et al., 2018) and a demo can 
be viewed on the web: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PMUnimtCag0. Eight 
frames that contained faces were presented on the screen, of which one was the target 
and seven were distractors. Participants in the ‘attend-angry’ condition were 
instructed to follow an angry facial expression (target) amid neutral distractor faces, 
while participants in the ‘attend-neutral’ condition were instructed to follow the 
neutral facial expression (target) amid angry distractor faces. All the frames, 
including the frame that presented the target, constantly switched identity. The 
emotional expression of the target, in addition to its identity, would change at random 
intervals, and one of the other frames would present a face depicting the target 
expression. This then became the new target. At these occurrences, participants had 
to find the new target as quickly as possible and start tracking it with their mouse 
again. Identical to Notebaert et al. (2018), each face remained constant for the first 2 
seconds of each game. From then on, individual faces within a frame switched to a 
different identity, while keeping the same facial expression at any point between 1 
and 2000 milliseconds throughout the game. Within each game, the target expression 
shifted to another frame 60 times, at random intervals of 5 to 10 seconds. All 8 
frames moved on different randomly predetermined paths, at a randomly 
predetermined speed between 30 and 50 pixels per 100 milliseconds. Thus, although 
the frames moved at different speeds, each frame’s speed was constant within a 
game. The frames bounced off the screen limits and off other frames they contacted 
at the reflected angle of impact. The target was indicated by the emotional expression 
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of the face. Furthermore, the mouse only disappeared when the cursor was correctly 
located in the position of the current target frame, to not obscure the target 
expression.  
 
Figure 20. A print screen of the emotion-in-motion task 
Participants were instructed to play five games of 5 minutes each. Each game 
would start with a 3-second countdown presented in the centre of the screen. After 
every game, participants were given feedback in the form of a score that represented 
the proportion of time that participants had their mouse on the target face during the 
game, as well as the average time taken to shift the mouse to the next target when it 
had moved to another frame. These scores were displayed along with the higher 
score for each over the past games. Participants were furthermore instructed to try to 
break their own high score with each new game they played. Unfortunately, this task 
originally consisted of 8 games and was programmed in a way that it saved each 
participants’ scores after the completion of all 8 games. It was decided to use only 5 
games in this study to match the duration of training with the dot-probe task and to 
reduce load on participants. Unaware of the save protocol of the program, data was 
not stored for the five games that the participants played. Ten participants completed 
the full 8 games as they did not follow instructions, the data of these ten participants 
are shown in Table 18 of the Appendix.  
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Data Preparation and Statistical Analyses 
Two bias index scores were calculated from the sixteen different trial types in 
the APA task, these scores are presented at the end of this chapter in the Appendix 
Tables 17 and 18. The formula to calculate these bias index scores is shown in the 
footnote 1. An attentional engagement bias index was calculated that reflected the 
degree to which attention becomes focused to a greater extent on angry relative to 
neutral faces, situated away from the initial fixation. An attentional disengagement 
bias index was calculated that reflected the degree to which attention remained 
focused on angry relative to neutral faces, situated in the same location as the initial 
fixation. As outlined in Rudaizky et al. (2014), a higher (positive) score on these bias 
indices represented selectively enhanced shifting of attention towards unattended 
faces that were situated away from initial fixation when these were negative rather 
than neutral (greater engagement bias toward threat) and a heightened tendency for 
attention to be sustained on faces that were presented in the same location as the 
initial fixation when these were negative rather than neutral (greater difficulty 
disengaging from threat). Scores around zero represent no engagement or 
disengagement bias. Lower (negative) score on these bias indices represented 
selectively enhanced shifting of attention towards initially unattended faces that were 
situated away from initial fixation when these were neutral rather than angry (greater 
engagement bias away from threat) and a heightened tendency for attention to be 
sustained on faces that were presented in the same location as the initial fixation 
when these were neutral rather than angry (greater difficulty disengaging from non-
threat).  
Before calculating the attentional bias indices from the mean RTs of every 
trial, the error trials were discarded. Errors were defined as an incorrect button press, 
failure to respond within 3000ms or an extreme score –values more than three 
standard deviations above or below the mean relative to each participant’s mean RT 
and were entered as missing values. Descriptive statistic on the proportion of errors 
in the pre- and post-attentional process assessment tasks are shown in Table 12. The 
means RT of each trial type were then checked to determine whether any of them 
were extreme scores. None of the scores were outside the 3SD range of the overall 
sample’s mean. In addition, participants were not excluded based on outlier bias 
scores after the engagement and disengagement bias index scores were calculated. 
This was similar to the data preparation procedure of Grafton and MacLeod (2014); 
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Rudaizky et al. (2014) who tested the APA task on smaller sample sizes with larger 
error variance and standard deviations. Thus, none of the participants were excluded 
in addition to those 15 participants who made more than 30% of errors.  
Table 12.  
Descriptive Statistics on the Proportion of Errors made in the Attentional Process 
Assessment Task Pre- and Post-Training 
 Pre-Test Post-Test 
 n Range M(SD) n Range M(SD) 
Total 149 2.08-65.9 12.3(11.1) 145 2.08-65.9 12.1(11.6) 
Included 138 2.08-28.6 9.62(5.32) 135 2.08-19.2 9.38(5.51) 
Excluded 11 33.3-65.9 45.7(10.5) 10 32.3-65.9 48.7(11.1) 
Note: Based on greater than 30% of errors, 7 participants were excluded in both the pre- 
and post- test, 4 participants only in the pre-test and 3 participants only in the post-test, 
resulting in the exclusion of 15 participants in total.  
Attentional engagement and disengagement bias index scores of the final 133 
participants were entered in 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 Attentional bias type (engagement vs 
disengagement) by Time (pre vs post) by Training (DPT vs EIM) by Direction 
(attend-angry vs attend-neutral) ANOVA. Significance level for all analyses were set 
at p < .05. 
Results  
Face Ratings 
One-way ANOVA’s conducted on the mean intensity ratings and the mean 
reaction time needed to categorise facial stimuli as angry or neutral did not differ 
across training conditions, all F < 1.09, p > .298, or levels of state anxiety 
(dichotomised with a median split), all F < 1.60, p > .209. Descriptive statistics for 
each face used are shown in Table 15 of the Appendix. The mean intensity ratings for 
each training condition are reported in Table 13.  
Table 13.  
Range, Mean and Standard Deviation of the Intensity Ratings for the Angry and 
Neutral Stimuli 
 Angry Faces Neutral Faces 
 Range M(SD) Range M(SD) 
DPT-angry (n = 30) 1.00 – 7.86 4.86(2.69) 1.00 – 6.06 3.13(1.51) 
DPT-neutral (n = 32) 4.31 – 8.47 6.50(.12) 1.00 – 7.75 2.22(1.63) 
EIM-angry (n = 33) 3.94 – 7.81 6.37(1.00) 1.00 – 6.81 2.38(1.42) 
EIM-neutral (n = 31) 4.81 – 8.31 6.48(0.96) 1.00 – 8.69 2.70(1.85) 
The valence of each face was on average miss rated 4.45 times (SD = 4.42, 
PE = 37.1). As shown in Table 15 of the Appendix, the neutral and angry facial 
expression of one specific model was miss-classified by participants more often than 
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other models, 3.17 SDs and 4.53 SDs from the mean, respectively. All other models 
were miss rated < 2.5 SD’s from the mean. The trials with this model, therefore, were 
excluded from further APA analyses. 
State Anxiety and Attentional Engagement and Disengagement at Baseline 
Descriptive statistics of the total STAI-S score of each training condition are 
shown in Table 14. A one-way ANOVA showed that state anxiety was trending 
towards a difference between the four training conditions, F(3,127) = 2.20, p = .091, 
η² = .049. Post-hoc comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) revealed that none of the 
training conditions significantly differed in their state anxiety scores at baseline, all t 
< 2.37, p > .114, d < 0.55.  
Table 14.  
Descriptive Statistics on the Total State Anxiety Scores for each Training Condition 
 Range M(SD) Distribution (S, K) 
DPT-angry (n = 30) 20 – 51 31.6(8.17) .687, -.267 
DPT-neutral (n = 32) 20 – 51 29.5(7.18) 1.06, 1.22 
EIM-angry (n = 33) 20 – 60 33.9(8.65) .934, 1.47 
EIM-neutral (n = 31) 21 – 46 30.1(5.69) .698, .410 
Note: Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of those in the dot-probe task (DPT) and 
emotion-in-motion task (EIM), either trained to attend angry faces (-angry) or trained to 
attend neutral faces (-neutral). Standard errors of skewness (S) was < .472 and of kurtosis 
(K) was < .833.  
At baseline, the sum score of the STAI-S did not correlate with the 
engagement bias, r(130) = .081, p = .359 or with the disengagement bias measured at 
baseline, r(130) = .065, p = .461. The scatterplot in Figure 21 show the correlations 
between state anxiety and the engagement and disengagement bias index scores per 
training condition. 
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Figure 21. The Association between State Anxiety and Engagement and Disengagement Bias 
at Baseline. Negative scores indicate attention bias towards neutral faces, whereas positive 
scores indicate attention bias towards angry faces (Study 2). The lines represent the line that 
fits the data best. 
Changes in Attentional Processes in Response to Attention Bias Modification  
The engagement and disengagement bias index scores assessed pre-and post-
training for each training condition are displayed in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22. Attentional Engagement and Disengagement Bias towards Angry and Neutral 
Faces from Pre- and Post-Training Condition in Study 2.  
Positive scores indicate attention bias towards angry faces, whereas negative scores indicate 
attention bias towards neutral faces. Error bars represent standard error from each mean. 
*** = p < .001 ** = p < .010 * = p < .050 (significant difference from zero).  
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The ANOVA resulted in a significant main effect for Attentional Bias Type, 
F(1,128) = 17.3, p < .001, η² = .119, such that there was evidence to support the 
existence of an attentional disengagement bias towards angry faces (M = 46.3, SE = 
7.99), not for the existence of an attentional engagement bias (M = .050, SE = 8.05). 
The interaction effect between Time and Training was significant, F(1,128) = 5.42, p 
= .021, η² = .041. Follow-up pairwise comparisons showed that the change from pre- 
to post-training was only significant for those who completed the dot-probe training 
task, t(64) = 2.55, p = .012, 95%CI(10.3, 80.9), d = 0.32, that is, participants trained 
with the dot-probe task had no bias pre-training (M = -1.69, SE = 12.2), however, had 
a tendency to attend more rapidly to and for an extended time with angry faces 
compared to neutral faces post-training (M = 43.9, SE = 12.1). There was no 
significant change pre- to post-training for those who completed the emotion-in-
motion training task, t(66) = .725, p = .470, 95%CI(-22.0, 47.5), d = 0.18. It seems 
that the two different training task result in different attention bias change patterns.  
Furthermore, the 4-way interaction between Attentional Bias Type, Time, 
Training, and Valence was marginally trending, F(1,128) = 2.89, p = .092, η² = .022. 
This was followed up for exploratory reasons. It seems that attention bias change in 
the disengagement bias was only significant in participants who completed the 
attend-angry training with the dot-probe task, t(29) = 2.06, p = .042, 95%CI(2.60, 
137), d = 0.54. As shown in Figure 22, these participants changed from having no 
attention bias pre-training to difficulty disengaging from angry faces post-training. 
This change is in the direction as expected based on the direction of training. 
Furthermore, attention bias change in the engagement bias was only significant in 
participants who completed the attend-neutral training with the dot-probe task, t(34) 
= 2.80, p = .006, 95%CI(27.8, 162), d = 0.64. As shown in Figure 22, these 
participants changed from enhanced engagement with neutral faces pre-training to no 
bias post-training. This is in the opposite direction as expected based on the direction 
employed in training. However, all other comparisons in the 4-way interaction were 
not significant, all t < .945, p > .347, d < 0.27. This indicates that the training 
provided to participants did not result in consistent attention bias change in the 
direction of the training across the engagement and disengagement bias. Overall, 
there is no strong support for or against hypotheses and provided that this 4-way 
interaction was trending, it is more likely that the two significant comparisons are 
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based on chance. All other effects in the omnibus ANOVA were not significant, all F 
< 2.41, p > .123, η² < .018.  
Discussion Study 2 
The objective of this study was to investigate how two processes that 
potentially contribute to attention bias -faster engagement with and the slower 
disengagement from threatening stimuli- change when two different attention bias 
modification (ABM) training tasks were employed. Furthermore, this study set out to 
compare the efficacy of the modification of attention bias patterns between the 
conventional dot-probe task and a novel gamified ABM procedure, the emotion-in-
motion task. The results showed that participants trained with the dot-probe achieved 
a significant bias change from pre- to post-training and those trained with the 
emotion-in-motion task did not. However, the attention bias change induced in the 
dot-probe task was independent of what participants were trained to attend to. These 
results provide some support for H4, which explored the option that the dot-probe 
task and emotion-in-motion task provide different results when changing attentional 
bias processes.  
The emotion-in-motion task, unlike the dot-probe task, was not successful in 
changing any attention bias processes. The bias change scores achieved with the 
emotion-in-motion training task in Notebaert et al. (2018) indicated that participants 
increased the correct tracking of happy faces with 2.7% from pre- to post-‘attend 
happy’ training. In Notebaert et al. (2018), this bias change score was assessed with 
an assessment version of the emotion-in-motion task. Since the two tasks are more 
dissimilar in this experiment, that is, the transfer was assessed from the emotion-in-
motion task to the APA task, it is possible that the non-significant findings observed 
may have been due to the lack of far transfer. Besides, it is also possible that the 
emotion-in-motion task did not change attention bias. Given that the only significant 
bias change found in Notebaert et al. (2018) was in those trained to attend to happy 
faces, it is possible that the emotion-in-motion task does not change attention bias 
with attend to neutral or negative training conditions. Another possibility is that the 
game elements in the emotion-in-motion task may have distracted attention away 
from the learning mechanism that underlies successful attention bias change as 
suggested by Forman et al. (2018). The continuously moving and changing faces in 
the emotion-in-motion task may have disrupted learning. 
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There was a trend, which revealed that those trained to attend to neutral faces 
in the dot-probe task changed from enhanced engagement with neutral faces at 
baseline to no engagement bias post-training. The training direction had no effect on 
attention bias change, which was the opposite of what was hypothesised. Particularly, 
the engagement bias found with neutral faces at baseline in one condition seems odd 
given that attention and emotion theories (see Chapter 1) theorise that emotional 
stimuli capture attention more rapidly than neutral stimuli. Furthermore, participants 
in the dot-probe task who were randomised in the attend-neutral condition were the 
only ones who had an engagement bias towards neutral faces and a disengagement 
bias with angry faces at baseline, whereas participants in the other conditions 
revealed no attentional bias at baseline. It is possible that the significant effect found 
in this condition merely represents a random effect (i.e., regression to the mean). 
This failure of the randomisation process to produce equivalent groups at baseline is 
a limitation of this study. A second significant attention bias change was revealed by 
the exploratory follow-up analysis from the trending interaction. That is, those who 
completed the attention training to angry faces with the dot-probe task changed from 
no disengagement bias at baseline to an enhanced disengagement bias from angry 
faces post-training. This change is in the hypothesised direction, based on the 
training direction. However, similar to the previous significant pair-wise comparison, 
it is even more likely that this comparison emerged as a random chance rather than a 
true effect.    
Overall, the results showed that the dot-probe training task changes attention 
bias towards angry faces, irrespective of the direction of training. Furthermore, the 
main effect of bias type was significant and revealed an overall disengagement bias 
with angry faces, while showing no evidence for an engagement bias. Hence, the bias 
change pre-to post-ABM with the dot-probe task was only evident in the attentional 
disengagement bias scores. In other words, the two training directions in the dot-
probe task enhanced attentional disengagement with angry facial stimuli. It is 
challenging to explain why two different stimulus-probe contingencies that underlie 
learning of attention bias in the opposite direction would result in an attention bias in 
the same direction. Nevertheless, researchers have suggested that it is not the 
valence-specific change training (i.e., ‘attend-neutral’ training) per se that results in 
attention bias change, the non-valence-specific training (i.e., ‘attend-angry’ training) 
may also lead to an attention bias change (Yao et al., 2015). This is supported by 
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others who proposed that training in general enhances attentional control, in turn 
facilitating attention bias change (Chen et al., 2015). Thus, it is possible that attention 
bias is not merely changed through bottom-up stimulus-probe contingency learning 
(i.e., the training direction). Contingency learning irrespective of direction that 
results in attention bias change, may strengthen other higher-order processes, like 
attention control.  
Future research is encouraged to investigate other processes than contingency 
learning that influence attention bias change. For instance, studies can assess 
attention control pre-and post-ABM to assess whether a change in attention control is 
associated with a change in attentional engagement and disengagement biased 
processes. Understanding the role of other processes like attention control in 
changing attention bias in ABM can shed light on how to successfully change 
attentional processes to change attention bias related to psychopathology. Moreover, 
it would be interesting to conduct this study using stimuli from the IAPS database 
and assess attentional engagement and disengagement bias pre- and post-different 
ABM training tasks. Given that the current study modified the APA tasks from an 
IAPS into a face version, the change in stimuli could have influenced the results. 
Conclusion Study 2 
This research was the first to examine change pre- to post-ABM in the 
engagement and disengagement process of attention bias. The results showed that the 
dot-probe task and not the emotion-in-motion training task was successful in 
achieving a change in the attentional disengagement process. The dot-probe training 
task changed attention bias towards angry faces, irrespective of the direction of 
training. Furthermore this study did not replicate the findings of the first time the 
emotion-in-motion task was used (Notebaert et al., 2018). However, they used an 
assessment version of the same task to measure transfer, which was only significant 
in those trained to ‘attend-happy’. The change in stimuli used as well as the change 
in assessment task may explain why this experiment did not replicate the findings of 
the original. More research is needed to establish exactly what processes are changed 
in ABM and what conditions are necessary to successfully change both processes. 
This knowledge will provide control over attention bias change and facilitates the 
translation of ABM into clinical practice. 
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Appendix Chapter 4 
Table 15.  
Descriptive Statistics of Each Stimuli in the Face Rating Task, Including Mean RT, 
Standard Deviation and Number of Errors on the Valence Categorisation and 
Intensity Ratings in Study 2 
  Valence 
Categorisation Intensity Ratings 
Model Gender - Ethnicity Mean 
RT(SD) 
N 
Errors Mean(SD) 
Mean 
RT(SD) 
Angry 1 Female - Asian 1948(1766) 3 5.57(2.21) 1641(1768) 
Angry 2 Male - Caucasian 1678(1518) 1 6.65(2.21) 1555(1607) 
Angry 3 Female - African 15638(969) 2 5.88(2.20) 1713(1741) 
Angry 4 Female - Caucasian 2511(1904) 20* 3.90(1.88) 1480(1871) 
Angry 5 Male - Caucasian 1638(1152) 1 7.19(2.24) 1684(1859) 
Angry 6 Male - Caucasian 1963(2275) 5 5.85(2.20) 1574(1637) 
Angry 7 Female - Caucasian 2043(1518) 8 4.41(2.00) 1665(2023) 
Angry 8 Male - Caucasian 1554(912) 0 7.46(2.16) 1486(1750) 
Angry 9 Female - Caucasian 1856(1240) 9 6.06(2.04) 1864(1901) 
Angry 10 Male - Caucasian 1543(969) 4 6.87(2.10) 1442(1656) 
Angry 11 Female - African 2049(1782) 5 7.08(2.28) 1594(1718) 
Angry 12 Male - Caucasian 1811(1488) 3 5.86(2.23) 2033(2534) 
Angry 13 Female - Asian 1608(1126) 2 6.71(2.19) 1605(1872) 
Angry 14 Male - African 2084(1990) 1 5.08(2.12) 1903(2011) 
Angry 15 Female - Caucasian 1688(1272) 2 6.12(2.23) 1568(1535) 
Angry 16 Male - Asian 1854(1240) 2 6.31(2.25) 1996(2720) 
Neutral 1 Female - Asian 1798(1011) 4 2.70(2.15) 1279(1130) 
Neutral 2 Male - Caucasian 1560(1021) 3 2.58(2.10) 1177(1851) 
Neutral 3 Female - African 1392(1012) 3 2.56(2.36) 861(1028) 
Neutral 4 Female - Caucasian 1276(914) 14* 2.45(2.23) 748(731) 
Neutral 5 Male - Caucasian 1367(818) 4 2.84(2.28) 980(1314) 
Neutral 6 Male - Caucasian 1264(819) 2 2.68(2.00) 815(1126) 
Neutral 7 Female - Caucasian 1296(1465) 9 2.46(2.97) 832(1223) 
Neutral 8 Male - Caucasian 1193(939) 2 2.42(2.92) 749(834) 
Neutral 9 Female - Caucasian 1523(1134) 11 2.95(2.95) 803(832) 
Neutral 10 Male - Caucasian 1382(1134) 1 2.60(2.01) 868(2308) 
Neutral 11 Female - African 1506(1190) 8 2.80(2.92) 726(762) 
Neutral 12 Male - Caucasian 1108(817) 2 2.36(2.88) 706(828) 
Neutral 13 Female - Asian 1095(761) 1 2.54(2.06) 646(727) 
Neutral 14 Male - African 1178(817) 1 2.54(2.10) 772(1129) 
Neutral 15 Female - Caucasian 1175(1086) 3 2.37(2.92) 635(759) 
Neutral 16 Male - Asian 1481(1592) 5 2.72(2.88) 666(788) 
Note: Mean reaction times (RT) and standard deviation (SD) and number (N) of errors for 
the valence categorisation of each face. Each face was rated by 114 participants. 
Mean RT and value, including their standard deviation (SD) of the intensity ratings of each 
face.  
* Trials with this model were deleted from the analysis due to high miss ratings in terms of 
its valence. 
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Figure 23. Mean RT and 95% Confidence Interval (dotted lines) per 16th Dot-Probe 
Training Trials for the 'Attend-Angry’ and 'Attend-Neutral' Training Condition in Study 2. 
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Table 16. 
Mean Tracking Percentage and Mean Reaction Time per Emotion-in-Motion Game and Averaged across all Games for those Participants that 
completed all Eight Games. 
  Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 Game 5 Game 6 Game 7 Game 8 Average 
‘Attend-Neutral’ 
(n  = 5) 
Mtracking (%) 35.2 42.6 45.7 25.7 47.2 41.4 37.6 39.2 39.3 
M (RT) 3.26 2.95 2.97 3.22 2.67 2.77 2.86 3.03 2.967 
‘Attend-Angry’ 
(n  = 5) 
Mtracking (%) 32.4 35.6 42.3 30.1 40.0 37.0 35.2 38.4 36.4 
M (RT) 3.27 2.94 2.74 2.88 2.79 2.65 2.62 2.93 2.855 
Note: Participants were instructed to complete only 5 out of 8 games, therefore, most data was not saved. Data shown in this table belongs to 10 participants 
that did not follow instructions. 
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Table 17.  
Reaction Time (Standard Deviations) and Distributions of all Trial Types in the those that Completed the Emotion-in-Motion Task in Study 2 
     Attend-angry Attend-neutral 
  Initial 
fixation 
location 
Target 
cue 
location  
Screen location 
representational 
face  
Pre-Training Post-Training Pre-Training Post-Training 
  M(SD) Distribution (S, K) M(SD) 
Distribution 
(S, K) M(SD) 
Distribution 
(S, K) M(SD) 
Distribution 
(S, K) 
1 Engagement 
threat trials 
(angry-
silhouette pair) 
Left Left  Right 789(56.26) .095, .086 682(75.5) .435, -.299 798(81.6) -.097, -.531 699(62.1) .399, -.151 
2 Right Left  Left 834(57.0) .145, .238 746(68.5) .433, -.187 857(54.9) -.022, -.822 740(61.7) -.264, 2.32 
3 Left Right  Right 776(53.8) .312, -.303 688(61.6) .056, -.011 791(63.4) -.291, .540 677(73.9) .768, .764 
4 Right Right  Left 818(64.4) 1.15, 1.94 692(58.5) -.770, 2.16 804(60.0) .044, -.096 685(51.2) -.027, -.417 
5 Engagement 
baseline trials 
(neutral-
silhouette pair) 
Left Left  Right 789(77.0) .475, 298 678(67.4) .447, .089 811(63.4) .220, -.091 694(52.0) .394, .784 
6 Right Left  Left 833(61.8) .150, .700 734(62.3) .246, .003 834(59.2) -.732, 1.08 760(49.4) .235-.558 
7 Left Right  Right 806(57.5) .698, 1.12 687(71.2) .514, -.837 777(53.7) -.117, 209 667(70.4) .508, .079 
8 Right Right  Left 810(79.9) 1.62, 6.39 670(63.5) .462, 1.01 799(49.1) .100, -.507 663(50.3) .199, .081 
9 Disengagement 
threat trials 
(angry-
silhouette pair) 
Right Left  Right 759(67.8) -.722, .367 676(78.7) -.401, -.169 754(73.8) -.035, .205 675(55.7) -.205, .121 
10 Left Right  Left 762(63.0) .501, .867 670(64.0) .532, .104 749(52.2) -.676, 2.77 637(51.5) .046, -.186 
11 Left Left  Left 912(64.1) .219, -.891 774(62.8) -.124, -.271 917(87.9) .384, .237 800(77.4) .537, .518 
12 Right Right  Right 821(64.9) .252, -.443 688(74.3) .418, -.536 812(71.5) -.348, -.379 677(55.8) -.529, .792 
13 Disengagement 
baseline trials 
(neutral-
silhouette pair) 
Right Left  Right 747(68.5) -1.33, 3.69 667(69.7) -.607, .749 759(64.9) -.165, .389 678(65.3) -.015, -.098 
14 Left Right  Left 745(57.4) .241, -.163 670(63.5) .462, 1.01 746(56.3) .265, -.378 663(50.3) .199, .081 
15 Left Left  Left 906(83.8) -.074, -.445 789(57.5) .318, .376 924(83.8) .752, 1.58 816(75.3) -.093, -.351 
16 Right Right Right 856(77.6) .317, .617 729(56.2) -.336, -.291 842(56.3) .669, .224 719(56.3) -.552, .530 
Note: Baseline trials consisted of a neutral-silhouette face pair; threat trials consisted of angry-silhouette face pair. 
The Initial fixation in engagement trials is always in the same location as the silhouette face; the initial fixation of disengagement trials is always in 
the same location as the angry or neutral face 1.  
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Table 18. 
Reaction Time (Standard Deviations) and Distributions of all Trial Types in the those that Completed the Dot-Probe Task in Study 2 
     Attend-angry Attend-neutral 
  Initial 
fixation 
location 
Target 
cue 
location  
Screen location 
representational 
face  
Pre-Training Post-Training Pre-Training Post-Training 
  M(SD) Distribution (S, K) M(SD) 
Distribution 
(S, K) M(SD) 
Distribution 
(S, K) M(SD) 
Distribution 
(S, K) 
1 Engagement 
threat trials 
(angry-
silhouette pair) 
Left Left  Right 802(50.6) .100, .121 712(60.3) -.405, 1.81 791(80.7) .033, .579 699(72.4) -.077, -.301 
2 Right Left  Left 837(79.0) .464, .546 736(73.4) -.041, -.173 822(56.3) .579, .667 743(71.7) 1.84, 4.77 
3 Left Right  Right 787(60.7) .000, .902 665(44.1) .101, -.033 789(69.9) 2.00, 6.36 657(64.2) -1.14, 2.97 
4 Right Right  Left 790(68.7) 1.73, 5.21 692(64.8) .024, .903 813(50.2) .885, 1.07 689(71.4) -.758, .480 
5 Engagement 
baseline trials 
(neutral-
silhouette pair) 
Left Left  Right 800(92.4) -.286, 3.12 722(60.3) .349, -.147 803(51.5) -.065, .212 700(64.6) -.052, 1.08 
6 Right Left  Left 840(76.0) .079, -.622 727(61.9) -.203, .545 837(80.3) 1.88, 6.77 739(56.9) .696, .548 
7 Left Right  Right 777(47.3) .838, .438 664(55.2) -.116, .978 767(46.2) .665, .284 689(64.6) -.136, -.115 
8 Right Right  Left 795(62.6) 1.89, 6.50 614(40.1) .542, 1.38 808(74.2) .079, 1.35 637(58.6) -.377, .237 
9 Disengagement 
threat trials 
(angry-
silhouette pair) 
Right Left  Right 741(66.5) -1.01, 1.72 683(48.2) -.446, -.636 761(77.2) -.440, .381 986(75.2) 1.34, 5.76 
10 Left Right  Left 749(44.0) .732, .480 648(47.6) -.607, .203 772(59.8) .782, .727 666(54.7) .403, -.569 
11 Left Left  Left 918(85.1) -.335, 1.41 798(67.7) .284, 1.58 913(84.5) .095, .966 807(70.8) .018, .413 
12 Right Right  Right 837(88.4) 1.39, 4.60 700(58.3) -.334, .185 823(84.8) -.554, .055 685(80.3) -.260, 297 
13 Disengagement 
baseline trials 
(neutral-
silhouette pair) 
Right Left  Right 755(60.8) -.788, 1.70 683(54.3) -.305, -1.78 763(66.0) .002, -1.11 681(82.6) 1.60, 3.77 
14 Left Right  Left 754(66.5) 2.47, 9.04 614(40.1) .542, 1.38 743(71.8) .336, 1.33 637(58.6) -.377, .237 
15 Left Left  Left 913(71.4) -.232, -.180 804(85.2) 1.69, 5.01 909(77.5) 1.18, 3.02 801(59.6) .197, .630 
16 Right Right Right 874(91.5) 1.78, 4.41 733(70.4) 1.13, 3.36 846(80.1) -.505, .616 712(77.3) -.457, 3.86 
Note: Baseline trials consisted of a neutral-silhouette face pair; threat trials consisted of angry-silhouette face pair. 
The Initial fixation in engagement trials is always in the same location as the silhouette face; the initial fixation of disengagement trials is always in 
the same location as the angry or neutral face 1. 
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Footnote 
1 The engagement and disengagement bias index scores can be calculated from the 
mean trials reported in Table 16 and 17 of the Appendix by using the following 
formula: 
  𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸  𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 =  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 (𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸) –  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 (𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸ℎ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸)
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 (𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸) –  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 (𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸ℎ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸) 
Engagement bias index (only RTs from engagement threat and baseline trials 
are used) = (When initial fixation is away from angry face in threat trial: RT for 
target cue location away from angry face minus RT for target cue location on angry 
face) minus (When initial fixation is away from neutral face in baseline trial: RT for 
target cue location away from neutral face minus RT for target cue location on 
neutral face). 
𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸  𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 =  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 (𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸ℎ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸) –  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 (𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸)
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 (𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸ℎ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸) –  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 (𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏  𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸) 
Disengagement bias index (only RTs from disengagement threat and baseline 
trials are used) = (When initial fixation is on angry face in threat trial: RT for target 
cue location away from angry face minus RT for target cue location on angry face) 
minus (When initial fixation is on neutral face in baseline trial: RT for target cue 
location away from neutral face minus RT for target cue location on neutral face). 
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
The central purpose of this thesis was to investigate how attention bias is 
assessed, acquired and changed in an attention bias modification (ABM) paradigm 
based on the dot-probe task. Two main studies were conducted (see for overview 
Table 19). The first study investigated the main stimulus-probe associative learning 
mechanism of the dot-probe task. The second study investigated how different 
training tasks employed in the ABM paradigm change the attentional processes of 
engagement and disengagement. The results obtained by each study will be reviewed 
in turn below. 
Table 19.  
Overview of the Experiments Conducted in this Research Project 
Experiments Study 
Design 
DPT 
Stimuli 
Probe 
duration 
Software Sample Self-report 
Study 1  
Experiment 1 ATATA shapes 1500ms DMDX Students Awareness 
Experiment 2 TATA shapes 1500ms DMDX Students Awareness 
Experiment 3 TATA shapes 500ms Inquisit M-Turk workers Awareness 
Experiment 4 ATATA faces 500ms Inquisit M-Turk workers 
Awareness, 
SIAS, SPS 
Experiment 5 ATA-AC faces 700ms Inquisit 
M-Turk 
workers 
Awareness, 
SIAS, SPS, 
STAI-S/T 
Study 2 
Experiment 1 APA-T-
APA faces 5000ms DMDX Students 
STAI-S, 
Face 
intensity 
and valence 
Note: A = dot-probe assessment task; T = dot-probe training task; APA = attentional 
processes assessment task; AC = Attentional Control assessment; SIAS = Social Interaction 
Anxiety scale; SPS = Social Phobia scale; STAI-S/T = State and Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
Review of Research Findings in Study One: The Establishment of a Template 
for Understanding Attention Bias Change with the Dot-Probe Task 
The unpredictive and predictive stimulus-probe associations in the dot-probe 
task underlie assessment and training of attention bias, respectively. In the dot-probe 
task, two stimuli are briefly presented simultaneously on two locations of the screen. 
Afterwards, a probe is presented in one of the two locations. The association between 
one of the stimuli and the probe is established by presenting a probe in the same 
location as a certain stimulus category. In this research project, the stimulus-probe 
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association in the dot-probe assessment task was of 50% congruency. The probe was 
presented equally often in the location of both stimulus categories (i.e., certain shape 
or valence). Thus an attention bias was evident when participants responded quicker 
to probes that followed one stimulus category compared to probes that followed the 
other stimulus category. This is because selective attention was at the location of that 
stimulus at the time the probe was presented, decreasing the RTs on such trials. 
Selective attention needed to shift to the probe that was presented in the opposite 
location, increasing the RTs on those trials.  
In the dot-probe training task the stimulus-probe association was of 95% 
congruency. The probe was presented in the same location as one of the two stimulus 
categories in 95% of the trials. Thus evidence of attention bias acquisition is 
demonstrated when individuals responded quicker to probes that followed the 
predictive stimulus compared to probes that followed the unpredictive stimulus. Such 
a pattern is taken as an indication that participants have learned the predictive 
function of a certain stimulus on the location of the probe, in other words, they 
learned the stimulus-probe contingency. As such, it would be revealed that these 
participants directed their selective attention to the location of the congruent 
stimulus. This would be indicated by a decrease in the RTs on 95% of the congruent 
trials as well as by an increase in the RTs on 5% of the incongruent trials as selective 
attention needed to shift to the probe that was presented in the location of the 
incongruent stimulus. As a result, the magnitude of the attention bias index (RTs on 
incongruent trials minus RTs on congruent trials) will be increased. Furthermore, the 
malleability of attention bias was assessed by providing a second training phase 
wherein the stimulus-probe contingency was reversed. A change in attention bias 
would be uncovered when participants acquired the attention bias during the training 
phase and as a result showed different attentional patterns in the assessments post- 
compared to pre-training phases. A within-training assessment was included to test 
whether attention bias acquired in training transferred to the post-training assessment 
phase as predicted by associative learning accounts (Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 
1975). The within-training assessment was established by calculating an attention 
bias index score from the 95% congruent and 5% incongruent trials.  
As reviewed in the introduction, recent research showed that providing a 
predictive stimulus-probe contingency in a training phase did not always lead to a 
successful attention bias change pre- to post-training phase (Grafton et al., 2017; 
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MacLeod & Clarke, 2015). Therefore, in Study 1 of this research project, five 
experiments were conducted to test how a stimulus-probe contingency in the dot-
probe task can influence attention bias acquisition and change. In the first three 
experiments, non-emotional stimuli (black outlined circle and triangle shapes with a 
white fill) were used to establish a working template of the dot-probe task without 
the interference of individual differences that are evident when responding to 
emotional stimuli. In the final two experiments, emotional stimuli (angry and neutral 
facial expressions) were re-introduced to examine the effects of different stimulus-
probe contingencies on changing attentional bias in relation to emotional 
information. Furthermore, the influence of individual differences in contingency 
awareness, anxiety vulnerability and attentional control on attention bias acquisition, 
change and assessment was investigated. Each experiment varied in its design and/or 
task parameters to determine a template for understanding changes in biased 
attention by establishing a dot-probe task capable of training, changing, and 
assessing an attention bias.  
Attention Bias Acquisition Established in the Reversed, not in the Initial 
Training Phase  
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that attention bias was acquired in 
the second, not in the first training phase. To account for the lack of attention bias 
acquisition in the first training phase it was hypothesised that pre-exposing 
participants to a non-predictive stimulus-probe association at baseline prior to the 
first training phase, may have diminished learning of the contingency (Baker & 
Mackintosh, 1979; Lubow & Moore, 1959; Mackintosh, 1975). Experiment 2 sought 
to address this hypothesis by deleting the baseline assessment. However, no support 
was found for this hypothesis, as the findings of Experiment 2 replicated the findings 
of the first experiment (i.e., lack of attention bias in the first training phase, while 
attention bias was successfully acquired in the second training phase).  
Experiment 3 was designed to address the possibility that the simplicity of the 
task may have meant that attention bias was not induced in the first training. It was 
hypothesised that by increasing the difficulty of probe identification, the reliance on 
the preceding stimuli would increase and in turn direct selective attention to the 
stimuli and enhance the chance that participants would learn the stimulus-probe 
associations. The probes were decreased in size and the probe duration was 
shortened. However, no support was found for this explanation in Experiment 3 
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wherein the dot-probe task was modified to increase the difficulty level of the dot-
probe task. There was no evidence of attention bias change during training. 
Furthermore, in contrast to Experiment 1 and 2, attention bias was not acquired in 
either training phases. This implies that in contrast to what was hypothesised, 
learning of the stimulus-probe contingency was impaired with the more difficult dot-
probe task.  
Attention Bias Change only Visible within Training, not in Post-Training 
Assessment 
In accordance with attentional theories of associative learning (Kruschke, 
2003; Le Pelley, 2004; Mackintosh, 1975) it was hypothesised that any pattern of 
selective attention assessed within a training phase would continue to be evident 
during the subsequent post-training assessment phase. If this were the case, 
participants would react faster to probes that presented in the same location as stimuli 
that previously held predictive value. However, no support was found for this 
hypothesis across the three experiments when the stimulus-probe contingency 
changed from a predictive contingency in the training phase, to a non-predictive 
contingency in the assessment phase. The bias index scores were not significantly 
different from zero in the assessment following the successful training phase. These 
results are in line with those of Le Pelley et al. (2013), who found that the 
predictiveness of a stimulus generated in a previous task was quickly extinguished 
and did not yield significant differences in a subsequent dot-probe assessment task. 
As such, the current results clearly suggest that the post-training assessment of 
attention bias is unlikely to precisely represent the pattern of bias acquired during the 
training phase, because the assessment phase will change the pattern of bias.  
The Effects of Including Emotional Stimuli into the Template 
Experiments 4 and 5 discussed in Chapter 3 were designed to replicate the 
first 3 experiments with the inclusion of emotional stimuli. Emotional stimuli 
increase the probability of automatically capturing selective attention in the dot-
probe task compared to non-emotional stimuli. In contrast to the previously used 
non-emotional stimuli, it was hypothesised that attention was likely to be biased at 
baseline to stimuli with emotional content. There are several individual difference 
variables that play a role in the existence and magnitude of pre-existing attention bias 
to emotional stimuli. First, the likelihood of finding an attention bias increases in 
samples that have elevated levels of anxiety vulnerability compared to those with 
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lower levels of anxiety vulnerability (MacLeod et al., 2019). Previous studies have 
consistently reported that individuals high in state and trait anxiety (e.g., Leleu, 
Douilliez, & Rusinek, 2014; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mansell, Ehlers, Clark, & 
Chen, 2002; Mogg et al., 1994; Penf, Yang, & Luo, 2013) and social anxiety (e.g., 
Mansell et al., 2002; Pishyar et al., 2004; Wabnitz et al., 2016; Wong & Rapee, 2016) 
show heightened attention bias to emotional stimuli compared to those low in state, 
trait or social anxiety. Furthermore, the relevance (Pergamin-Hight et al., 2015) as 
well as the threat intensity of emotional stimuli (Koster et al., 2006) seems to 
influence the magnitude of the attention bias found. That is, negative attention bias in 
emotionally vulnerable individuals is enhanced when stimuli are disorder relevant 
and moderate in threat intensity. 
Experiments 4 and 5 replaced the non-emotional shapes with facial stimuli 
and controlled for individual differences in emotional vulnerability with anxiety 
measures (social anxiety in Experiment 4 and social, trait and state anxiety in 
Experiment 5). Emotional stimuli used were angry faces of middle-aged Caucasian 
males, which were compared to neutral faces of the same models. In Experiment 4, 
the stimulus-probe contingencies of the dot-probe task were manipulated in the same 
way as was done in the previous three experiments. That is, attention bias acquisition 
was assessed with a training phase that trained selective attention to one of the two 
facial expressions, followed by an assessment. Then, attention bias change was 
assessed with a second training phase that reversed the contingency to change 
attention bias to the second, previously incongruent stimulus, followed by an 
assessment. The pre-, post-, and within-training assessments were included to assess 
whether attention bias was changed from pre- to post-training, as well as whether the 
attention bias acquired in the training phase was transferred to the post-training 
assessment phase. Furthermore, the training direction was counterbalanced between 
participants, which resulted in participants who were first trained to attend to angry, 
then neutral faces (labelled as AN) or the reversed (labelled NA). In experiment 5, 
the ABM paradigm was simplified by omitting the reversed training phase and its 
post-training assessment. There were two training directions, participants were 
trained to selectively attend to angry faces (labelled as ‘attend-angry’ condition) or to 
selectively attend to neutral faces (labelled ‘attend-neutral’ condition). In both 
experiments, the results of participants in the two training conditions were compared 
to a control group in which participants completed the same number of trials as the 
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congruency throughout the whole procedure.  
No Pre-Existing Attention Bias to Emotional stimuli at Baseline 
As reviewed in the beginning of the Introduction chapter, attention and 
emotion theories state that selective attention is biased towards emotional stimuli. An 
attention bias towards negative facial information is systematically found in 
individuals high in social anxiety (Duque & Vázquez, 2015). However, in both 
experiments that used emotional stimuli, the dot-probe task did not provide evidence 
for a pre-existing attention bias to angry faces compared to neutral faces in the total 
sample or in those high in social anxiety. A possibility is that there is no preferential 
attending to one or the other stimulus in our sample, because participants are 
effectively dividing their attention across both stimuli. Eye-tracking data has 
provided evidence for heightened vigilance for emotional faces in those with 
affective disorders (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Given that our sample was not 
pre-selected on high vs low levels of social anxiety, it is possible that the dot-probe 
task was not able to detect an association with preferential attentional processing of 
angry vs neutral faces. Furthermore, attention bias tends to be demonstrated in 
between-group comparisons rather than correlations (Bantin et al., 2016).  
An alternative is that the processing of stimuli with emotional content is not 
entirely automatic and the faces presented in the dot-probe task may be suppressed. 
Pessoa, Kastner, and Ungerleider (2002) showed with amygdala responses to 
negative facial stimuli that these stimuli were not automatically processed, but 
required volitional attention. The amygdala has shown to be critical in emotional 
processing (e.g., Anderson & Phelps, 2001). Pessoa et al. (2002) measured fMRI 
responses evoked by pictures of faces with fearful, happy, or neutral expressions 
combined with different oriented bars in the top left and right corner. In alternating 
blocks, participants were either instructed to attend to these faces and categorise 
them on sex (‘attended’ trials) or attend to the bars and decide whether the two bars 
where oriented in the same or different orientation (‘unattended’ trials). Pessoa et al. 
(2002) found higher activation of the amygdala in the ‘attend-negative’ relative to 
‘attend-neutral’ facial stimulus conditions. They found no increased amygdala 
activation to the non-attended negative relative to neutral facial stimuli. In addition, 
Gaspelin and Luck (2018) found that individuals may be suppressing the salient 
stimuli like faces if they are not task relevant. Given that the faces in the dot-probe 
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task are not task relevant, the lack of attention bias at baseline in experiments 4 and 5 
may be due to the lack of attention paid to the face stimuli. Participants may not have 
attended to the stimuli, even suppressed them, and as a result, the RTs were not 
influenced by the stimuli when participants needed to decide whether the probe was 
horizontally or vertically presented.  
Attention Bias Acquisition and Change in Training was not Established 
In experiments 4 and 5, participants did not acquire an attention bias to 
neutral or angry faces when they received a 95% stimulus-probe contingency 
towards the neutral or angry face in the training phase, respectively. It seems that 
continuously associating the probe with a certain stimulus category is not enough to 
change selective attention to emotional or neutral stimuli. Given that this did not 
replicate the findings in the first three experiments, which used non-emotional 
stimuli, it is possible that the inclusion of emotional stimuli limited contingency 
learning, and subsequently attention bias acquisition. Given that emotional stimuli 
are more complex to process compared to black and white circles and triangles, it is 
possible that the complexity of the stimuli decreased contingency learning. The 
complexity of the stimuli may have led participants to ignore them, as it is possible 
to complete the dot-probe task without paying attention to the stimuli. Merely 
increasing the probe exposure duration by 200ms and omitting the second training 
and assessment phase, as done in Experiment 5, did not lead to the acquisition of 
attention bias. This suggests that decreasing the overall difficulty level of the task 
and procedure did not aid the acquisition of attention bias. It seems that other factors 
besides emotion or complexity of the stimuli interfere with the establishment of 
stimulus-probe associations that lead to attention bias acquisition and change. 
 It is likely that the explanation for the lack of attention bias to emotional 
stimuli at baseline can also explain the lack of training. Explicitly, the stimuli and, 
with them, the emotional valence were not automatically processed as participants 
may not have paid attention to the stimuli to detect the probe in training. Pessoa et al. 
(2002) reported that if attentional resources are depleted, face stimuli, emotional or 
not, will not be processed. This explanation is in line with self-reports of participants 
who completed experiments 4 and 5. Participants reported that they found the task 
very difficult to complete and were not aware of the role the stimulus played in the 
task. Overall, the results of the two experiments that included emotional stimuli 
indicated that attention bias was not evident in emotional compared to neutral stimuli 
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in the dot-probe task. It is possible that this finding was evident because some 
participants ignored all stimuli and only paid attention to the probes to complete the 
task. 
Participants’ failure to attend to the stimuli in the dot-probe task may explain 
why the dot-probe did not detect any pre-existing bias or change attention bias. 
Without attention paid to the stimuli that predicts the probe, participant’s RTs are not 
influenced by biased attention at baseline or during training. Studies on the role of 
attention in stimulus-probe associative learning suggest that the association between 
a stimulus and an outcome is not established if they were paired in the presence of a 
second stimulus that has previously been associated with that outcome (Luque, 
Vadillo, Gutiérrez-Cobo, & Le Pelley, 2016). This effect has been labelled ‘blocking’ 
and was first documented by Kamin (1969). According to attentional models of 
associative learning, blocking reflects a decrease in attention paid to the blocked 
stimulus, resulting in the lack of contingency learning (Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla 
& Wagner, 1972). Given that the dot-probe task presents two stimuli simultaneously 
of which a participant needs to learn the association with one stimulus and the probe, 
while the other stimulus was previously paired with the probe, it is possible that 
blocking occurs and hinders contingency learning.  
The Effect of Individual Differences in Contingency Awareness on Contingency 
Learning 
Contingency awareness has shown to be a factor that is a requisite for 
contingency learning (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002) and was assessed in all five 
experiments of Study 1. In each experiment that used non-emotional stimuli, 
approximately one-third to half of the participants reported some awareness of a 
stimulus-probe association. The awareness data of these three experiments were 
combined into one analysis. This was done to ensure that the analysis was powerful 
enough to establish whether those classified as aware compared to those not aware 
would show different attention bias patterns during the assessment and training 
phases. The analysis showed that the attention bias acquired in the second training 
phase interacted with contingency awareness. Those reporting awareness of a 
stimulus-probe association showed quicker responding to the probe that followed the 
predictive stimulus, which indicated greater training of selective attention. No 
attention bias change in line with the contingency was evident in participants not 
aware of the stimulus probe contingency. The interaction between contingency 
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awareness and attention bias acquisition supports the strong single-process model of 
learning (Brewer, 1974). This model proposes that contingency awareness is a 
necessary step in contingency learning. 
The inclusion of emotion in the design initially resulted in very few 
participants who reported awareness of the stimulus-probe contingency in 
Experiment 4 (<10%). After reducing the difficulty level of the dot-probe task, by 
increasing the probe duration by 200ms, and eliminating the reversed training and 
assessment phase, more participants reported awareness in Experiment 5 (40%). This 
suggests that contingency awareness may be dependent on the difficulty level of the 
dot-probe task. Nevertheless, in contrast to the previous three experiments that used 
non-emotional stimuli, the interaction between contingency awareness and attention 
bias acquisition was not replicated with emotional stimuli. It is likely that the 
awareness analysis was underpowered. Another explanation is that participants may 
have ignored the stimuli and only paid attention to the probes to perform the dot-
probe task in experiments 4 and 5. This is supported by several researchers who have 
studied stimulus-probe associative learning in the dot-probe task with stimuli 
putatively below the threshold of conscious recognition. These studies showed that 
attention bias assessment and training is unlikely with the dot-probe task when the 
stimulus was presented below perceptual threshold (<170ms) (Bantin et al., 2016; 
MacLeod et al., 2002), indicating that the conscious perception of stimuli is 
necessary for contingency learning to occur.  
Similar to our study, the first experiment reported in Grafton et al. (2014) 
measured awareness with self-report. They found that 21.9% of participants were 
able to freely recall the contingency and 37.5% after they were given multiple 
options to choose from. Grafton et al. (2014) found that the contingency training 
resulted in attention bias change in the trained direction. Although, the small number 
of participants acquiring awareness in the first experiment of Grafton et al. (2014) 
meant that the analysis was underpowered, this training effect was marginally greater 
in those aware when compared to those not aware. Furthermore, the change in 
attention bias did not result in differential emotional reactivity in those aware vs not 
aware after a stressor task. However, this effect was evident in the total sample. The 
second experiment of Grafton et al. (2014) as well as another recent study conducted 
by Lazarov et al. (2017) manipulated awareness instead of measuring it. These 
experiments compared participants who received explicit instructions about the 
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stimulus-probe associations to participants who did not receive these instructions. 
Consistently, it has been found that ABM with explicit instructions lead to greater 
initial learning during training. However, for those who are explicitly aware of the 
contingency, the change in attention bias did not result in a reduction in emotional 
reactivity to the subsequent stressor (Grafton et al., 2014; Lazarov et al., 2017).  
Overall, our findings suggest that contingency awareness may be necessary 
for contingency learning or that contingency learning is more likely for those that 
show evidence of contingency awareness. The association between contingency 
awareness and attention bias acquisition supports a strong single-process model of 
learning (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). The possibility that attention bias training is 
not based on intuitive and automatic responses, as has previously been suggested 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 2005; Eysenck et al., 2007; 
Koster et al., 2009; Williams et al., 1988). Higher cognitive processes, like 
contingency awareness seem to be important as well, which is recognised by many 
other models (Beck & Clark, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). Solely relying on concepts of automaticity is insufficient to explain attention 
bias training in most situations. A comprehensive theory of attention bias and 
attention bias change calls for an understanding of the interaction of cognitive with 
automatic processes. 
The Effect of Individual Differences in Attention Control on Attention Bias 
Modification 
Attention bias was not acquired as a result of exposure to a stimulus-probe 
association and levels of anxiety neither explained any variance in attention bias or 
attention bias trainability. Therefore, other possible moderators of attention bias 
acquisition were assessed in Experiment 5. These were attentional control of 
selectivity and attentional control of inhibition. The attention control task of 
Basanovic et al. (2017) was employed after ABM and a significant association 
between attention control of inhibition and attention bias measured within the 
training phase was found. Those with higher control of inhibition showed an 
attention bias towards the congruent stimuli in training. It seems that attention 
control of inhibition and not selectivity is an important predictor of attention bias 
acquisition. This is partially in line with previous research (Basanovic et al., 2017; 
Everaert et al., 2017). Basanovic et al. (2017) used an identical attentional control 
assessment task and found a significant association between attentional control of 
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inhibition and attention bias change. Unlike the findings in Experiment 5, Basanovic 
et al. (2017) also found a marginally significant association between attentional 
control of selectivity and attention bias change. Everaert et al. (2017) measured 
cognitive control of inhibition, shifting and updating. They found that inhibitory 
control was associated with attention bias change. This suggests that attentional 
control of inhibition has more influence on attention bias malleability as opposed to 
attentional control of selectivity.  
The Reliability of the Dot-Probe Task 
The reliability of the dot-probe task has been discussed as a problem of the 
ABM paradigm. Recently, MacLeod et al. (2019) stated that there are two aspects to 
the reliability problem. First, studies have treated the reliability problem as if 
individuals may not show stable patterns of attentional responding to threat (e.g., 
Zvielli et al., 2015). Second, existing attentional bias assessment tasks may not 
satisfy the psychometric requirements that an assessment instrument must fulfil to 
adequately classify individuals (McNally, 2018; Rodebaugh et al., 2016). The mean-
split half and Spearman-Brown reliability of the dot-probe assessment task was 
assessed in each condition and assessment phase in which a 50% contingency was 
employed in all five experiments of the first study. The congruent vs the incongruent 
trials were compared randomly over 5000 iterations. The findings can address both 
aspects of the reliability problem, which will be outlined below.  
 Overall, the split-half and the Spearman-Brown reliability scores were 
statistically not different from zero or unacceptably poor (between 0.24 and 0.53) in 
all assessment phases across the five experiments. According to the first aspect of the 
reliability problem, attention bias may not be a stable construct. This was also 
evident in the results of Study 1 as some training phases were successful in inducing 
an attention bias, while the assessment phases after these training phases were not 
able to capture the bias acquired in training. This suggest that attention bias is not 
stable and dependent on contingencies employed by the dot-probe task. According to 
the second aspect of the reliability problem, the dot-probe assessment task needs to 
adequately classify individuals into either having or not having an attention bias. The 
findings of the five experiments indicated the inefficacy of the dot-probe assessment 
task. The assessment phases across the experiments were not able to detect an 
attention bias towards the congruent or emotional stimuli compared to the 
incongruent or neutral stimuli, either in everyone or in those high in anxiety versus 
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those low in anxiety. This suggests that the dot-probe assessment task used in Study 
1 was not adequate in reliably assessing the existence or the lack of, attention bias to 
non-emotional stimuli in Study 1 – Experiments 1 to 3 or to emotional stimuli in 
Study 1 – Experiments 4 and 5. 
Kruijt and Carlbring (2018) proposed that future studies should focus on the 
question of whether the dot-probe task can reliably modify bias for individuals with a 
consistent and high pre-existent bias. However, it is first necessary to establish how 
the dot-probe task can reliably assess a consistent and high pre-existing bias. 
Therefore, other methods of measuring a reliable attention bias need to be 
considered, as successfully done by MacLeod and Grafton (2017) with their double 
probes in the dot-probe task. Furthermore, according to MacLeod et al. (2019) 
further research is also recommended to assess whether compound scores of multiple 
existing assessments of different attention bias measures (i.e., EEG and dot-probe 
task) or multiple assessments of the dot-probe assessment task may increase the 
reliability of the attention bias assessment.  
Limitations of Study One and Recommendations for Future Research 
Lack of Attention Paid to the Stimulus 
The main concern of Study 1 involves the participants’ lack of attention 
towards the stimuli, either automatic (driven by the emotional content) or volitional 
(driven by the stimulus-probe association in training). It seems that most participants 
only attended to the probe and ignored the stimuli that preceded the probe. This is 
problematic since the dot-probe task measures attention bias through assessing the 
differential responding to probes that were presented in the same location as an 
emotional versus a neutral or a congruent versus an incongruent stimulus. Attention 
bias cannot be assessed with the dot-probe task when the participant ignores the 
stimuli presented before the probe. Future research could address this concern by 
making the stimulus-probe association task relevant. For instance, the dot-probe task 
could be modified such that participants need to remember a certain aspect of the 
stimuli to provide a response to the probe. Participants would then need to respond 
whether the task relevant aspect was evident in the stimulus presented in the same 
location as the probe. This would ensure that participants pay attention to the probe.  
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Lack of Transfer between Training and Assessment Phases 
Attention bias change was only found in the within-training assessment in 
one of the two training phases and not in the post-assessment phase. The use of the 
95% contingency within the training phase allowed us to assess evidence of attention 
bias acquisition and change, while participants were receiving active attentional 
training. Previous studies unsuccessful in ABM, which used 100% contingencies in 
the ABM training (e.g., Naim, Kivity, Bar-Haim, & Huppert, 2018), cannot establish 
whether the lack of a bias change is due to unsuccessful training or due to 
unsuccessful transfer of the attention bias to the post-training assessment. Further 
studies ought to include a within-training assessment to disentangle these two 
possible reasons for failure related to attention bias change. Furthermore, it may be 
appropriate for future ABM studies to include assessment within the ABM training 
contingencies to permit assessment of attention bias, and reduce the likelihood of 
subsequent bias extinction. The assessment within-training seems to be more 
sensitive in measuring an attention bias as opposed to a post-training assessment. In 
turn, the reliability of attention bias assessment and training may increase.  
It may be advisable to develop different post-assessment procedures where, 
for instance, subtle changes to the contingencies are introduced, rather than an abrupt 
change. According to the exploration-exploitation decision making hypothesis (Daw 
et al., 2006; Laureiro-Martínez et al., 2015), when the contingency radically changes, 
the context will also change radically from training to assessment phase. Participants 
who were using the contingency to enhance their task performance may then 
relinquish that strategy in favour of another to maximise performance on the task. 
Instead, if the context gradually changes by incrementally altering the contingency, 
participants may be less likely to alter the strategy used in the training phase. 
Consequently, a more gradual shift in contingency may be less likely to disrupt an 
acquired pattern of bias, and, therefore, an attention bias can also be evident in the 
post-training assessment phase. Future research could investigate how attention bias 
change can be assessed without the influence of a discrete assessment phase on the 
attention bias patterns acquired during training. In addition to changing the 
contingency more subtly, attention bias can possibly be measured in a more direct 
way, overcoming the need for any change in contingencies. For instance, a free 
viewing task could be employed that measures eye-gaze as suggested by Armstrong 
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and Olatunji (2012). It is important to investigate other ways of attention bias 
assessment that do not include an abrupt stimulus-probe contingency change. The 
findings of Study 1 revealed that a change from predictive to a non-predictive 
contingency resulted in attention bias extinction. The methods suggested above may 
eliminate the possibility of attention bias extinction and, thus, increase the reliability 
of attention bias assessment. 
Limited Assessment of Contingency Awareness  
A limitation of the experimental design was that awareness of the stimulus-
probe associations employed in the dot-probe task was assessed with a self-report at 
the end of the experiment. In accordance with the recommendations of Lovibond and 
Shanks (2002) the measure of awareness was relevant, sensitive, and not reactive. 
That is, the measure was relevant as it asked about the stimulus-probe contingencies 
directly related to the stimulus-probe associations in the dot-probe task. The measure 
was sensitive because it included a free recall as well as a recognition test to assess 
awareness. Lastly, the measure was not reactive because awareness was assessed 
after the dot-probe task, thus, the assessment did not influence further responding by 
directing attention to the stimulus-probe association. Nevertheless, the 
recommendation of immediacy was not met since the awareness was assessed at the 
end of the experiment, after multiple stimulus-probe contingency changes. This has 
its limitations, such that participants may have had difficulties with remembering or 
reporting the contingencies. Nonetheless, these difficulties were taken into account 
by not classifying participants according to the correctly reported contingencies. 
Participants were categorised as aware when they reported (on multiple-choice 
items) that any contingency was present, regardless of whether it was the correct 
contingency, while participants were categorised as not aware when they reported no 
awareness of any contingencies having been present. Furthermore, at the time of the 
study’s design, immediacy was chosen to be sacrificed (i.e., awareness was assessed 
post-ABM), since the recommendation of reactivity (i.e., awareness assessment 
influencing ABM) was found to be more important.  
Previous research has measured contingency by manipulating contingency 
awareness via explicitly telling participants about the contingency (Grafton et al., 
2014; Lazarov et al., 2017). This method may be limited as well, as it is possible that 
participants who were not told about the contingency, but who acquired awareness 
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confounded the between-group effect by themselves. While Grafton et al. (2014) 
assessed contingency awareness with a self-report at the end of the procedure; the 
authors only disclosed that 73% of those in the explicit ABM also reported to be 
aware of the contingency. The authors did not state the proportion of participants 
who reported to be aware in the non-explicit ABM condition. Moreover, in their first 
experiment, the proportion of participants who became aware of the contingency 
without instructions was 21.9%. This proportion is similar to that in Study 1, which 
showed that at least one-third to half of all participants acquired awareness without 
explicitly being told about the stimulus-probe contingency. It is suggested that 
studies that compare different instruction types should control for the possibility that 
participants can acquire contingency awareness without the explicit instruction.  
Contingency awareness should be measured with an immediate measure that 
does not influence the responding in the dot-probe task. Recently, Arad et al. (2018) 
measured contingency awareness with EEG and used the mismatch negativity ERP 
as an indicator of contingency awareness. Mismatch negativity has been associated 
with violations of statistical contingencies (Arad et al., 2018). Participants in their 
experiment completed a dot-probe training task with an 80% congruency. They found 
that the visual mismatch negativity ERP was a clear indication of contingency 
awareness during ABM. Furthermore, the amplitude of the mismatched negativity 
ERP predicted improvement in clinically assessed and self-reported social anxiety 
symptoms after ABM. This is a promising method of measuring contingency 
awareness without interfering with the ABM training. Furthermore, this method 
seems to be sensitive and relevant, therefore, adhering to all the recommendations 
made by Lovibond and Shanks (2002). Another way to assess contingency awareness 
while completing ABM may be by using online expectancy rating trials. For 
instance, test trials can be provided intermittently during the dot-probe training task 
where, for instance, question marks will appear instead of a probe. The participants 
are then required to predict the location in which the next probe will appear. An 
additional advantage of these immediate measures lies in the ability to assess time-
related contingency awareness effects, in other words, the degree to which the 
contingency is acquired over time. This provides additional information clarifying 
whether contingency awareness precedes or succeeds contingency learning.  
As stated before, approximately one-third to half of all participants 
consistently acquired awareness. Individual differences shown to be important in 
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other contingency learning tasks include low arousal and greater cognitive 
processing, like better working memory (Cosand et al., 2008) or greater attentional 
focus (Hur, Iordan, Berenbaum, & Dolcos, 2016). It may be that those concepts are 
related to the ability to acquire awareness of contingencies in the dot-probe task. 
Support for individual differences in acquiring awareness was provided in Chapter 4. 
There were significant differences in state and trait anxiety between those aware and 
not aware of the contingency. It seems that individuals low in state and trait anxiety 
were more likely to become aware of the stimulus-probe contingency than those with 
higher levels of anxiety. This suggests that high levels of anxiety possibly interfere 
with acquiring contingency awareness. However, this difference was not associated 
with different attention bias patterns at baseline or in any subsequent phases. 
Furthermore, the acquisition of contingency awareness was related to attentional 
control of selectivity (not to attentional control of inhibition). The results showed that 
those aware of the stimulus-probe contingency had a marginally higher cost of 
attentional selectivity than those who reported not to be aware of the contingency. 
This suggests, contrary to the hypothesis, that lower attentional control is associated 
with acquiring contingency awareness. However, given that this effect was only 
marginally significant, it has to be interpreted with caution. Therefore, another 
recommendation for future research is to investigate why some individuals acquire 
awareness without explicitly being told, while others do not. It is recommended that 
further research investigates other individual differences in acquiring awareness of 
the contingency as these may explain why some individuals become aware of the 
stimulus-probe associations used in the dot-probe task, while others do not. 
Especially, because the change in selective attention can lead to a change in 
psychopathology and the results of the first three experiments in Study 1 showed that 
selective attention was only changed in individuals aware of the contingency.  
Limited Evidence to Establish the Role of Attention Control in Attention 
Bias Modification 
The results of Experiment 5 indicated that attention control of inhibition was 
strongly and positively associated with attention bias acquisition in ABM training to 
neutral stimuli, away from threat. In contrast to the current findings, previous studies 
found that attentional control was associated with attention bias change measured 
from pre- to post-training, irrespective of the training direction (Basanovic et al., 
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2017; Everaert et al., 2017). The findings of Experiment 5 showed that attentional 
inhibitory control was only associated within the attention training away from 
emotional stimuli. The difference between the design of Experiment 5 and previous 
research is related to the procedure where attention control was measured post-ABM, 
instead of pre-ABM. This difference in design may explain why the training 
direction was relevant for the association between attention control of inhibition and 
attention bias change in Experiment 5. As attention control was measured after ABM, 
it is possible that the ABM training changed attention control of inhibition, compared 
to attention control being measured pre-ABM. This is particularly true for 
participants in the ‘attend-neutral’ condition, as they are trained to attend to neutral 
stimuli and have to inhibit the more salient emotional stimuli. Chen et al. (2015) 
tested whether ABM increases attentional control assessed with an anti-saccade task 
using an eye-tracker. They found that attention control of inhibition increased from 
pre- to post-ABM compared to placebo training. Participants in the ABM condition 
received a 100% congruency training to attend to neutral stimuli. This finding 
supports the idea that the association between attentional control of inhibition and 
attention bias acquisition in the ‘attend-neutral’ training condition, found in 
Experiment 5, may be causal. That is, the ‘attend-neutral’ training direction in ABM 
increases attentional control of inhibition. It would be interesting for further research 
to test this causal hypothesis by testing attentional control of inhibition pre- and post-
ABM (including both training directions) versus placebo training. This may be done 
either with the ACA task used in Experiment 5 of the current research project or with 
the anti-saccade task employed by Chen et al. (2015) using the eye-tracker. Such an 
experiment will establish whether attention control is an individual trait or state, and 
whether the direction of the ABM training influences change in attentional control. 
Review of Research Findings in Study Two: Attentional Processes Responsible 
for Attention Bias Change 
The second study investigated how attention bias change influences 
attentional engagement and disengagement processes when employing different 
training procedures in the ABM paradigm. In particular, the existence of an 
attentional engagement and disengagement bias were assessed pre- and post-ABM 
training with the attentional process assessment (APA) task (Grafton & MacLeod, 
2014; Rudaizky et al., 2014). One experiment was conducted wherein the 
conventional dot-probe training task was compared to a new gamified ABM training 
INVESTIGATION INTO ATTENTION BIAS MODIFICATION 149 
task (the emotion-in-motion task). This was done to explore several non-mutually 
exclusive hypotheses, which examined whether the two different ABM training tasks 
would change one or both of the attentional processes thought to affect performance 
in the original dot-probe task, in addition to ascertaining whether the two different 
training tasks changed the same or different processes.  
The findings supported the first hypothesis: changes in biased attentional 
disengagement were responsible for ABM induced changes in attentional bias. The 
results indicated a main effect for attention bias type, such that all participants 
showed an overall disengagement bias. Moreover, this effect interacted with the 
measurement time (pre- to post-ABM), however, not with training direction (‘attend-
neutral or ‘attend-angry’) or condition (dot-probe task vs emotion-in-motion task). 
Furthermore, the data did not support the second or third hypotheses, which stated 
that changes in biased attentional engagement alone (H2) or that both processes (H3) 
were responsible for ABM induced changes in attentional bias. There was no 
evidence to support the existence of an engagement bias with angry faces at baseline 
or after training.  
Single versus Dual Attention Bias Account in Attention Bias  
In the general introduction it was discussed whether a single or a dual account 
could best explain attention bias towards threat. The single biased attentional process 
account holds that only the attentional engagement or only the attentional 
disengagement process is responsible for attention bias to threat in individuals with 
high levels of anxiety. Some researchers found that only the attentional engagement 
to threat process was enhanced in those with an attention bias to threat (Koster, 
Crombez, Van Damme, et al., 2004; Koster et al., 2006; Salemink et al., 2007), 
supporting a single biased attentional engagement account. Whereas other 
researchers found that only the attentional disengagement from threat process was 
impaired in high anxious individuals (Fox et al., 2002; Yiend & Mathews, 2001), 
supporting a single biased attentional disengagement account. The dual biased 
attentional process account was proposed by Rudaizky et al. (2014) and Grafton and 
MacLeod (2014) who tested the APA task and found that both the attentional 
processes of engagement and disengagement to threat were independently biased in 
those high in anxiety.  
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Study 2 tested the attentional processes with the APA task, which adheres to 
the three criteria of Clarke et al. (2013). These criteria significantly improve the 
ability of the assessment task to disentangle engagement and disengagement 
processes compared to the previously used assessment tasks. However, in contrast to 
Grafton and MacLeod (2014) and Rudaizky et al. (2014), the results of Study 2 did 
not find strong support for the dual biased process account. Overall, only the 
disengagement process was found to be biased in all participants, supporting a single 
biased attentional disengagement account. Nevertheless, there was a marginally 
trending 4-way interaction, which revealed that those trained to attend to neutral 
faces in the dot-probe task changed from enhanced engagement with neutral faces at 
baseline to no engagement bias post-training. Conversely, participants who 
completed an attention training to angry faces with the dot-probe task changed from 
no disengagement bias at baseline to an enhanced disengagement bias from angry 
faces post-training. These attention bias changes were indexed by a marginally 
trending interaction and are likely to represent a random effect (i.e., regression to the 
mean) as only one of the two pair-wise comparisons was in the same direction as the 
training provided. Moreover, the engagement bias found with neutral faces at 
baseline in one condition of the dot-probe task was unexpected given that attention 
and emotion theories, described in Chapter 1, theorise that emotional stimuli capture 
attention more rapidly than neutral stimuli.  
Attention Bias Change with the Dot-Probe Task and Emotion-in-Motion Task 
The fourth hypothesis, which explored whether the dot-probe task and the 
emotion-in-motion task induced the same or different change in biased attentional 
processes, was supported. There was a significant interaction between time of 
measurement and ABM training task, which showed that those trained with the dot-
probe task achieved a significant bias change from pre- to post-training, whereas 
those trained with the emotion-in-motion task did not. This is in contrast to the 
findings of Notebaert et al. (2018), who found that the emotion-in-motion task was 
successful in acquiring an attention bias change. The bias change scores observed in 
their study indicated a small 2.7% improved in the tracking of happy faces compared 
to angry faces pre- to post- ‘attend happy’ training. Since the significant effect in 
Notebaert et al. (2018) was found in the ‘attend-happy’ training condition, our non-
significant results may have been caused by the use of different training directions 
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(‘attend-neutral’ and ‘attend-angry’). Furthermore, in Notebaert et al. (2018), the 
significant bias change was assessed with an assessment version of the emotion-in-
motion task. The non-significant findings observed in our experiment may be due to 
the lack of far transfer to a different assessment task.   
An alternative possibility is that the game elements in the emotion-in-motion 
task may have distracted attention away from the learning that underlies successful 
attention bias change as suggested by Forman et al. (2018). The continuously moving 
and changing faces in the emotion-in-motion task may have disrupted participants’ 
acquisition of attention bias. The previous experiments in Study 1 showed that 
attention bias change was not easily accomplished. This implies that training of 
selective attention is not as straight forwards as initially thought. It seems that merely 
directing selective attention continuously to certain stimuli may not lead to an 
attention bias change. Multiple factors seem to influence stimulus-probe associative 
learning. Given that these difficulties in learning were evident in a controlled 
experiment, with non-emotional stimuli, the additional gamification elements may 
bring in even more additional factors that can interfere with learning. It is 
encouraged that future research first investigates how to achieve a reliable attention 
bias change, before altering the training task to achieve a potentially not outcome 
related effect such as making it more enjoyable to complete.  
The results showed that the attention bias change pre-to post-ABM with the 
dot-probe task was only evident in the attentional disengagement bias scores. 
Furthermore, they revealed that the dot-probe training task trained participants to 
remain focused on the angry faces, irrespective of the direction of training. It is a 
challenge to explain why two differently directed stimulus-probe contingencies that 
are assumed to underlie learning of attention bias would result in an attention bias in 
the same direction. It is possible that not only bottom-up contingency learning, but 
also other higher-order processes underlie attention bias change as well. These 
processes include attention control and contingency awareness.  
Limitations of Study Two and Recommendations for Future Research 
The current study altered the APA tasks from an IAPS into a face version and 
the training direction in the emotion-in-motion task from ‘attend-happy’ to ‘attend-
neutral’. These changes in stimuli and training conditions could have influenced the 
results. Therefore, further studies are encouraged to replicate this experiment using 
stimuli from the IAPS database and assess attentional engagement and 
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disengagement bias pre- and post-different ABM training tasks and conditions 
(attend-happy, -neutral and -angry or -disgust). Furthermore, the attentional 
disengagement bias changed pre- to post-ABM training with the dot-probe task, 
however, for participants in both training directions. This suggests that higher order 
processes may play a role in the change of disengagement biases. Given that 
Experiment 5 in Study 1 showed that attentional control of inhibition might be 
changed through ABM, it would be interesting to investigate whether this change is 
mitigated by the change in attentional disengagement bias. In particular because 
inhibiting and disengaging from stimuli seems to be related (Taylor et al., 2016). 
Therefore, future research is encouraged to assess attention control and attention 
processes pre- and post-ABM and analyse whether a change in attention control is 
associated with a change in attentional disengagement biased process.   
The limitations of Study 2 include the existence of a pre-group difference in 
attentional engagement and disengagement. The results showed that participants in 
the ‘attend-neutral’ condition were the only ones who had an engagement bias 
towards neutral faces and a disengagement bias with angry faces at baseline. 
Participants in the other conditions revealed no attentional bias at baseline. Hence, it 
is recommended that this study is replicated in a sample that has equivalent processes 
of attention bias at start. This may be achieved by pre-selecting participants with 
equal levels of anxiety, as it is more likely that a homogenous sample will show 
similar processes of attention bias.  
Theoretical Implications 
The two studies presented in this research project showed that the direction of 
selective attention towards a certain stimulus category by providing a predictive 
stimulus-probe association does not automatically result in attention bias acquisition 
or change. This implies that attention bias training is unlikely to only be based on 
intuitive and automatic responses as previously suggested (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Beck et al., 2005; Eysenck et al., 2007; Koster et al., 2009; Williams et al., 1988). 
Higher cognitive processes, like contingency awareness and attention control, seem 
to be important as well, as is recognised by many other models (Beck & Clark, 1997; 
Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998).  
The importance of top-down processes, like awareness and attentional 
control, have been evidenced in studies that investigated attention in patients with 
lesions in the right cerebral hemisphere, which results in visuospatial neglect. In this 
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condition, visual sensation (i.e., bottom-up processing) is intact, however, patients 
fail to detect or become aware of stimuli in the side of space opposite of the lesion 
(Mesulam, 1981; Rafal, Ward, & Danziger, 2006). Other studies have shown that 
lesions in other parts of the brain, including the parietal lobe, frontal lobe, anterior 
cingulate cortex, basal ganglia, and the thalamus also resulted in visuospatial neglect 
(see for review: Pessoa et al., 2002). This evidence has led to the notion that stimuli 
from the environment are processed top-down through a distributed network and not 
only through visual bottom-up processes. Therefore, solely providing bottom-up 
stimulus-probe associations may not be sufficient to modify attention bias. Other top-
down approaches need to be considered as well, such as increasing the acquisition of 
contingency awareness. Before we consider theory building, research that 
investigates new ways of modifying attention bias are needed. Especially studies that 
test the efficacy of ABM using top-down and bottom-up approaches. 
A modified ABM training task that enhances top-down learning of a stimulus-
probe contingency could include specific learning trials presented among the 
traditional dot-probe trials that resemble a classical fear conditioning paradigm (Luck 
& Lipp, 2016). In such learning trials, neutral stimuli (i.e., neutral faces) could be 
paired with a positive stimulus (i.e., pleasant picture or sound) and negative stimuli 
(i.e., angry faces) could be presented alone. By doing this, participants may learn to 
attend to the safe stimuli and ignore or suppress the threat stimuli in subsequent trials 
where both stimuli are presented. The additional learning trials may facilitate top-
down attention to the stimuli that precede the probes, which in turn enhances 
learning of the stimulus-probe contingency. In addition, participants in classical 
conditioning paradigms are often aware of the pairings (Reiss, 1980). The awareness 
of such learning trials may transfer to the stimulus-probe parings of the dot-probe 
trials resulting in better training of selective attention. Future research is required to 
test whether augmentation of the attention bias modification paradigm with 
additional contingencies can create a new ABM task that would be more effective in 
changing attention bias and subsequently relieve psychopathology. 
This research project was the first to investigate the most basic stimulus-
probe associative mechanism responsible for attention bias assessment, change and 
acquisition with the dot-probe task. Additionally, it was the first to investigate how 
the processes of engagement and disengagement that underlie attention bias behave 
when different ABM training tasks are employed. The results of this research project 
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revealed that there seems to be a need to develop a theory or extend on existing 
theories to explain how attention bias can be changed. Existing theories of attention 
bias, described in Chapter 1, focus on how attention bias is acquired, not on how is it 
changed. The development of testable hypotheses which state how attention can be 
changed and what conditions are necessary to achieve this change would allow 
researchers to develop ABM training paradigms that are able to change attention bias 
more reliably. This research project contributed to the development of such a theory 
by showing that attention bias change is not easily replicated and is subject to several 
moderators. The difficulty of replicating attention bias change and the existence of 
possible hidden moderators is further supported by the mixed findings on this topic. 
The experiments in this research project found evidence of two individual differences 
that effect attention bias change, these were the levels of acquired contingency 
awareness and attentional control of inhibition. More research is required to replicate 
the findings in this thesis and future experiments are needed to build upon the 
recommendations made before existing theories can be extended or new theories 
developed.  
In sum, the experiments presented in this thesis showed that the exclusive use 
of a bottom-up approach to change attention bias, whereby stimuli are associated 
with probes, seems to be insufficient to induce attention bias change in most 
situations. Therefore, developing a more specific theory that includes different 
pathways to attention bias change and predicts attention bias change combining 
bottom-up as well as top-down approaches is particularly important. Especially, since 
emotion vulnerability related to psychopathology can be reduced when attention bias 
change is successfully induced. Thus, it seems to be requisite that a theory integrates 
automatic as well as controlled processes involved in successful attention bias 
change. A complete understanding of how attention bias is changed will further aid 
the development of clinical interventions that can successfully target emotional 
dysfunction in a range of emotional and non-emotional disorders. 
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